Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

2017

Character Luck and Moral Responsibility: The Character of the
Ordinary Person in Aristotle's Rhetoric and Politics
Marcella Linn
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Linn, Marcella, "Character Luck and Moral Responsibility: The Character of the Ordinary Person in
Aristotle's Rhetoric and Politics" (2017). Dissertations. 2594.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/2594

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 2017 Marcella Linn

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

CHARACTER LUCK AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY:
THE CHARACTER OF THE ORDINARY PERSON
IN ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC AND POLITICS

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY

BY
MARCELLA LINN
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
MAY 2017

Copyright by Marcella Linn, 2017
All rights reserved.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
So many have helped me in the preparation of this dissertation that I wonder how little I
have contributed myself. To start, I would like to thank my director, Dr. Thomas Carson whose
many, many comments aided enormously in refining my writing and developing the ideas in this
dissertation. From the start, he has been encouraging and supportive, reading draft after draft
after draft and guiding this project to its completion. My ability to think and write
philosophically continues to be refined under his guidance. I am very fortune to have worked
with him and to have thought through many of the ideas in this dissertation with him.
I would also like to express my gratitude for the significant role Dr. Julie Ward has
played in my development as a writer and thinker. My knowledge of Aristotle is indebted to her
teaching and her guidance as director of my master’s paper and reader of my dissertation. On
several occasions, she played a pivotal role in my interpretation and use of Aristotle, which
helped my project evolve in original and interesting ways. The time she has so generously
dedicated to me as her student is appreciated beyond measure. I am also so thankful for her
advising over the years, which has helped me throughout my progress as a graduate student.
I also thank Dr. J.D. Trout, who not only agreed to be a reader for this dissertation, but so
generously agreed to read an earlier draft of one of my chapters. His comments on that draft
helped me in each of my subsequent revisions by keeping me focused on some of the bigger
questions about using Aristotle in relation to contemporary issues. In addition to his help on my
dissertation, my work as his teaching and research assistant was crucial for my becoming

iii

familiar with the vast literature on cognitive biases. It was as his teaching assistant that I was first
introduced to the situationist position.
Many of the faculty at Loyola have advised me on various issues concerning coursework,
teaching, proposing and writing a dissertation, and preparing for the job market. I would like to
mention a few who have made a significant contribution in one way or another.
I thank Dr. Victoria Wike for all the meetings, conversations, and email exchanges that
helped me navigate the various intricacies of graduate student life.
I thank Dr. Kristen Irwin for her enthusiastic support. Even though I was not her student,
she advised me on several occasions on beginning a dissertation, preparing for the job market,
and preparing for my first on-campus interview.
I especially thank Dr. Jason Rheins who met with me when I was trying to figure out a
topic for my dissertation and advised me on other occasions as well. He generously offered his
time for a summer reading group on Aristotle with me and some other students. I also benefitted
from the work I did for him as his teaching assistant, which helped me develop a familiarity with
Ancient Greek philosophy. During this time, I was beginning work on my dissertation proposal
and benefited a great deal from the conversations I had with Dr. Rheins about Aristotle, moral
luck, and situationism.
I have also benefited from the numerous conversations I have had with my fellow
graduate students, be they during seminar, in the grad lounge, or over a post-seminar beer. I will
always cherish their friendship and conversation and the community that we formed throughout
our time at Loyola.

iv

I am thankful for the audience at the fall of 2016 History of Philosophy Roundtable
meeting. I relied heavily on the comments I received there when revising. I am especially
thankful for Robby Duncan and Dr. David Ozar’s comments and interest.
I want to say a big thank you to all the department assistants who helped me on numerous
occasions on matters small and large. Thank you: Holly, Bryn, Molly, Lauren, Lucas, and
Miguel.
I was also very lucky to have gotten the Pre-Doctoral Teaching Scholars Fellowship
(2015-2016) and the Arthur J. Schmitt Dissertation Fellowship (2016-2017). Without this
funding, I would not have been able to complete half the work I did over the last two years.
I would like to express a special thank you to Dr. Gregory Dobrov for teaching me Greek
and for being a wonderful and dedicated professor. Though his time on earth was too short, his
work will outlast all of us. I can hardly read a word of Greek without recalling one of his
animated lectures and without wishing I could hear just one more.
All the contributions from the faculty, staff, and graduate students at Loyola would have
been for nothing had I not had the support of my family. I’d like to thank my parents for an
upbringing that made all the difference. I especially must thank my sister, Maria, who has been a
second mother to my kids and a lifelong friend to me. I do not know that anyone has a sister as
selfless as she. For over a decade, she has arranged her work schedule semester after semester in
order to accommodate my childcare needs and continues to spend every day off helping me
juggle work and childcare. She also generously offered her time to format this dissertation – a
time consuming and frustrating process, especially given my struggles with technology. I cannot
thank her enough for what she has done for my family, and I would be lucky to have the
opportunity to return her generosity.
v

Lastly, I thank my husband, Joe, and our kids. Those kids have brought such joy and love
to my life and have motivated me beyond measure. Throughout every difficulty, Joe has been an
unending source of love and support. His kindness and thoughtfulness have sustained me each
time I have felt depleted. And, his conversation and wisdom have inspired me. My life is full
because of him, and every word I have written is for him.

vi

To Joe

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

iii

ABSTRACT

x

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1

CHAPTER TWO: LUCK, MORAL LUCK, AND CHARACTER LUCK
I. A General Account of Luck
II. Transition from a General Account of Luck to Moral Luck
III. Moral Luck and Character Luck
IV. Character Luck and Responsibility
1. Sher on Blame for Traits
2. Moody-Adams on Acting Out of Character
3. Trianosky on Active Temperaments
4. Card on Forward-Looking Responsibility for Character
V. The Need for an Account of Ordinary Character and Responsibility

14
15
23
36
44
48
50
53
57
58

CHAPTER THREE: CHARACTER, CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT, AND
RESPONSIBILITY IN ARISTOTLE’S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
I. Habituation in EN II.1-3
II. EN III.1-5’s Conditions for Responsibility
III. Conclusion

60
63
74
82

CHAPTER FOUR: GENETIC INHERITANCES AND NATURAL TEMPERAMENTS:
CHARACTER, CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT, AND RESPONSIBILITY IN
ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC
I. Responsibility in the EN and Ideal Candidates for Virtue
II. The Rhetoric on Temperament and Responsibility
1. Moral and Natural Development
2. Responsibility in the Rhetoric
III. Another Model of Responsibility
1. Natural Virtue and Habituated States
2. The Genus of the Temperaments of the Ordinary Citizen
3. Responsibility for a Temperament
IV. Conclusion

85
86
88
90
93
110
111
114
116
120

CHAPTER FIVE: SOCIAL INHERITANCES: CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT AND
MORAL UNDERSTANDING IN ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS AND RHETORIC
I. Ethics, Politics, and the Non-Ideal in Aristotle
II. Aristotle’s Account of Moral Awareness in the Politics
1. The Roles of Law and Family in Upbringing and Moral Awareness
2. Moral Education and Moral Awareness

122
123
127
127
133

viii

III. Character Development and Maintenance and One’s Circumstances
1. Rhetoric II.15-17 and Politics IV.11 on the Importance of Circumstances for
Development and Moral Awareness
IV. Responsibility and One’s Upbringing
V. Conclusion

138
139
148
152

CHAPTER SIX: ARISTOTLE AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE EMPIRICAL
ADEQUACY OF CHARACTER
I. The Studies and Their Interpretations
1. Key Concepts
2. Doris and Local Traits
3. Miller and Global Traits
4. Assessing Miller and Doris
II. Aristotle and Situationism
1. Aristotle on Actual Virtue
2. Aristotle on Ordinary Virtues
3. Fragmented Character and Behavioral Inconsistencies
III. Ordinary Character as a Temperament: An Example
IV. Further Implications for Moral Education
V. Conclusion

156
160
166
170
172
176
178
179
187
191
193
201
202

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

205

BIBLIOGRAPHY

213

ix

ABSTRACT
There are many significant factors, such as one’s natural temperaments and upbringing,
that are outside of one’s control and affect one’s character. This calls into question one’s
responsibility for one’s character, and if we are not responsible for our characters, then it seems
we cannot be held responsible for the many actions that stem from them. I will show how a
person can be responsible for her character and actions stemming from it despite the
pervasiveness of character luck. To do this, I develop an account of character and responsibility
from various passages in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Rhetoric, and Politics. The latter two
texts take into consideration the ordinary citizen who has not been met with good character luck,
and they teach us much concerning the way contingent factors like one’s natural temperament or
upbringing can affect one’s character and actions springing from it. I argue that we can construct
an account of responsibility from Aristotle’s empirically-grounded texts, the Rhetoric and
Politics, that is broader than the standard account taken from the Nicomachean Ethics since it
does not assume ideal conditions surrounding one’s character development and maintenance and
thus can apply to more people. This view of responsibility considers not only control and moral
awareness, but also one’s capacity to develop virtue and perform virtuous actions. This capacity
can be affected by one’s natural temperaments, upbringing, or circumstances that make it easier
or more difficult to develop virtue or perform virtuous actions. I finally will show how the
account of character of ordinary people in Aristotle is consistent with recent findings in

x

contemporary social psychology which is important for establishing that his moral theory passes
the minimal requirement for psychological realism.

xi

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Holding that people are morally responsible while acknowledging and respecting the
limited amount of control that humans exercise over their lives is difficult for two reasons. First,
in many cases, it seems intuitive that if luck impinges on a situation, an agent is not fully
responsible, if she is at all. That is, an agent’s either being praised, blamed, or held accountable
for something should be affected by the presence of luck. Nicholas Rescher claims that luck and
responsibility are mutually exclusive.
There is, in the final analysis, no such thing as moral luck. The very idea is a
contradiction in terms that comes to grief in a dilemma. If the significant evaluation at
issue results from luck, then morality does not enter into it. And if it is moral through
being in some way within our responsibility and control, then it is not a matter of luck
(1995, p. 158).
It seems intuitive that when factors outside of a person’s control – or luck – affect an agent, they
will also affect her being held responsible. Imagine, for example, a careful driver who is obeying
all traffic laws, but happens to hit a child who quickly, but carelessly runs across a busy road,
leaving no time for the driver to stop or swerve. The driver might feel regret1 for having been the
proximate cause of the child’s injury, but she is not blamable for the accident since her hitting
the child was a matter of bad luck. The driver was unlucky to have hit the child because she did
nothing wrong and could not have prevented it through her agency – she was simply in the
wrong place at the wrong time. While paradigmatic cases of moral luck like this one make
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In fact, Bernard Williams argues that while the driver would not be guilty, it would be appropriate for her to feel
agent-regret (1980, p.42).

1

2
Rescher’s claim seem plausible, there are other types of cases that raise more difficult questions
because they are more complicated. Consider the luck surrounding a person’s character. It would
be very difficult to determine which parts of a person’s character are the result of her efforts
alone and which are influenced by factors outside of her control.2 Even in the consciously chosen
actions of a young adult, social upbringing and circumstances play a significant role in the things
she has come to value. The kind of people we are is heavily subject to those factors which we do
not control. And so, character luck is a special type of luck and will require special attention. The
problem remains: if moral luck is a contradiction in terms and so much of our moral lives is
subject to luck, there is very little for which one can hold a person responsible. This dilemma
leads Thomas Nagel into skepticism about moral responsibility.3
A second reason why it is difficult to see how we can be morally responsible in cases of
luck is that there are several types of luck so presenting a general account of luck must
appreciate the relevant differences between the types of luck. Nagel divides moral luck into four
types: 1) an act being overly determined physically (causal luck); 2) the results of one’s act being
interfered with to produce either positive or negative results (resultant luck); 3) the types of
situations or problems that an agent faces (circumstantial luck); and 4) the kind of person one is,
which is affected by one’s natural temperament and upbringing (constitutive, or character, luck)
(Nagel, 1979, p. 60). A general account of moral luck should be able to capture all four kinds of
moral luck. Many even argue that it should also apply to all other kinds of luck as well, such as
epistemic luck, explaining how each instance is lucky or unlucky. In chapter two, I respond to

2

As I will show in chapter two, moral luck is distinct from luck in general insofar as it involves the epistemic
problem of knowing. In other words, it takes into account what an agent can reasonably know.
3

(Nagel, 1979).

3
the recent demand for a general account of luck and show why moral luck is distinct from other
types of luck.
In this dissertation, I focus on character luck – the luck having to do with a person’s
character. As I have indicated above, character luck is a particularly problematic instance of
moral luck because our characters are affected by so much that is outside of our control such as
our natural temperaments, upbringings, and the kind of social and political circumstances under
which we develop. If all of these factors remove responsibility, then there would be little for
which we can be properly held responsible for our characters. And if we are not responsible for
our characters, then it seems we cannot be held responsible for the actions that stem from them.
In chapter two, I introduce moral luck and its relation to a general account of luck. Thus
far, I have been assuming that lack of control is necessary for luck, meaning that what counts as
luck requires that there are factors outside of one’s direct or indirect control. But, other accounts
differ from this view, arguing that a more accurate view of luck understands luck as what is
improbable (Rescher 1995) or modally non-robust (Pritchard, 2005). Recently, Hales has even
expressed skepticism that any of the leading three accounts – control, probability, or modal – can
fully capture what is and is not lucky (2014). For this project, I begin by showing that lack of
control and having significance are necessary, though not sufficient, for something to be
attributed to luck. I do this in chapter two. Doing so is necessary to establish the connection
between moral luck and responsibility, which requires (some level of) control. A hard
determinist and a compatibilitist will certainly argue that nothing is within our control, but these
views assume that there is a connection between responsibility and control (namely that control
is necessary for responsibility). Other libertarian accounts will disagree about what or how much
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is within our control, but again, they assume control is necessary for responsibility.4 For my
dissertation, I do not enter into the free will debate. Throughout, I assume that it is reasonable to
hold people responsible for their behavior and that the minority views denying this are false.
While I do not defend this assumption, I think it is plausible to believe that people are
appropriately held responsible in some sense. For people do respond to criticism or punishment
in ways that demonstrate the ability to exercise control over their behavior sufficient for
changing it. While character luck creates problems for assignments of moral responsibility, it
does not show that we cannot hold anyone responsible for their behavior. In sum, my view would
only exclude the hard determinist, who argues that no one can be appropriately held responsible
for his or her behavior. I leave it open whether a compatibilist, semi- or super- compatibilist,
libertarian, or some other view of freedom or compatibilism is most plausible as nothing I say
contradicts these views.
After arguing lack of control is necessary for luck, I then spend the remainder of the
chapter discussing moral luck and the particular instance of moral luck called character luck. I
argue there that character luck is a special case of moral luck since it involves general conditions
surrounding one’s life, rather than events, that are better described as fortune, not luck. I
conclude chapter two by considering various approaches to assigning responsibility for character
despite its being subject to luck. Sher, for one, argues that although the development of character
may be influenced by external factors – one’s upbringing for example – insofar as character is
who one is as a moral agent, it has an internal nature that distinguishes it from other types of
things subject to luck. Other ways of treating the problem of character luck include showing that

4

Some accounts of responsibility circumvent questions about what counts for control by endorsing a quality of will
or attributability account of responsibility. See Frankfurt (1971), Arpaly (2009), or Doris (2002 & 2015) for just
some examples of this.
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some temperaments are more active than others and hence are morally significant5 or considering
the fact that we can act out of character, suggesting we are capable of acting otherwise.6 I raise
problems with each of these views and conclude that a reexamination of character is needed to
understand moral responsibility.
Along with control, responsibility is also traditionally thought to require moral
understanding. For example, a person might have tendencies to behave selfishly, but be unaware
that her behavior is morally wrong. Perhaps she was raised on a heavy dose of individualism
causing her to understand her behavior as admirable because it displays self-sufficiency and
pride in one’s own work. She may not understand her reluctance, and maybe sometimes
unwillingness, to help others as an instance of poor behavior because she does not understand
helping others to be her responsibility. She may even think that her unwillingness to provide her
time or money for others as an instance of helping them to become more self-sufficient. It is
possible that a person lacks awareness of the wrongness of many things she does. What this
example illustrates is that a person may lack the necessary moral knowledge to understand that
her behavior is in need of modification and the source of her limited awareness might be outside
of her control (e.g. an improper upbringing and social circumstances). Given that there are
examples of this sort, it’s also plausible to think that moral understanding is required for
responsibility – at least this is often the case in traditional theories of responsibility.
Still, not all accounts of responsibility require both control and moral understanding. On
some views, responsibility is understood as either attributability (of a praiseworthy or
blameworthy trait) or accountability (as in a case where one is not at fault, but is expected to

5

(Trianosky, 1993)

6

(Moody-Adams, 1993)
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compensate in some way for the damage caused by her act).7 Attributability accounts are those in
the spirit of Harry Frankfurt who endorses a quality of will account: a person is responsible with
respect to the quality of her will, whether or not she exercised complete control over its
development or is fully aware of its moral quality. Accountability views suspend judgment of
praise or blame and focus instead on compensating for harms done to others when one’s actions
play a role in causing the harm, but the harm is not one’s fault. For example, consider a driver
who may choose to run her vehicle into a parked car to avoid hitting a pedestrian. Though this is
not a blameworthy choice, she may still be held accountable for the damage done to the parked
car. In other words, being held accountable means a person is expected to compensate for bad or
harmful behavior even though she is not blamed for it.
Throughout my discussion of moral luck and the character of the ordinary person, I do
not defend my own account of responsibility, but rather, I start with the assumption that
responsibility will involve control and moral understanding, that is, awareness of the moral
significance of a situation and one’s behavior as well as having moral knowledge. It is important
to note here that one might lack awareness or moral knowledge but still be culpable for bad
behavior if one’s ignorance is culpable. For example, a doctor might administer a drug to which
her patient has a serious allergy because she was unaware of the allergy. But, if the doctor’s
ignorance was caused by her own negligence – as would be the case if this was an allergy she
was supposed to check for before administering the drug – then she is culpable for the patient’s
reaction to the drug because she is culpable for her ignorance of the allergy. If, by contrast, the
allergy the patient had was a rare one of which the patient was not even aware, it was not part of
the doctor’s protocol to check for such allergy, and the doctor had no other reason to check for it,

7

See Nelkin (2014, pp. 5-9) for some discussion on the different senses of responsibility. See also Card (1996) or
Hill (2000) who discuss being responsible in an accountability sense.
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then the doctor would not be culpable for either the patient’s reaction or her ignorance. I assume
that responsibility involves control and moral understanding since our ordinary practices and
many theories of responsibility use these two conditions to determine whether one should be held
responsible. Rather than provide a defense for this view, I instead focus on how responsibility for
character and what follows from it is still intelligible according to it. But, in acknowledging the
limited control and moral understanding the ordinary person exercises on account of the
pervasiveness of moral luck, I argue in chapter two that these conditions should be understood in
less stringent ways. The examination of character and responsibility in Aristotle in chapters
three, four, and five explain how and why the conditions should be less stringent. There, I
construct an account of responsibility from what Aristotle says in various places that takes into
consideration a person’s capacity to form virtue and perform virtuous actions. I do so by bringing
together his discussion of character and responsibility from Nicomachean Ethics (EN), Rhetoric,
and Politics in a far more extensive way than has been done before. The pieces I use to construct
this account are Aristotle’s, but the account itself is not explicitly stated by him.
In chapter three, I focus on the account of character, character development, and
responsibility in Aristotle’s EN, especially on his emphasis on that which is “up to us.” In
chapters four and five, I compare the EN account to his Rhetoric and Politics, finding evidence
for a view of character and responsibility that is broader and more empirically adequate than the
account given in the EN alone, one that emphasizes contingent factors such as one’s age or
circumstances. Since the former text is written for an audience that Aristotle assumes has been
met with good moral luck – they are free, Greek male citizens who are in the best position to
become virtuous since they have the right temperaments and upbringings – he ignores cases
where a person may lack the capacity to become virtuous or whose capacity is limited on account
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of bad moral luck. By contrast, in the Rhetoric and Politics, his emphasis is on these cases since
he is writing about a more general population. Though Aristotle does not explicitly state his view
of character and responsibility in these texts, I construct such a view using pieces from all three
texts, especially the more empirically-grounded texts, i.e., the Rhetoric and Politics. In chapter
four, I focus on the moral luck concerning one’s natural temperaments – that is, temperaments
with which one is born or temperaments that develop naturally over time, on account of physical
changes that take place in relation to age. Here, my discussion is limited to the Rhetoric. In
chapter five, I focus on the moral luck concerning one’s social inheritances – that is, one’s
upbringing and community. I discuss passages from both the Rhetoric and Politics. I will show
that, taken together, the EN, Rhetoric, and Politics develop Aristotle’s wider ethical view of
character and responsibility. This view acknowledges and respects the pervasive role that moral
luck plays in the development and maintenance of character.
Not only does an examination of Aristotle’s more empirically-grounded texts tell us a
great deal more about the character of the ordinary person, it also reveals further evidence in the
Politics that his notion of virtue does not set an unreasonably high standard. In the ideal city, for
instance, all citizens will be fully virtuous. Yet, Aristotle acknowledges that virtue is hard to
maintain by one’s own efforts alone and so he puts provisions in place so that one’s
circumstances can help one avoid acting against the common good. For example, he claims that a
citizen ought to own two properties – one near land and one near the sea – in order that he does
not favor laws that benefit one place at the expense of the other.8 In the ideal city, the citizens
will be wealthy enough to afford both properties and by having both they are less likely to vote
for laws that will be beneficial to those living in one place at the expense of another. Instead,

8

I discuss this example and others in chapter five.

9
they will be in a better position to think about what laws will be best for everyone, regardless of
where they live. That a fully virtuous person would need good laws not only to have developed
virtue, but to maintain his virtue is a surprising part of Aristotle’s view given that it is commonly
thought that he holds that the virtuous person performs virtuous actions on the basis of character
alone.
In chapter six, I show that Aristotle’s view of the ordinary person and the less-thanperfect ideal of the fully virtuous person is consistent with recent findings of social psychologists
whose experiments show that a person’s behavior is more significantly determined by minor
situational factors rather than character. This view is called situationism. Even more, Aristotle
remarks about how a person’s mood will affect her behavior is interesting giving the vast
empirical evidence of the strong connection between good moods and helping behavior. In the
Rhetoric, for instance, he explicitly acknowledges the effect mood has on decision making and
behavior and subsequently spends ten chapters discussing ways in which an orator might arouse
certain emotions in order to make his audience more persuadable. This is an important task given
the recent drive in contemporary ethics towards empirical adequacy. Owen Flanagan refers to
this drive as “psychological realism” and states the minimal version of it as follows.
Make sure when constructing a moral theory or projecting a moral ideal that the
character, decision processing, and behavior prescribed are possible, or perceived to be
possible, for creatures like us. (1991, p. 32)
Both philosophers and psychologists have recognized the importance of having an empirically
adequate account of ethics.9 This has posed a particularly difficult problem for virtue ethicists

9

While some might argue that psychology, being part of the natural sciences, can only yield descriptive claims that
cannot undermine a normative theory, psychological realism is not as controversial a thesis as naturalism. For even
Aristotle thought it important to accurately conceptualize human psychology before one could show what the good
for a human is. See for example his famous function argument at EN, I.7, 1097b30-1098a15. See Hurka (1993) who
argues that we can base moral theories on an account of human nature.
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given the amount of empirical data that has indicated it is one’s situations, not one’s character,
that more significantly determines her behavior. To mention briefly just a few studies, which I
will go on to discuss in detail in chapter six, consider the following.
Good moods and helping behavior. In various studies, the presence of a good smell or
lack of loud ambient noise increased the amount of helping behavior in subjects by putting them
in a good mood.10 In another famous study, finding a dime in a phone booth almost always
resulted in helping a person pick up a stack of papers that were dropped, and the not finding of a
dime almost always resulted in the person’s not helping.11
The Milgram Experiments. In these 1963 experiments, the gentle urging of the
experimenter was enough to cause most subjects to attempt to administer lethal levels of highvoltage shocks to a hidden, but audibly in pain, learner whenever he answered a question
incorrectly.12
Situations and Samaritans. Darley and Batson’s 1973 study on situational factors and
helping behavior showed that minor situational changes like being in a rush determined whether
a seminarian stopped to help a women in distress.13
Watching Eyes. Moral behavior has been shown to increase when a picture of eyes is
present rather than a picture of flowers. Pictures of eyes have been correlated with: increased
generosity in a game where players decide how much of their good fortune they would share

10

(Mathews and Cannon, 1975, p. 575)

11

(Levin and Isen, 1972).

12

(Milgram, 2009, pp. 27-31).

13

(Darley and Batson, 1973)
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with other players,14 increased donations to a communal pot in a public goods game,15 increased
donations to a communal pot used to replenish the coffee supply in a shared office,16 and
decreased litter in a self-service cafeteria.17
Group Effect. The results of group effect studies conducted by Latané and Nida show that
when a higher the number of people are present, the chances of any individual helping are
lower.18
For some scholars, such as Gilbert Harman,19 these studies indicate that it is the situation, not a
person’s character, that more reliably predicts her behavior, casting doubt on the very existence
of character. Others, such as Maria Merritt,20 John Doris,21 or Christian Miller22 argue that the
evidence is stacked against a view of character based on Aristotelian psychology. But, when we
consider both Aristotle’s view of the ordinary person and the more realistic conception of virtue
we find in his Politics, the worry that an updated psychology undermines his view is assuaged. In
chapter six, I show the extent to which Aristotle’s view of character and virtue is empirically
adequate as it is consistent with these findings in social psychology.

14

(Haley and Fessler, 2005)

15

(Burnham and Hare, 2007)

16

(Bateson et al, 2006)

17

(Ernest-Jones et al, 2011)

18

(Latané and Nida, 1981)

19

(Harman, 1999 & 2010)

20

(Merritt, 2000 & 2010)

21

(Doris, 2002 & 2010)

22

(Miller, 2013 & 2014a)
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In response to those like Harman, Doris, Merritt, and Miller who think character as
traditionally attributed to Aristotle is empirically inadequate, many have persisted in defending
an Aristotelian account of character and virtue by arguing that the evidence from social
psychology does not challenge his view. I also respond in defense of Aristotle against situationist
critiques of him, but I take a different approach than others. Whereas some of these responses,
like that of Julia Annas (2005), remain unsympathetic to situationist findings, I consider what
these findings say about ordinary people and how they coincide with what Aristotle says. My
approach stands in contrast to the traditional theories of virtue and character attributed to
Aristotle in that it expresses a more realistic account of virtue and considers the ordinary person
who lacks full virtue or vice. Others, such as Annas, rely on ideal notions of virtue and practical
wisdom. Only Neera Badhwar (2014) takes an approach like mine, but while she raises important
points in regards to the realistic conception of virtue in Aristotle, she does not do so to the extent
that I do and she leaves out an important distinction between actual virtue and ordinary character
in Aristotle. Further, my account is unique in that I show how assigning responsibility is possible
despite character luck.
In sum, what I will show in my dissertation is that we can develop a more empirically
adequate account of character and an account of responsibility with less stringent conditions than
the account in the EN out of what Aristotle says in different places. This account is significant
because it shows how one can be responsible for a character whose development is heavily
subjected to luck and the actions that follow from it, while still: (1) accounting for why
consistencies in behavior are situational, which cause situationists to take as indication of a lack
of character traditionally conceived, (2) respecting the limited control over and moral
understanding of our behavior, and (3) respecting the influence our natural dispositions and
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social world has on our character development. I do this by putting together insights from what
Aristotle says about character and responsibility, especially in works outside the EN, namely the
Rhetoric and Politics. I argue that the EN emphasizes certain things like control (what is “up to
us”) and ignores contingent factors like one’s natural temperaments and upbringing since the
intended audience has already been blessed with naturally good dispositions and has had a good
upbringing. Thus, they are responsible for knowing and choosing the good. By contrast, Aristotle
focuses on those contingent factors in the Rhetoric and Politics since he has in mind a more
general population. The result is a more realistic expectation of moral development and virtue.
As I fill out Aristotle’s account of character by emphasizing contingent factors in its
development and maintenance, I show how he accounts for the ordinary person who lacks robust
traits and so is highly vulnerable to situational factors. Further, the view of full virtue in Aristotle
does not suppose all virtues are global or that a fully virtuous agent never relies on situational
cues to consistently behave virtuously. So, the worry that Aristotelian virtue requires the kind of
psychology humans do not have that can sustain global traits independently of one’s
circumstances – or that Aristotle’s view lacks psychological realism – is addressed by showing
the traditional view attributed to him is a misunderstanding of his actual view. The fact that most
people do not have robust traits and are largely influenced by situational factors is also accounted
for if we bring together what Aristotle says about the ordinary person, who lacks a unified
character. The result is an empirically adequate view of character and responsibility that not only
addresses the problem of character luck and the limited control we exercise and moral
understanding we have, but is to a large extent consistent with recent work in social psychology,
and therefore meets the demand for psychological realism.

CHAPTER TWO
LUCK, MORAL LUCK, AND CHARACTER LUCK
The problem with moral luck is that it raises significant problems for responsibility. If
responsibility requires that an agent exercise some level of control and maintain some level of
awareness – as is traditionally held – and moral luck involves that which falls outside of our
control, then it seems that one cannot be properly held responsible for what can be chalked up to
luck. In fact, some, like Rescher, argue that “moral luck” involves a contradiction. If, however,
luck and morality are mutually exclusive, and luck remains a pervasive feature of our lives, then
where is there room for responsibility? For if the ways we habitually think, reason, desire, and
act are significantly impacted by our surroundings – surroundings which we often do not choose,
especially in the early stages of our development – then most of what typically grounds our being
held responsible is caused by luck. Yet, we hold people responsible for being callous or careless
despite the fact that they may not have freely chosen to become so. If we did not, so much of our
characters and behavior would be excused that we would have to give up many serious
attributions of responsibility.1
This chapter addresses three broad areas of luck. First, I present recent concerns for
constructing a general account of luck, one which aims at capturing all the individual types of

Here and most elsewhere, I focus on responsibility for character and for actions that stem from one’s character.
This is the particular field of responsible action that is affected by character luck. This does cover much for which
we are held responsible, but it does not address those actions that do not stem from a person’s character, but for
which a person is rightly held responsible. For example, a generally patient person might lose her temper because
she is under a lot of stress and lash out at a friend. While her behavior is uncharacteristic of her, it is not excused
merely because it is out of character.
1
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luck: moral, epistemic, or otherwise. I argue in response to these concerns that lack of control
and significance are a necessary, though not sufficient, conditions for luck. Next, I transition to
moral luck. Establishing lack of control as a necessary condition for luck makes the connection
to moral luck since moral luck involves the conflict between luck and responsibility, and
responsibility requires that one exercise some control. Finally, I focus on a particular type of
moral luck – character luck. Character luck is more complicated than other types of moral luck
since it involves both the natural temperaments with which we are born and the circumstances in
which we develop and it does not seem to meet the requirements for being instances of luck. I
conclude that character luck is a genuine instance of luck, but involves the related concept of
fortune. In this final section, I examine other views about how we ought to treat character luck
before I argue that a broader view of character is necessary if we are to understand how
responsibility and character luck can be adequately understood.
I. A General Account of Luck
Andrew Latus points out that prior to his 2003 piece, there had not been much work done
to give a general account of luck. Rather, he observes, most accounts typically assume a control
account of luck – luck is anything that is beyond one’s control.2 Recent accounts of luck present
various views championing one of three aspects of luck3: (1) chance or probability4, (2) modal

2

See for example (Nagel, 1979), (Williams, 1981), (Card, 1993), (Walker, 1998), (Zimmerman, 2003). See also
more recent instances: (Wolf, 2004), (Tessman, 2005), (Hanna, 2014), (Nelkin, 2014). Latus argues for a hybrid
view of luck that includes 3 elements: (1) lack of control; (2) low probability of happening; (3) significance of event
(Latus, 2003).
3

Some views do opt for hybrid accounts. See (Latus, 2003), (Levy, 2011), (Riggs, 2007), or (Broncano-Berrocal,
2015). I imply a hybrid view is best in the moral luck section of this chapter.
4

(Rescher, 1995)
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non-robustness5, or (3) lack of control.6 In this chapter, I argue, pace Broncano-Berrocal, that
lack of agential control is a necessary condition for a general account of luck.7 The goal of this
section is to highlight the importance of control in the typical (ordinary and philosophical)
understanding of responsibility. In brief, lack of control is typically treated as a mitigating factor
when assigning responsibility to someone. One might have bad luck, which mitigates blame, or
good luck, which may mitigate praise.
In addition to an event’s8 being either improbable, modally non-robust, or outside of
one’s control, all general accounts of luck typically include a significance condition that requires
an event have significance if it is to be considered lucky or unlucky. Thus an event that is not
important to the agent will not qualify as lucky or unlucky even if it is improbable, morally nonrobust, or outside of her control.9 With a significance condition, cases of luck that do not affect
human beings will be eliminated.10 For example, a star in a distant galaxy may implode despite
its being unlikely to occur, but if its effects do not reach earth, it has no significance for us.
While some event in a distant galaxy may affect other non-human beings in ways that are
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(Pritchard, 2005, 2012), (Whittington, 2014), (Carter and Peterson, 2016)

6

(Mele, 2006) and (Greco, 2010)

7

See Broncano-Berrocal (2015) who argues that the presence of other features (namely (1) or (2)) can be included to
make distinctions between kinds of luck. In particular, he argues that the modal (non-)robustness of events can help
us distinguish between types of luck, but unless there is a lack of agential control, there is no instance of luck.
I follow Coffman’s lead in understanding “event” to include facts or truths, as in the colloquialism, “In the event
that,” which can also mean “If it’s the case that” or “If it’s true that.” (Coffman, 2009, p. 499). It is not until I treat
character luck in section 2 of this chapter, that I distinguish between events and general conditions or circumstances
of a person’s life.
8

9

(Hales, 2014)
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This may go for either moral or epistemic luck. If an event has no moral import, its occurrence will not be morally
lucky or unlucky for an agent. Similarly, if a belief has no significance, one’s happening to believe it is not lucky or
unlucky.
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significant to them, here I am only concerned with what is significant for human beings. Other
cases that I exclude are those such as the improbability of seeing a pigeon on one’s drive home
from work or is significant for an animal.11 What counts as significant varies by philosopher. The
following are views about what counts as significant: (1) an agent would call an event significant
if she knew the relevant facts12; (2) the event has some objectively significant status for the
agent, whether or not she is aware of it13; (3) the agent has some subjective or objective14 interest
that the event effects either positively or negatively.15 Duncan Pritchard has recently changed his
view from (1) to denying the significance condition: he argues that human significance is not
part of the metaphysical load a general account of luck should be expected to carry.16 In this
chapter, I endorse the significance condition, but I do not specify how we should understand this
condition as my goal is not to produce a general account of luck.
In sum, what a general account aims to do is make sense of all the individual instances of
luck that occur in either the moral or epistemic realm. Given my interest in moral luck, I will
focus on the relation between the general account and moral luck. I do not here present a general
account of luck. My aim is more modest than that. I will merely show that lack of control is a
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Aristotle also claims that what is called a matter of luck for an animal is not a genuine instance of luck (tuchē)
since it does not involve choice (Physics, II.6, 197b15).
12

(Pritchard, 2005, pp. 132-133)

13

(Coffman, 2007, p. 388)

Bellantyne says of subjective and objective interests: “Subjective interests… are associated with mental states like
desires, preferences, and consciously adopted goals. Objective interests are often tied to health or proper biological
function; they’re the sorts of interests some people say we have in leading a life that includes knowledge or
friendship. Even if we take no interest (subjective) in such things, we still have an interest (objective) in them”
(2012, p. 331).
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(Bellantyne, 2012, p. 331)
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necessary condition for luck. Without this condition, the moral significance of luck gets lost.
Since responsibility is often understood as requiring that some kind of control is exercised,
including a lack of control condition in an account of luck forges the connection between luck
and moral responsibility; the presence of luck tends to mitigate, and sometimes even remove,
responsibility because it involves that which is outside of our control. To make my argument for
this condition, I first consider Jennifer Lackey’s view that lack of control is not necessary for
luck and show how the counterexample she uses fails to demonstrate this. Since the standard
procedure is to examine counterexamples, I will construct my argument by pointing out where
her counterexample is insufficient. The main problem with her objection is that it operates on an
insufficient understanding of control. Thus, it will also be important to give necessary and
sufficient conditions for control. I then give a positive argument for the control condition.
Lackey argues that lack of control is neither sufficient nor necessary for a general account
of luck. Since I do not aim to show lack of control is sufficient, I will focus on her argument
against its being a necessary condition. Lackey argues that since one’s having control might
itself be a matter of luck, lack of control is not a necessary feature of a lucky or unlucky event
(2008, p. 259). To illustrate this conclusion, she presents the case of The Demolition Worker,
which goes as follows.
Demolition Worker. Ramona is a demolition worker, about to press a button that will
blow up an old abandoned warehouse, thereby completing a project that she and her coworkers have been working on for several weeks. Unbeknownst to her, however, a mouse
had chewed through the relevant wires in the construction office an hour earlier, severing
the connection between the button and the explosives. But as Ramona is about to press
the button, her co-worker hangs his jacket on a nail in the precise location of the severed
wires, which radically deviates from his usual routine of hanging his clothes in the office
closet. As it happens, the hanger on which the jacket is hanging is made of metal, and it
enables to electrical current to pass through the damaged wires just as Ramona presses
the button and demolishes the warehouse. (Lackey, 2008, p.258)
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Lackey argues that although this is clearly a case of luck, Ramona exercises control insofar as
her pressing of the button is the direct cause of demolishing the warehouse. The fact that she had
control over demolishing the building was merely a matter of the luck involving her co-worker’s
hanging his coat in the right spot at the right time. For a significant period of time, the wires
were not connected and so Ramona was indeed lucky that just before she hit the button, a
connection was established that would allow her to effectively demolish the building. Thus,
Lackey concludes that lack of control is not necessary for luck; this is a case involving both
control and luck.
In response to Lackey’s view, Coffman (2009) and Levy (2009) similarly suggest that the
luck surrounding the circumstances that put Ramona in a position to demolish the warehouse
does not transfer to her actually demolishing the building. Coffman argues that she might have
been lucky to have been in a position to demolish it, but once in that position, she is not lucky
that she pressed the demolishing button (Coffman, 2009, p. 503). Levy similarly states, “Neither
the exercise of [Ramona’s] control nor the occurrence of the event are lucky; the luck is prior to
them” (Levy, 2009, p. 493). Levy says that luck was involved at the time when Ramona’s coworker hung his coat, but not when she presses the button and effectively demolishes the
building. He claims that later events do not inherit the luck of earlier ones. There is something
that these two responses get right. If luck could be inherited, then the result would be
undesirable; there would be too many events counted as instances of luck. Take for example the
luck of my being alive (something significant to me and outside of my control). The luck present
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there does not pass on to all of my subsequent actions. On that basis, it is not now a matter of
luck that I intentionally type these words.17
There is yet another way in which Lackey’s counterexample fails to demonstrate that lack
of control is a necessary condition. The sense of control she is operating with is one in which is
restricted to what Broncano-Berrocal calls “effective control” (2015, pp. 18-19). Many accounts
that speak both for and against the control account focus on one’s ability to produce or prevent
an event.18 Yet, when one has control over something, one has more than the ability to physically
cause or prevent a state of affairs. She also has knowledge of the state of affairs that allows her to
deliberate accordingly. Broncano-Berrocal calls this “tracking control” and describes it as a kind
of monitoring which involves two components: (1) epistemic – one has the appropriate
information about something and (2) dispositional – one’s knowledge allows one to begin, stop,
or continue an action that will achieve some goal (2015, p. 20). For example, a doctor’s control
over a patient’s health involves her monitoring the patient’s physical well-being, which allows
her to intervene with medicine if needed. When it comes to Lackey’s Demolition Worker, she
fails to have control in the tracking sense because she is not aware of the severed wires before
she hits the button.
I find Broncano-Berrocal’s distinction between effective and tracking control compelling.
There are many cases where luck is attributed because the consequences of one’s action were not
foreseeable. If, for example, I accidentally scratch a friend of mine during a pickup basketball
game and he develops an infection as a result, I might be held responsible insofar as it is not a
totally unforeseen consequence of getting a cut. But, if he runs a red light on the way to the
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See Levy (2009, p. 492) for a similar example.
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See Statman (1993), Zimmerman (1993), Lackey (2008), and Coffman (2009).
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doctor’s office and gets a ticket, he could not fairly hold me accountable. Even though my giving
him a cut was the reason he was headed to the doctor’s office, getting a ticket is not a foreseeable
consequence of getting (or giving) a cut.19 Hence it was a matter of bad luck that he got a ticket
as a result of the scratch I gave him.20
Thus, we can say one has control if she has: (1) the ability to produce or prevent an event
and (2) relevant knowledge of an event which allows her to gather information needed to affect
an event or to predict the consequences of certain actions with respect to an event. These capture
Broncano-Berrocal’s understanding of control and add the feature that one is able to predict how
her actions will affect her circumstances.21 We might state the control condition, which is a
necessary conditions for luck, as follows:
Control Condition: A has control over B if and only iff (i) A can act to either produce or
prevent B from happening, and (ii) A has the relevant knowledge with respect to B that
allows A to gather information needed to either (a) reliably affect B (i.e. reliably start,
stop, or continue B) and (b) predict the consequences of A’s action with respect to B.
Including both effective and epistemic features of control helps illuminate where Lackey’s
demolition worker fails to show control as unnecessary for luck. Ramona fails to satisfy
condition (ii) since she is not in an epistemic position to reliably destroy the building; she
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Here the unforeseeability is on account of an effect (getting a ticket) that does not normally follow from a
particular cause (getting scratched). Later I consider cases where the causal connection might be there, but a person
lacks relevant information that would allow her to make predictions with respect to an even. In other words,
foreseeability is important whether or not an occurrence is likely.
This is similar to Aristotle’s claim that luck (hē tuchē) and chance (to automaton) are coincidental (or accidental)
causes (aitia kata sumbebēkos). Since their results don’t follow always or for the most part (and so are not
foreseeable), they are causes only in a coincidental (or accidental) sense (Physics, II.5, 196b23-28). Luck (hē tuchē)
and chance (to automaton), for Aristotle, ultimately involves two events coinciding such that one event has the
effect that typically follows from another, but does not typically follow from itself. Luck is a narrower instance of
chance insofar as it only applies to those cases involving human choice.
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Including an epistemic feature will also mean that our knowledge not be a matter of luck. In other words, a belief
that is the result of epistemic luck – dubbed a “Gettiered belief” – that functions within one’s deliberative process
will cause the conclusion of one’s deliberation to be lucky or unlucky in proportion to the significance of that belief
in the process.
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happens to contribute to its destruction, but was not aware of the severed wires which makes her
pressing of the button unreliably effective (requiring, for example, the placing of a coat hanger at
the right spot).
There are other counterexamples to the view that lack of control is sufficient for luck.
The sun’s rising is outside of one’s control, and its rising is significant for a human being, yet it
is not a matter of luck that the sun rises each day.22 However, this is not a problem for my
account since I do not aim to show that lack of control is both necessary and sufficient. Still,
some discussion of these counterexamples helps in our understanding of lack of control. The
counterexample of the sun’s rising is similar to another counterexample given by Lackey. She
uses an example of her regularly picking up her daughter from school. Although having her mom
pick her up is outside of Lackey’s daughter’s control, she is not considered lucky each time her
mom picks her up. Lackey takes this also to show we should reject the view that lack of control
is sufficient for luck. Both in the case of the sun’s rising and of Lackey’s daughter, a person may
use the knowledge of a thing in order to make plans or predictions in relation to a thing. When it
comes to the sun’s rising, one can use her knowledge that the sun will rise tomorrow in her
deliberating about her wish to sun bathe in the morning. Thus, while she may not have effective
control over the fact that the sun will rise, she is able to plan her life accordingly and position
herself to benefit from the regular occurrence. Similarly, Lackey’s daughter can walk to the spot
where she is regularly picked up by her mom even if she cannot control whether her mom will
show up.
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See Lackey (2008) and Hales (2014) who discuss this counterexample.
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These examples help elucidate the latter part of (ii) of the control condition: that one can
predict the consequences of her act with respect to a fact or event (e.g., the sun’s rising or getting
picked up). Both the sun bather and Lackey’s daughter can reasonably expect that they will catch
the sun or get picked up if they position themselves accordingly. Neither case is a case of luck
since one is able to make reliable predictions with respect to them. Thus, these examples show
that while a person may lack effective control, she might still exercise epistemic control. For
example, the sun bather does not exercise control over the sun’s rising, but can exercise control
with respect to it. Similarly, a child might not effectively control her mother’s behavior, but she
can still predict that her mother will pick her up and plan accordingly.
The preceding discussion provides a response to Lackey’s objection that lack of control is
a necessary condition for luck and in doing so I have elucidated what it means for a thing to be
outside of an agent’s control. While I have responded to a prominent objection to the control
condition, I have not yet provided evidence that lack of control is necessary for luck. While I
lack space here to provide a full defense of lack of control as a necessary, it does seem
counterintuitive to hold, as Lackey does, that an event can be a matter or luck for a person who
exercises control either over or in relation to it. Take, for instance, winning the lottery. This is a
paradigmatic case of luck. Yet, if a person could rig the lottery so that she would win, it would
hardly make sense to call her winning a matter of luck. The same thing seems to hold for any
other paradigmatic cases of luck – place the otherwise lucky or unlucky event under an agent’s
control and the results of the event no longer seem to be a matter of luck.
II. Transition from a General Account of Luck to Moral Luck
While including a lack of control condition in a general account of luck makes a
connection to moral luck since responsibility requires control, the connection between the two is
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not yet fully established. For some things may be outside of our control, and have moral
significance, but may not meet the other conditions required for calling something a matter of
luck. In remaining modest in what I do in this chapter, I will not present a full account of all the
conditions for luck. But, I have conceded that lack of control, though necessary, is not sufficient
for luck. This is clearly the case in the example of the sun’s rising each morning – there we have
an event that is far outside any agent’s control, but is not a matter of luck. In this section, I
continue to be modest in my aims. While I will not give a full account of the necessary and
sufficient conditions for luck, my argument does not require it. I recognize that, aside from lack
of control and significance, there may be other conditions for a general account of luck, but I do
not consider what these may be. I proceed by analyzing and defending cases of moral luck that
are taken as paradigmatic. I have stated that the significance condition will involve anything that
has significance for a human, whether that be understood in objective terms – i.e., independently
of her taking an interest in it – or subjective terms – i.e., only in case where she consciously
acknowledges a thing’s significance to her. Regardless of how significance is defined my view
will not be affected since I can defend moral luck on any of these views. In this section, I
respond to the worry Stephan Hales raises that no general account of luck can capture every
instance of moral luck, especially cases of natural temperaments and social inheritances, which
are the focus of my dissertation. So, I focus on whether these paradigmatic cases of moral luck
are genuine cases of luck. I conclude that character luck involves fortune, but is still a genuine
instance of luck.
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Hales argues that no one general theory of luck captures all instances of luck.23 Defenders
of moral luck are in particular posed with a problem. Of the three kinds of general theories of
luck –probability, modal, and control – Hales argues that not having a control account of luck
makes moral luck disappear. On the modal or probability accounts, many cases of moral luck do
not arise, as I will explain shortly. He argues that a general account of luck must include more
than a control and a significance condition. For if luck were merely a matter of lack of control
over a significant event, too many things would be considered a matter of luck that are obviously
not. For example, the sun’s rising every day is outside of our control and significant, but not a
matter of luck. But, I have shown above that the case of the sun’s rising does not actually meet
the control condition since one can exercise epistemic control in relation to it. Still, I have only
argued that lack of control is necessary, not sufficient. So it may be the case that some instances
of moral luck do not meet all conditions. If this is true, Hales argues we can either admit that
“luck” is ambiguous (which Hales argues we cannot) and say that there is a different theory for
moral luck than for epistemic luck, or we must admit there is no such thing as moral luck. I will
argue that moral luck is ambiguous.
Hales argues that the control theory has been mostly assumed in the moral luck literature;
philosophers have not specified what counts as being outside of one’s control nor have they
posited other conditions for counting a thing as a matter of luck. He claims, “To my knowledge,
the only defender of moral luck who explicitly adopts something other than a straight control
view is Peels (2015), who defends a hybrid view of luck that includes lack of control as a
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necessary condition” (Hales, 2015, p. 2387). Still, Hales finds that even on a hybrid view, some
paradigmatic cases of moral luck cannot be accounted for.
One might argue that under the other theories of luck, such as a strict probability or
modal account, moral luck arises, and thus a control account or condition is not necessary. I have
argued above that lack of control is a necessary condition, but, if it were not, Hales argues that
moral luck will not arise on other accounts. For example, take the social and genetic lotteries; it
seems lucky to have been born with certain genetic, social, intellectual, or economic privileges.
However, Hales argues that under the probability account, these are not cases of luck since it is
not improbable that a person is born to her parents into the society in which they reside. First, he
argues that it is metaphysically necessary that if a person exists, she must be born to her parents;
God does not choose one’s parents with a roll of the dice. Second, being born into a specific
society is also not improbable since a child will always be born into the society in which his
parents live. Lastly, if that society is racist or sexist, Hales claims this is not improbable since
most societies have some degree of racism or sexism (pp. 2391-2392).24 Under the modal
account, Hales also argues that these are not cases of luck since a person’s social and genetic
inheritances would be the same in nearby possible worlds, i.e. they are modally robust (p. 2392).
Thus, on Hales’ view, if a person exists, it is neither improbable nor modally non-robust that she
is born to her parents with the genetic inheritances she has and in the particular society she is.
Hales’ argument relies on what he calls “plausible Kripkean assumptions” about personal
identity. On that view, proper names and indexicals like “you” are rigid designators – they refer
to the same object in all possible worlds. In other words, they designate only the object that
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actually exists in all possible worlds (Kripke, 1980, pp. 77-78). This means that there is no
possible world where the “you” that refers to any particular person designates something other
than that person as she actually exists, i.e. with the social and genetic inheritances she has. So,
her identity is modally robust (the same in all possible worlds). Further, her identity is
metaphysically necessary; she could not have been any other person than she actually is. So, the
probability that she is who she is is 1.
While this view of personal identity that Hales subscribes to seems plausible to him and
to many others in the analytic tradition, it is far from being universally accepted. Many others
might instead endorse a Lockean or narrative25 view of identity and find a Kripkean view to be
highly counterintuitive. Though defending a view of personal identity lies far aside the scope of
this project, I think it is reasonable to be skeptical about the view that Hales assumes. For on this
view, it becomes very improbable that any person exists as she must be born of certain parents,
in a certain place, at a certain time, and with the genetic inheritances she actually has. That a
female with a very specific set of natural temperaments was born to my parents on March 1,
1987 in Maywood, IL is highly unlikely given the vast amount of possible temperaments, places,
parents, and times in which a person could be born, male or female. Further, in this view of
personal identity, Hales also assumes the truth of materialism, denying that there be any nonphysical constituent of the self that is independent of the self that actually exists. Hales does not
give us sufficient reason to accept it or to justify his confidence in such a view. If we reject
Hales’ Kripkean view of identity, we cast doubt on his view that our social and genetic
inheritances do not meet a probability or modal condition.
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Hales objection to strict probability and modal accounts of luck affects not only
probability or modal accounts, but hybrid accounts of luck that use either a probability or modal
condition as well. He argues that hybrid accounts are no better at addressing the problem given
that they include a probability or modal condition. Hales only mentions Peels as offering a
hybrid account which goes as follows.
According to Peels, an event E is lucky or unlucky for some person S at some time t iff
(i) S lacks control over the occurrence of E at t, (ii) E is significant to S at t, and (iii) E
occurs in the actual world, but not in a wide class of nearby possible worlds. All three
conditions must be met for an event to be lucky (Hales, 2015, p.2394).
Hales argues that this definition does not count the cases of the social and genetic lotteries as
lucky or unlucky since condition (iii) does not hold; one is born the same person under the same
circumstances in nearby possible worlds. Thus, while the probability and modal accounts of luck
might capture many instances of moral luck, they do not capture the case of character luck,
according to Hales.
In the cases of genetic and social luck, we might maintain they are genuine cases of luck
by rejecting his view of personal identity. Briefly put, these cases of moral luck, contra Hales, do
meet the probability or modal condition since it is unlikely an individual is born into the exact
circumstances she is given the range of possibilities. Later, I consider another problem that
shows that these cases are ultimately not matter of luck, but fortune.
Hales suggests an alternate way to account for moral luck that does not rely on
probability or modal robustness that is worth considering. He asks whether “luck” is ambiguous,
meaning something different for cases of epistemic luck than for cases of moral luck. If we mean
something different by “luck” when we refer to moral luck, then we don’t need to worry if each
case of moral luck does not satisfy all of the conditions of the general account. But, Hales rejects
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this approach using the contradiction test to test for ambiguity in luck.26 For example, the
sentence “Fido is a dog, but not a dog” is syntactically contradictory, but if “dog” is ambiguous,
semantic contradiction is escaped; Fido is of the species “dog,” but not a male (p. 2398). But,
“luck,” Hales argues, does not fare the same way. He claims that you cannot say “Megan is lucky
and unlucky”; it doesn’t make sense. Even if she is lucky in different domains – say morally, but
not epistemically lucky – the ambiguity does not work the same way as it does for the Fido
example because it needs a context to be evaluable. It is analogous to saying “Tim won (at
tennis), but did not win (at poker)”; “won” is not ambiguous, but simply refers to different
contexts. Regardless of context, however, the Fido example involves an ambiguity (p. 2399).
If arguing that “luck” is ambiguous is the only way to save moral luck, then Hales
concludes that “moral luck has no important role in ethics” (p. 2401); it becomes a dubitable
concept since it does not fit under any proposed general account of luck and does not pass the
ambiguity test. But, Hales’ rejection of luck as ambiguous is too quick. For the analogy to tennis
is not a good one. There, “won” refers to the same concept, but is simply applied to different
games. By contrast, one can be lucky or unlucky in one domain and not another, each having
different conditions for luck. So, calling someone epistemically lucky or unlucky will refer to
something different than being morally lucky or lucky, and even being lucky or unlucky in other
domains such as in sports or in winning the lottery. When it comes to moral luck, we are
concerned only with cases that affect responsibility assignments, which will require the taking
into account what an agent can reasonably be expected to know. But, in Hales’ treatment of luck,
he does not consider the epistemic condition for one’s exercise of control: control requires, as I
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endorsed. The test operates by looking at syntactically contradictory sentences that would avoid a semantic
contradiction if the key term is truly ambiguous (2015, p. 2398).
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have argued above, that one is able to make reliable predictions with respect to an event. It may
be the case that calling an event an instance of luck requires the low probability of its occurrence
or its modal non-robustness, as a meteorite striking the White House as Donald Trump assumes
the presidency has a low probability and may not occur in nearby possible worlds where its
course is slightly different causing it hit the Washington Monument instead. But, when it comes
to moral luck, we consider the perspective of the agent and what she could reasonably predict. If
the meteorite was in fact controlled by some sophisticated equipment invented by an advanced
alien society and several members of Congress were aware of this fact and the plot to destroy the
White House if Trump were ever to enter it as President, then those members of Congress could
be held responsible for not informing the relevant people to protect the president’s life (either
praised or blamed or held accountable for keeping the information to themselves). Knowledge of
such a bizarre conspiracy, however, would not be something anyone would reasonably be
expected to have. So, if no human was aware of such a conspiracy, no human being would be
(even partially) responsible for the attack, even though it was a carefully planned and thus a
probable and modally robust event. In other words, a planned attack makes it a likely occurrence
and one that would occur in nearby possible worlds and thus plans that are successfully executed
are not a matter of luck. But, given that we would not reasonably expect someone to be in a
position to predict such a bizarre occurrence, it would be still be a matter of luck relative to what
a person knows and so would affect responsibility assignments. Because we consider what can
be known by the individual, moral luck differs in a significant way from other types of luck, and
so “luck” is an ambiguous term.
Perhaps it will be better to use an example that is more ordinary. It is courageous when a
firefighter enters a burning building to save someone trapped inside. It requires the right amount
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of fear and confidence, as well as the knowledge of how to navigate a burning building and find
someone through the smoke and flames. In some cases, a firefighter uses all of her knowledge to
discern a safe path to the victim and out of the building, yet something goes wrong, trapping both
people inside and causing them to die. It may be the case that had the firefighter known every
single fact about the particular house – the state of the house’s foundation prior to the fire, what
the house’s ventilation was like, how many dirty, flammable rags there were at a point that could
ignite the fire enough to make the house collapse, etc. – she might have been able to deduce that
another entry would have allowed her to successfully save the victim and herself. But, no one
would reasonably expect her to know every single possible factor that would lead to her failure.
Her expertise allows her to discern a many of these factors, though not all of them. And although
there may be a chain of causal events that could make the entranceway’s collapsing at the time it
did likely, full knowledge of all causal factors is simply too high of a standard to use to judge
responsibility. Instead, we rely on some reasonable standard we judge based on the situation and
availability of knowledge. Had the firefighter’s miscalculation been caused by her negligence in
evaluating the relative safety of entering the house where she did, we would not consider it bad
luck that the house collapsed once she entered it. But, since she took into account all that she
could when she entered the way that she did, she has simply experienced some bad luck and
would not be blameworthy.
In light of these examples, we can see how an event might be predictable if one had all
the information concerning it, but still a matter of moral luck because it does not meet the control
condition. Part of what is needed in order to exercise epistemic control is to be in a position to
make reliable predictions with respect to an event. This mean that the standards by which we
judge control must be relative to the perspective of the agent since control requires that one has
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the knowledge needed to reliably effect or predict the consequences of an event. If something is
improbable or modally non-robust, one will not be in a position to reliably make accurate
predictions with respect to it. Yet, something might be probable or modally robust all things
considered, but unpredictable based on how a person’s particular position affects her calculations
and thus outside of her control. Had she been aware of all of the relevant information concerning
the event, she may have been able to predict its occurrence, but she is only held responsible for
what she could have been reasonably expected to know given the evidence that’s available to her
and the time she had to consider it in her deliberation. Thus, “luck” must be ambiguous. It does
not merely rely on a context to be evaluated as “winning” in tennis and not in poker does. One is
morally lucky or unlucky when we consider how much control she can exercise with respect to
some significant event. This requires that we also consider the epistemic aspect of the control
condition. Other instances of luck, such as whether Rajai Davis will hit his only postseason
homerun to tie the game with two outs in the 8th inning in game seven of the World Series, do
not rely on whether the agent can make accurate predictions himself. It is because moral luck is
luck that affects responsibility that it must take into account a person’s ability to make
predictions with respect to her choices.
To formalize how moral luck is relative to one’s perspective, I return to the control
condition defined earlier in this chapter. There, I argued that having epistemic control required
that:
A has the relevant knowledge with respect to B that allows A to gather information
needed to either (a) reliably affect B (i.e. reliably start, stop, or continue B) or (b) predict
the consequences of A’s action with respect to B.
In this definition, part (a) refers to one’s effective control – one’s ability to act in ways that affect
B. Part (b) refers to one’s epistemic control – one’s knowledge needed to make predictions with
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respect to B. Including (b) in this definition requires that moral luck is relative to an agent’s
perspective since a person cannot exercise control if she is unable to make predictions given the
information she has. So, in order to understand what is predictable relative to a person’s
perspective, we need to understand what would allow a person to make predictions concerning
an event. I propose three conditions for calling something predictable relative to an agent: (1) A
has access to information sufficient for making accurate predictions with respect to B, (2) A has
the time needed to utilize all information needed for making accurate predictions with respect to
B in her deliberations, and (3) A has the cognitive ability sufficient for deliberating with respect
to B.
Only in cases where all three conditions are met can an event be said to have been
predictable relative to the agent. If any of these three cases cannot be met, then the event will
meet control condition for luck. Consider a scenario where our firefighter does not meet the first
two conditions. In the example I gave, she took into consideration all that she could when
making her decision to enter where she did, but she may not have had access to all information
that would have allowed her to make a more accurate prediction, such as any unique feature of
the house or its contents that would have thwarted her efforts. So she would not have met
condition (1). In cases of fires, there is often a limit to the time one has to deliberate since
immediate action is needed. Perhaps if our firefighter had a few more minutes she would have
had time to perform an exhaustive evaluation that would have caught some details changing her
course of action to a more effective one. So, condition (2) is also not met. In this case, we
assume condition (3) is met since she is a trained firefighter, but there are often cases where (1)
and (2) are met, but (3) is not. These cases may involve a cognitive handicap caused by a mental
disability or in cases where a person is simply not trained to be able to pick out the relevant
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information and use it to deliberate. In the latter case, we can point to a bystander who is
observing the fire. While he may have access to the information by virtue of his proximity to
observable facts, and he may have the time needed to utilize that information, he would lack the
cognitive ability to do so since he is not trained to fight fires. Another reason a person might not
meet condition (3) is if he is in an emotional state that interferes with his cognitive processing.
Perhaps our firefighter routinely displays courage in the face of fires, but is too distressed to
concentrate when she is putting out a fire in her own home or in the home of someone close to
her. In cases like these, we might say that the circumstances overstrain human nature, making it
too difficult for a person to exercise her cognitive capacities. In some cases of character luck, a
person’s upbringing may inhibit her moral awareness, making it difficult for her to morally
deliberate even if she has access to the moral facts (such as witnessing another’s suffering) and
time to deliberate.
Compare our firefighter to another person who would have met all three conditions and
thus would have been in a better position to know that the building was to collapse when it did.
A firefighter who not only knows the general laws concerning fires, but who also has specialized
knowledge of the building and time enough to deliberate could potentially meet all three
conditions. Being near the building when the fire started and having previous knowledge of its
particular architecture, the wood, or even the flammable contents of the home that would make
some rooms more dangerous to enter than others, would all be significant factors putting him in a
better position to judge when the building might collapse and where the best point of entry would
be. Thus, he satisfies condition (1) since he has access to more information regarding the
building’s architecture and the home’s contents. He may have more time to deliberate if he was
present at the moment the fire started, meeting condition (2). And, as a fellow firefighter, he
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would satisfy condition (3) by virtue of his expertise in fighting fires. His ability to predict the
building’s collapsing would be much greater than our first firefighter’s ability and thus he would
be less likely to suffer from bad luck.
In cases of predictability that are relative to a person’s perspective, we often express our
frustration at our epistemic shortcomings or our understanding of others’ shortcomings when we
say things like “If only I had known…” or “It’s not your fault. How could you have known?” In
these cases, we recognize that something might have be predictable had we been aware of all the
facts ahead of time, but that life is such that we often do not operate with full knowledge of all
the causal mechanisms at play. When our ignorance of those factors is not our fault, we are
dealing with cases of moral and epistemic luck. There is moral luck because we were not
operating with full control in morally significant matters given that we are not in the best
position to make accurate predictions about the world. And there is epistemic luck because our
knowledge is affected by factors outside of our control of which we could not reasonably be
expected to be aware. When we assign moral responsibility, we take into account what the agent
could reasonably be expected to know and thus the conditions for luck are judged according to
the perspective of the agent.27
In his line of argument against the significance condition for luck, Duncan Pritchard
attacks the approach to luck that takes into account a subject’s construal of luck. He claims that
“our interest ought to be in luck as an objective feature of events, which means that we should be

Compare to Latus’ claim that luck is perspectival; it may be a matter of chance relative to what you can
reasonably expect, but not relative to what someone else knows (2003, pp. 468-469). Rescher also claims that luck is
“a matter of those goods and bads that befall us purely by chance, in a way that is unforeseen, unplanned for, and
unexpected – at any rate by the agent herself” (2014, p. 621, my emphasis). My account specifies that this is
particularly true in cases of moral luck since responsibility is involved.
27
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wary about drawing too many conclusions from agents’ subjective judgements about luck”
(2014, p. 604). Pritchard argues that calling an event lucky or unlucky points to features of its
occurrence that are (for Pritchard) modally non-robust.28 But, moral luck cannot leave out the
subject’s construal since we are not making a claim about the event per se, but about the
subject’s decision-making procedure that relied on the event’s occurrence or non-occurrence.
This is clear in cases of luck that involve force or where the results of one’s decision were
unforeseeable.29 In other cases of luck, such as character luck, one’s decisions are affected by
factors that lie outside of one’s control, such as her natural temperaments and upbringing.
Admittedly, character luck is a little different from other types of luck and so I treat it in its own
right in the following section. Leaving aside the special complexities of character luck until the
next section, for now I just conclude that moral luck requires that we take into account the
perspective of the agent and what she can reasonably predict.
III. Moral Luck and Character Luck
While we have made the transition from a general account of luck to moral luck by
showing that in cases of moral luck, luck is relative to an agent’s perspective. But, we have not
addressed all the problems with moral luck yet. For as we move from moral luck in general to
character luck, we see that this particular type of moral luck comes with its own baggage. Hales
argues that it is neither improbable that someone is born to her parents in the society in which
they reside, nor does she have different natural temperaments, residency, or parents in nearby
possible worlds. Thus, on his view, cases of character luck do not seem to meet all conditions for
luck on any hybrid view that is put forth in the luck literature. In section two, I expressed
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skepticism concerning the view of personal identity that Hales assumes in his argument and
argued that he must provide more defense for this view. But, there is another concern for
character luck that arises: who or what is lucky or unlucky to have been born with certain social
and genetic inheritances? Before responding to this objection, let us take stock of the different
types of moral luck and how other types are more easily analyzed on a general account of luck
than character luck.
As I have noted above, Thomas Nagel assumes a control account of luck. He defines
moral luck, saying, “where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond
his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be
called moral luck… good or bad” (Nagel, 1979, p. 59). He then famously divides moral luck into
four types, as the quote below explains. In what follows, I will discuss his four types in light of
the view of moral luck that considers how the different instances are outside of an agent’s
control, significant, and unpredictable. Nagel says of the four types:
There are roughly four ways in which the natural objects of moral assessment are
disturbingly subject to luck. One is the phenomenon of constitutive luck – the kind of
person you are, where this is not just a question of what you deliberately do, but of your
inclinations, capacities, and temperament. Another category is luck in one’s
circumstances – the kind of problems and situations one faces. The other two have to do
with the causes and effects of action: luck in how one is determined by antecedent
circumstances, and luck in the way one’s actions and projects turn out (Ibid., p. 60).
We can call the latter two types of luck causal and resultant. Causal luck involves some kind of
force that determines one’s behavior by either overriding or bypassing one’s deliberative
process. It is a matter of moral luck that someone perform some forced action when she could
not have predicted that her action would be forced, it was outside of her control, and has
significance for her insofar as it causes her to act contrary to how she would have acted
otherwise. There may be cases where a person’s action is forced in a predictable way. If someone
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is a slave, for instance, she may be routinely forced to do terrible things for her master and, after
some time, can reasonably expect to be forced to do something terrible. Thus, her forced acts do
not meet the predictability condition. This case shows that not all cases of being forced are
matters of moral luck. It may be the case that the slave suffered bad moral and prudential luck in
her becoming a slave, but subsequent events, although terrible, do not inherit that luck. So while
her becoming a slave might be a matter of bad moral luck, her performing a routine terrible
action is not bad moral luck, but simply a forced or involuntary action, warranting pity and
exculpation. The assignments of responsibility (or lack thereof) are similar, though the reasons
for pity and exculpation differ.
Resultant luck occurs when the consequences of an agent’s action are impeded in ways
that are outside of her control, unpredictable, and significant. Thus, consider the case of my
accidentally scratching a friend and giving him an infection during the pickup basketball game
that I mentioned above. This is a case of resultant luck since his getting a ticket on the way to his
doctor visit was not a foreseeable consequence of getting a cut. Hence it was a matter of bad
resultant luck that my scratching him caused him to get a ticket.
Circumstantial luck can be broadly divided into two categories. The first category has to
do with the kinds of situations an agent faces. This type of circumstantial luck affects an agent
and her decisions by posing her with situations she did not choose, but within which she must
act. Thus a person faces bad circumstantial luck if she decides to make a deposit at her bank at
the same time a burglar decides to take everyone at the bank hostage until he successfully
commits his robbery. It is unlikely, and thus unpredictable, that someone will be at the bank at
the time it is robbed and the robbery is something clearly outside of the patron’s control. This is
also obviously a significant event for the woman. Thus, she experiences bad circumstantial luck
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of the first kind. Other cases of bad circumstantial luck consider alternate possible worlds, such
as if I were a young German man at the time Hitler was in power, and question whether I would
have acted in morally problematic ways. In these cases, one may simply have been lucky to not
have been faced with such circumstances that are outside of her control and significant, and
where the level of horror and involvement in such terrible crimes was unpredictable.30
The second category of circumstantial luck is of more concern for this chapter. This
category has to do with the circumstances into which you are born, which affect the kind of
character you develop. Hales’ criticism applies to this and the following type of luck. It is far
outside of anyone’s control and very significant which circumstances one is born in. Very good
circumstances – good parents, access to a good education, living in a city with low crime rates,
etc. – give a person a significant advantage when it comes to developing a good character.
Having good examples and not being morally challenged to the point of overstrain, such as how
a poor child in a rough neighborhood might be challenged in being honest or not stealing, are the
kinds of circumstances that can help a child develop virtue at a reasonable pace. By contrast,
developing in very bad circumstances can have lasting effects. A person who grows up in a racist
society will have difficulty overcoming her racial biases even after she consciously disavows
them, as the empirical literature on implicit biases indicate.31
While one’s circumstances meet the control and significance conditions, Hales questions
whether they are improbable or modally non-robust. Similarly, the final type of luck is targeted
in Hales’ criticism.
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Character luck involves the kinds of genetic and social inheritances one has as well as
one’s natural temperaments. Genetic inheritances refer to the kinds of natural temperaments with
which one is born. Being inhibited, for example, can make it difficult for one to develop a trait
where she is generous to strangers in face to face situations because her shyness might be too big
of an obstacle to overcome. Social inheritances refer to the kinds of circumstances into which a
person is born such as the moral goodness or badness of her parents and the moral code they pass
on to their children, the prevalent social attitudes of her society, the conventional moral code of
the time and place in which she is developing, and the other factors surrounding her
circumstances that were mentioned above as the second kind of circumstantial luck. Natural
temperaments broadly refer to any natural dispositions one has either from birth32 or that develop
over time as a result of physical changes. For example, as a person ages, she may find it easier to
be temperate on account of a weakened appetite. Because these factors are outside of a person’s
control and significant insofar as they affect her character development and maintenance, these
are treated as paradigmatic cases of moral luck.
Whether these factors are improbable or modally non-robust is debated: Hales for one
concludes they are not. He argues that if what causes my temperaments can potentially be
explained by certain genetic predispositions inherited from by parents, then it is not luck that I
have those temperaments. Further, he argues that if it is also not improbable or modally nonrobust that I am born into the society in which my parents reside, then the type of circumstantial
luck that affects character luck is also ruled out. By contrast, in response to the challenge that
one’s genetic inheritances are not a matter of luck, Neil Levy argues that the lack of modal
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robustness should be measured not in terms of the agent’s traits varying across possible worlds,
but the variation amongst all people in the human population taken as a whole (2009, p. 496). He
claims that one should ask whether it is unlikely that any human inherit a happy temperament
rather than whether this human was born with a happy temperament in nearby possible worlds.
While this line of argument addresses the modal condition, it winds up being unsatisfactory. For
it is not clear that anything other than congenital defects would count as (un)lucky traits. Perhaps
the odds are low that anyone inherit a positive (i.e., virtue-conducive) temperament like
cheerfulness or being uninhibited. But, it’s not clear this is the case. Even so, it seems that a great
deal of the natural temperaments with which we are born are not rare, yet these are paradigmatic
cases of moral luck. Levy’s response, then, does not address the concern that our natural
temperaments are instances of moral luck. Instead, his response narrows the field so much that it
leaves out the paradigmatic cases of character luck. In section II, I argued that these are indeed
improbable and modally non-robust insofar as there are many possible temperaments, societies,
eras, and parents with which one might be blessed (or cursed).
Still, some philosophers argue that there may be some other phenomenon at work here
that is related to, but distinct from, luck. I have argued in section I that for an event to be
considered a matter of luck, it must meet the control condition. This requires that a person lacks
effective control over starting, stopping, or continuing a process and that she lacks epistemic
control in knowing enough to start, stop, or continue a process and knowing enough to make
predictions or plans in relation to an event. Morally significant events must meet the control
condition to be genuine instances of moral luck.33 But, significant conditions or circumstances,
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such as one’s social and genetic inheritances, that are far outside of an agent’s effective control
are still matters over which we can exercise some epistemic control. For while I may not have
had effective control over the kind of temperaments or social inheritances I have, I can exercise
epistemic control with respect to them by making plans or predictions in relation to them. For
example, I can engage in activities that can offset my naturally irritable temperament. Some
philosophers suggest we call cases that involve general conditions of one’s life rather than
chancy events matters of moral good or bad fortune rather than luck. On my analysis, we can say
that they are close to cases of moral luck since they meet the effective control and significance
conditions, but because they do not meet the epistemic condition for lack of control, they fall
under a different concept. Similarly, Rescher claims, “Luck is a matter of having something good
or bad happen that lies outside the horizon of effective foreseeability. There is thus a significant
difference between luck and fortune. You are fortunate if something good happens for you in the
natural course of things… fate and fortune relate to the conditions and circumstances of our lives
generally, luck to the specifically chancy goods and evils that befall us” (1995, p. 28). Compare
to Coffman’s claim: “You can be fortunate with respect to an event whose occurrence was
extremely likely, whereas an event is lucky for you only if there was a signiﬁcant chance the
event wouldn’t occur” (2007, p. 392).34 The difference between cases of luck and fortune applies
to differences between events and conditions of one’s life. For an event can be predictable or
unpredictable, but some of the general conditions of a person’s life, such as her social or genetic
inheritances or her natural temperaments, are important features of her life that lie outside of her
control and are significant, but are not matters of luck since one can make plans and predictions
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with respect to them. Natural temperaments that accompany age are not unpredictable since they
are common changes that occur as one ages.
The distinction between luck and fortune helps to make an important clarification
concerning character luck. While it seems that out of all the possible natural temperaments and
social environments, a person is lucky to have been born with those conducive to forming virtue,
this is not the case since these are conditions in relation to which one can make predictions or
plans. So, we may be fortunate, but not lucky, to be born with certain natural endowments. Still,
both fortune and luck affect responsibility assignments. For we are not responsible for having a
bad natural temperament, but we can be responsible for not working to offset or change out bad
temperament when we have the capacity to do so. Further, character luck includes not just being
fortunate with respect to one’s genetic inheritances or natural temperaments, but the coincidence
between these and one’s circumstances. For example, a person may be naturally submissive to
the authority of her parents and her natural submissiveness may not be a matter of luck, but
fortune, since it is a general condition of her life. But, whether or not she has good parents will
affect whether her natural submissiveness leads to virtue or vice. Similarly, a person who is
naturally disengaged from others might be lucky to develop in circumstances where keeping his
distance from others is what is best, such as in a place where most people he encounters are
vicious.
So, while we might call it a matter of fortune that a person has a certain temperament, we
can call her lucky if she develops in circumstances most conducive to developing virtue for a
person of her temperament. Thus, character luck is a genuine instance of luck when we consider
one’s temperament and upbringing together. I will thus continue to use the expression “character
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luck” when I consider all that contributes to a person’s character, though I recognize that one’s
natural temperaments and social inheritances are matters of fortune, not luck.
IV. Character Luck and Responsibility
In the previous section, I addressed some concerns about character luck and the type of
circumstantial luck that affects character luck, showing how they differ from the other types of
luck: causal and resultant. Here, I consider some views about the uniqueness of character luck
compared to the other three types of luck that suggest how one might still be responsible for her
character despite the presence of luck. In other words, while cases of causal and resultant luck
remove assignments of responsibility, cases of character luck do not always do so. If character
luck was incompatible with responsibility, luck would be too pervasive to make responsibility
possible.35 The following are the main reasons these accounts give to treat character luck
differently: character has a more internal nature,36 one’s natural temperaments can be active
states,37 one can act out of character,38 and one can take responsibility for who she is in a
forward-looking sense of responsibility.39 I treat each of the views in turn, raising some concerns
for them before I present my own view.
Before I begin, I will first say a few things about responsibility, as there are several
accounts defended and which may have different implications. Here, I avoid difficult questions
of free will and determinism, as these are beyond the scope of this project. But, I do assume that
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any account that denies there is anything for which we can be held responsible is false. For this
requires that one is an error theorist about responsibility such that no application of the concept
of responsibility is accurate. In other words, one would have to hold that every ascription of
responsibility is mistaken. I, by contrast, assume that responsibility is rightly applied in some
cases. The view that no one could rightfully be held responsible is a minority one that is very
much contrary to the moral practices of almost every society. So, I do not think this to be an
unreasonable assumption. For my purposes, I do not here endorse any positive accounts of free
will, but follow a traditional understanding of responsibility to require exercise of control and
awareness. Thus a person who either lacks control over her action or is (excusably) unaware that
the action she is performing is a bad one would not be held responsible for the act.40
To further specify the control condition for responsibility, one should take into account
the empirical literature that presents a challenge to our typical intuitions about the amount of
control we exercise. Several studies in the last century have indicated that the behavior of
ordinary people is significantly influenced by minor situational factors rather than by any robust
character trait or reflective deliberative process. For instance, helping behavior tends to be
increased if one is in a better mood, which is reliably affected by minor things such as being
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around good smells,41 low or moderate ambient noise,42 or finding a dime in a phone booth.43
Generous behavior has been shown to be manipulated by displaying pictures of eyes nearby,
suggesting that people behave generously when they are reminded they may be seen and should
act to maintain reputation.44 These studies challenge our intuitions about how much control we
tend to exercise since morally significant behavior can be manipulated by morally irrelevant
factors. In other words, much of our behavior does not seem to be freely chosen or the result of
an abiding character, but is most influenced by insignificant situational factors.
In order to address the problems of limited control, we must modify this condition in
order to establish a realistic conception of responsibility. Thus, I assume that the traditional
account of responsibility will rely on modest conditions of control and awareness. Rather than
requiring full control or awareness over one’s actions, assigning responsibility should just
require that a person exercise some amount of control and awareness. The amount of control
ought to be somewhere in the area of meeting the conditions for control outlined early on in this
chapter: being able to exercise effective control and having epistemic control over an event.
When it comes to the situational factors that unconsciously affect a person’s behavior, she is
responsible for her behavior if she can choose to help or not to help and has knowledge of what
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(Baron, 1997)

42

(Mathews and Cannon, 1975, p. 575)

43

(Levin and Isen, 1972).

The “watching eyes” phenomenon has been found in different contexts. In a game where participants had to
decide how much of a windfall they’d share with another, the presence of eyes increased generosity (Haley and
Fessler, 2005). Increase in generosity was also found in another game where participants had to decide how much to
contribute to a communal pot (Burnham and Hare, 2007). Increased donations to a communal pot used to replenish
the milk supply in an office were found when a picture of watching eyes were nearby (Bateson et al, 2006).
Decreased littering in a cafeteria correlated with the picture of eyes (Ernest-Jones et al, 2011).
44
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kinds of behavior (that she can control) will result in helping. Even if her helping behavior is
partially (or significantly) influenced by irrelevant factors such as good smells, she is still
responsible for her behavior since it is not coerced. The amount of awareness one has will be
affected by one’s access to moral knowledge. For example, a person developing in a deeply
racist society will be less responsible (if at all) for her racist attitudes compared to a person
developing in modern American society. Further, being aware of all the minor influences on
one’s behavior is not necessary for being held responsible for it. When a person is not aware of
these influences, she might still be responsible for her behavior since she still exercises
awareness of the act she is performing and its significance. Only when she lacks the awareness
of these two things, as the person born into a racist society might, would she be exculpated.
I acknowledge that I am glossing over many difficult details about responsibility and that
I do not provide hard and fast rules to be applied in any particular case where moral
responsibility is at issue. Instead, I am merely appealing to an account of responsibility that I
believe both aligns with common intuitions and practices of assigning responsibility and fits with
the available empirical data. I do this for two reasons. First, I do not think it possible to provide a
precise account of responsibility that has the flexibility to work with the variable moral
experiences characteristic of our lives. Second, my main goal in this chapter and dissertation is
not to provide a defense for these conditions. Instead, I focus on how responsibility for character
and what follows from it is still intelligible according to them. To do this, I consider the common
approach to responsibility and indicate where it might be modified without completely
undermining it or suggesting radical revision. The goal is to show that despite the presence of
luck or fortune, we can still be held responsible for many things in a meaningful sense.
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With some preliminary remarks about responsibility in place, we can see how the
difficulty of responsibility for character arises. For we lack significant control over the factors
that inform our character development and the circumstances in which we develop can impede
our awareness. In what follows, I consider some of the ways philosophers have argued that we
can still be held responsible for our characters despite the pervasiveness of character luck. The
upshot of this discussion is that developing a broader account of responsibility helps us to
understand how to assign responsibility in ordinary cases.
1. Sher on blame for traits. George Sher argues that blame for character traits does not
require control over the development of the traits – which we clearly do not have to a large
extent – because blame only requires the absence of some external impediment, such as being
coerced or ignorant of the facts surrounding one’s choice or act. Since character traits are internal
to us, Sher claims we are rightly blamed for them as they are not an external impediment that
would exculpate an agent. He says,
[T]he agent’s failure to accord the proper weight to moral reasons reflects badly on him
because it can be traced to some feature of his own deliberative activity rather than some
external factor that impedes or constrains that activity. There are, of course, many hard
questions about how to draw the line between what is internal to an agent and what is not;
but their answers are not important here. Instead, what matters is simply that the very acts
over which we are most inclined to say an agent lacks control are also the acts whose
wrongness or badness we are most inclined to attribute to external factors (Sher, 2001, p.
151).
Sher thinks that someone is blameworthy if she deserves blame, that is, if an attitude such as
indignation, disgust, or disappointment is rightly directed at her (p. 155). When someone’s moral
failure is on account of her decision-making process, Sher thinks she is rightly blamed (p. 150).
But, Sher also claims that blame is a wider category than responsibility or punishment; someone
who is blameworthy may not necessarily be held responsible or punished for her blameworthy
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trait (p. 157). A person might be blamed for things he was responsible for and for which he
deserves punishment, but this does not mean that because he is rightly blamed, he was
responsible for the trait or should be punished.
According to Sher, responsibility can be for good or bad things, but blame is only for bad
things. So they have a different structure (p. 157). Sher understands responsibility more than
simply being “subject to praise or blame,” but as having a causal relation to a thing. Since people
do not have a causal relation to the development of their traits, they are not responsible for them.
Sher narrows the scope of causal responsibility to that which has causes rooted in one’s will or
reasons for an act. Since a person doesn’t have a certain kind of character on account of her own
reasons, she is not responsible for her character. So, Sher concludes that one can be blamed for
bad traits, but not responsible for them (p. 158).
Sher’s view is severely limited in a couple ways. First, it does not address the worry that
traits having external sources, such that being influenced by one’s circumstances or being born
with a temperament one did not choose, are not internal expressions of a person. In other words,
one can distinguish between traits that were chosen by one and traits that develop unconsciously
within someone. The former have internal causes while the latter have external causes.
Sher secondly does not distinguish between being bad and being blameworthy. One
might objectively have a bad character insofar as she has naturally vicious traits,45 but if she is
ignorant of those traits or of the moral significance of them (say due to mental deficiency or bad
circumstantial status), she does not seem to be blameworthy for those traits just because they are

I insert “naturally” here to call to mind the distinction Aristotle makes between natural and full virtue or vice. The
former appeal to one’s appetitive inclinations or temperament while the latter require that one consciously choose to
habituate those traits (EN, 1144b4-10). More on this distinction in chapter four.
45
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internal to her. On the modest standards of control and awareness that I proposed above, we can
uphold this distinction between bad and blameworthy traits by considering whether a person
exercised a reasonable amount of control in developing her natural traits46 into virtue (and thus,
for the actions that spring from her traits) and whose awareness is not impeded by poor
circumstances.
2. Moody-Adams on acting out of character. Michele Moody-Adams defends the view
that “part of being human is having the capacity to act out of character – even in spite of one’s
character – should doing the morally right thing, or any other circumstance, require this”
(Moody-Adams, 1993, p. 111). She argues that our ability to act out of character grounds our
responsibility for our actions.
Acting out of character, however, seems to require an awareness that is also subject to
character luck. For a person may have developed under circumstances that limit her capacity to
develop virtue or perform virtuous actions by impeding on her moral awareness. Similarly,
Susan Wolf argues that a person’s upbringing can prevent her from recognizing the need to mend
her character (1987, p. 58). Wolf argues that this happens either because a person grew up where
the wrong values were encouraged, as in the case of American slave-owners or German Nazis in
the 1930s, or because a person has a rough childhood and has trouble revising or avoiding deeply
rooted ideals that lead to serious wrongdoings, as in the case of an abused child who grows up
and commits violent crimes.
Moody-Adams acknowledges this objection and in response she first claims that the case
of the Nazis or slave-owners is implausible. Rather than an inability to see their behavior as

These statements about one’s ordinary character and responsibility will be argued for at length in chapters four
and five where I derive that account from Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Politics.
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wrong, these people demonstrated an unwillingness to consider that they might be wrong.
Further, she thinks this approach makes both the oppressors and the oppressed into victims
without adequately distinguishing them. So, she rejects this as a plausible case where
responsibility might be mitigated (p.122).
Second, in response to the case of the abused child, Moody-Adams claims that we may
mitigate our moral responses towards those who are victims of their circumstances, but that these
people are not free from being held responsible for wrongdoings. For it would not be fair to
exculpate someone for harming an innocent person just because she had a bad upbringing. We
might extend mercy or forgiveness to a person who suffered a bad upbringing, but this does not
mean she is not blameworthy for her wrongdoing. Further, Moody-Adams argues that having a
trait does not necessitate action; one might have a strong bad impulse, but this does not mean that
impulse is irresistible (p. 123). In other words, character is not destiny; one may exercise a strong
act of will to overcome her character-driven bad inclination that developed from her bad
upbringing. And so, Moody-Adams thinks that everyone has the capacity to act out of character.
In fact, she argues that treating one as lacking such a capacity is denying him or her a humanity
since it takes the person outside of the realm of moral responsibility and treats her as merely a
passive victim to circumstance (p. 125).
In the second type of case that Moody-Adams considers, the acting out of character might
also be described as being self-controlled, i.e., when a person desires the wrong thing, but
persists in right action. There are certainly times when this is the case and a person overcomes
her bad character or inclination in order to do something good. Further, as we shall see in chapter
three, on an Aristotelian account of responsibility, one is not only responsible for actions
stemming from her character, but for actions that are voluntary if she is capable of choice. So, I
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do not disagree with Moody-Adams in the cases where a person has developed poor inclinations,
but recognizes that her actions are wrong and performs them anyways. In these cases, a person’s
moral awareness is not impeded by her upbringing, though she has developed strong desires for
the wrong things.
But, Moody-Adams dismissal of the first type of case where a person has developed the
wrong ideals and cannot see her behavior as wrong is too quick. For she focuses on German
Nazis and American slave-owners, which are extreme cases that may be easier to challenge than
other cases falling under the same type. Consider, for instance, the difference between an
American slave-owner who holds racist beliefs about African Americans and on the basis of
those beliefs justifies causing great physical harm to his African American slaves, and a person
who lives in an all-white, slave-free community who holds similar racist beliefs as the slaveowner and on the basis of those beliefs using offensive language when referring to African
Americans. The former person may be unwilling, rather than unable, to see his actions as wrong
given his experience of the suffering of his slaves by his own hand. It is implausible to think that
one could not recognize his wrongdoing when watching the pain inflicted on another. The latter
person, however, does not have access to the kind of evidence that would challenge his belief in
the inferiority of a certain race since his offensive language is used only in the presence of others
who believe it is not offensive. If he were to witness the beating of slaves or be corrected by an
African American when using offensive language and still resist correction, then we might call
him unwilling rather than unable to see his behavior as wrong.47

47

This example draws on Thomas Carson’s ethical analysis of the character of Abraham Lincoln (2015).
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In brief, while Moody-Adams is right to recognize that responsibility for actions is not
always derived from character, she fails to recognize cases where one’s upbringing impedes
one’s moral awareness.
3. Trianosky on active temperaments. Gregory Trianosky rejects two premises he takes
to be characteristic of Kantian views of agential credit:48 that moral virtue must be to the credit
of an agent (i.e., an agent must have the correct motivations) and that natural affections, can be
praised, but are not to the credit of the moral agent (Trianosky, 1993, pp. 94-95). His rejection of
these premises relies on his understanding that credit only requires that a person’s character is
virtuous and she is primarily responsible for it (p. 95). So, for example, if a person develops a
virtue because she is naturally malleable and happened to have good parents, she will not deserve
credit for it since she is not primarily responsible for the development of her virtue – her parents
are. By contrast, if a person is naturally generous, the generous character she develops as a result
is to her credit since she is primarily responsible for it. Unlike being malleable, the person with a
generous temperament actively discriminates between values (p. 96).
In order to understand Trianosky’s view, I focus on his view of credit. Trianosky claims
there are three necessary and sufficient conditions for assigning credit to an agent:
(1) The trait must be a praiseworthy one.
(2) The trait must have the content it does primarily because of the agent’s active
discrimination rather than the discriminations made by others.
(3) Reference to the value-making features of the trait (or of what it aims at) must figure
essentially and fairly directly in the explanation of why the trait is developed and
maintained (Ibid.).
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Trianosky distinguishes between credit and praise. The former is the seat of responsibility and occurs when one
does an action for the sake of duty, not because of any inclination. The latter can be given to any admirable trait
despite its genesis or whether it develops uncritically from one’s upbringing or is a part of one’s natural
temperament (p. 94).
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Premise (1) is straight forward; we only receive credit for good traits. In explanation of (2),
Trianosky claims that agency must be involved in the shaping of one’s character either through
one’s will or by having any active temperament (pp. 97-98). The former is not as controversial –
it seems plausible that one is reasonably held responsible for what one freely chooses to become
part of her character. The latter is more controversial; it claims that one can be held responsible
for our character if it is caused by a temperament that involves actively discriminating among
ends. In other words, when a person’s natural temperament consists of elements that express a
value, she is responsible for the character she develops because she and no one else is the cause
of it even if her valuing of that end is not the result of her own reflective processes. By contrast,
when a person’s natural temperament is passive, he is not the author of the character that he
develops since he merely accepts whatever values are presented to him. For instance, a person
who is naturally naïve or malleable might habituate the virtue generosity because she has had the
good luck of a good upbringing, but she does not deserve credit for her virtuous state since its
habituation was possible only on account of her passivity (p. 98). In other words, her malleable
trait does not consist of any element that indicates that she values being generous or performing
generous actions. Its relation to generosity is accidental; it is the result of her being lucky to have
had good parents and to have had a malleable temperament so that she accepts whatever values
they say she should. By contrast, another person may be naturally inclined towards generosity.
This is an active state because it discriminates among ends; she chooses those actions that
express her generosity because she is motivated by helping others rather than merely pleasing her
generosity-loving parents (pp. 98-99). Thus, a person can be responsible for a character
developing from an active temperament: the active temperament can act as an explanatory factor
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as to why a person develops one trait over another because it is based on the content of that trait
rather than who happens to favor the trait (p. 100).
Trianosky uses condition (3) to further describe the differences between the malleable
and naturally generous person. The malleable person chooses to be generous only to satisfy the
wishes of her parents. If she had bad parents, she could have just as easily developed vices on
account of her natural malleability (p. 101). In other words, she may become generous not
because she values helping others, but because she happened to have good parents. By contrast,
the naturally generous person chooses to develop traits that benefit others because they benefit
others; there is an essential connection between the trait and why she chooses it, even if the
reason she chooses it is due to her natural temperament (p. 102).
In sum, Trianosky argues that responsibility for character makes sense despite the fact
that our temperaments are not under our control when those temperaments are active. In this
way, responsibility for character is different than responsibility for actions since it does not
require voluntariness. Rather, it is because a person is the author of her character and not
someone else that makes her responsible for it. When a person has a passive temperament, she
does not stand in the same relation to her subsequent character as a person with an active
temperament, according to Trianosky, because she is not primarily involved in forming her
character (p.106). From this discussion, Trianosky concludes, “perhaps we may agree that an
innocent truism is as respectable a virtue as its more formal Kantian counterpart” (p. 108).
Trianosky’s view acknowledges the fact that our characters develop on account of a host
of factors over which we do not control, such as our natural temperaments, and in some cases of
which we are not aware. For example, he discusses the noble innocent who develops a good
character as a result of the naturally good temperament she did not choose, but who lacks
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awareness of the goodness of the values that guide her (p. 104). But, he implausibly concludes
that natural virtue could be as much a virtue as consciously habituated virtue. For the virtuous
character that results from an active temperament will not be as stable as one that is the result of
conscious choices since one’s natural temperaments change over time.49
Still, while Trianosky claims that the active temperament discriminates amongst ends, he
says the process of forming one’s character may not be conscious or voluntary. But, this is
problematic for a couple reasons. First, the process is at odds with calling one’s subsequent
character that of a noble innocent. For the exercise of agency in the choosing of ends and
performing right actions is enough to call a person fully virtuous rather than having the natural
virtue a noble innocent has even though she did not choose her naturally virtuous temperament.
Second, it is hard to believe that an adult could be naturally generous and form a generous
character through voluntarily choosing generous acts and being motivated by the right reasons
without being aware so that she recognizes the goodness of generosity. Further, this criticism
also applies to his view of passive temperaments. He claims that a person can develop a good
character, even have the right motivations and make the right choices, but because his character
development was facilitated by a passive temperament and good parents, he is not responsible
for it. This conclusion overemphasizes the importance of the genesis of one’s voluntary choices
that are formative of one’s character. For the adult who was fortunate to be brought up well still
makes free choices that form her character and is thus responsible for forming it. In sum, the
account of a character formed through both active and passive temperament that Trianosky
describes is undistinguishable from a character formed through one’s conscious will. Further, I

I discuss the moral implications that changes to one’s natural temperament that occur in relation to age in chapter
four. See also (McCrae et al, 2000) for discussion of the empirical evidence for temperamental changes according to
age.
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recognize cases of responsibility for character despite one’s being affected by character luck that
Trianosky rejects: a person who freely chooses actions formative of his character is responsible
for it despite the significant role his passive temperament played in acquiring the ends at which
his free choices aim.
4. Card on forward-looking responsibility for character. Card trades a “backwardlooking” or “liability” sense of responsibility, where the focus is on assigning praise, blame,
regret, punishment, or reward, with a “forward-looking” sense of responsibility, where we
focusing on actively taking responsibility for our future actions and selves (Card, 1996, p. 25).
Her main focus is on those who have experienced bad circumstantial luck that affects their
character development, namely those who have grown up under oppressed circumstances and in
turn may develop “survival skills” – vices needed to survive one’s circumstances. She argues
that taking responsibility involves developing an integrity of character rather than autonomy.
Card lists four senses of responsibility, the first three are forward-looking, the last is
backward-looking:
(1) The administrative or managerial sense of responsibility – undertaking to size up and
organize possibilities comprehensively, deciding which should be realized and how;
(2) The accountability sense of responsibility – agreeing to answer or account for
something, or finding that one should be answerable, and then doing do;
(3) The care-taking sense of responsibility – committing oneself to stand behind
something, to back it, support it, make it good (or make good on one’s failure to do
so), and following through;
(4) The credit sense of responsibility – owning up to having been the (morally) relevant
cause of something’s happening or not happening, taking the credit (or blame) for it.
(1996, p.28)
All four types involve a “taking” of responsibility that Card sees as characteristic of being a
responsible agent. A moral agent takes initiative to follow through on some task and puts herself
in a position to be credited or blamed or to make up for the loss in some way if she fails.
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Card’s concern is with integrity – wholeness with respect to important values and
commitments – not autonomy – independence from others (p. 32). Thus she views responsibility
as primarily a matter of staying true to the values and commitments one has. Card’s view, in its
emphasis on developing integrity, does not directly address the relationship that responsibility
may have to characters lacking integrity, characters had by ordinary people who do not
consciously “take” responsibility in the forward-looking sense she develops.
V. The Need for an Account of Ordinary Character and Responsibility
I have presented four accounts of how one might respond to the problem of character
luck and have raised objections to them all. In sum, Sher’s account misses an important
distinction between having a positive or negative quality of character and being responsible for
developing that character. Moody-Adams fails to recognize genuine cases where a person’s
upbringing affects her moral awareness and her ability to understand some moral truths.
Trianosky unsuccessfully tries to identify a fully virtuous character with natural virtue and gives
an account of a character formed through an active temperament that is not obviously different
from forming a character through one’s will. Lastly, Card’s account presents a way for those
with ordinary characters to take responsibility in a forward-looking sense, but does not address
responsibility assignments to those who do not make this commitment. If we instead focus on the
type of character of the ordinary person, we can understand how a person can be held responsible
despite her good or bad character luck. In developing this account of the character of the
ordinary person, we can identify two sources of character luck: natural temperaments and one’s
upbringing. While one’s natural temperament and the circumstances into which one is born are a
matter of fortune, not luck, the way they interact can make one lucky or unlucky. The result is
that we can be held responsible to the extent that we have the capacity to reform our characters,
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i.e. make them better (i.e., virtuous) or more durable, and perform good actions. Still, our
circumstances can impede the awareness needed to motivate or initiate that reform and thus can
provide an excusing factor for a bad character.
In chapters three and four, I draw on the works of Aristotle to develop an account of the
character of the ordinary person that helps us understand how responsibility can be assigned
despite bad luck and fragmentary characters. Doing so allows us to construct an account of
responsibility and character that can answer to contemporary issues of moral luck and the
challenges posed by social psychologists that it is situations and not characters that determine
behavior. In chapter six, I show how Aristotle’s account is consistent with the current
psychological literature on character. Specifically, the work of John Doris on local virtues and
Christian Miller on global traits indicates that the ordinary person exhibits traits of character that
are very narrow when it comes to objective features of a situation (Doris) or broad with respect
to psychologically salient features (Miller). For example, a person might only help another in
need when she is in a good mood. According to Doris, she has the narrow or local trait “helpfulwhen-in-a-good-mood” that is activated in a very narrow set of situations that call for helpful
behavior. According to Miller, she has a global trait consisting of various dispositions that are
relevant to helping behavior, one of which is “helpful-when-in-a-good-mood.” This trait is
activated across situations, but issues in variable behavior depending on how the person sees the
situation, i.e., whether it is one that elicits fear, guilt, a good mood, etc. These views are
consistent with Aristotle’s claims in the Rhetoric and Politics that a person’s behavior is
significantly influenced by her mood and that her character and behavior is vulnerable to
circumstances. This means that the extent to which a person can form her character relies on the
quality of the environment in which she develops and acts.

CHAPTER THREE
CHARACTER, CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT,
AND RESPONSIBILITY IN
ARISTOTLE’S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
The pervasiveness of moral luck, especially that of character luck, makes it difficult to
understand how we can appropriately hold others, and be held, responsible. If responsibility
requires some level of control and awareness, and the natural temperaments and social
inheritances that play a large role in the formation of our characters are far outside of our control
and often impede our awareness, basing an ethical theory on character seems hopeless. Further,
relying on a theory of character and responsibility that is inspired by Aristotle seems even more
doomed. For the traditional views attributed to him set standards of virtue and control that almost
no one reaches. Throughout this and the following chapters, I will show the extent to which
Aristotle’s view in the EN sets an ideal that is difficult, but not impossible, to achieve given what
he states in the EN (this chapter), Rhetoric (chapter 4), and Politics (chapter 5) and what we
know based on recent empirical work (chapter 6).
In this chapter, I focus on setting forth a standard account of Aristotle’s theory of moral
development and responsibility in his EN.1 Since the account I construct in chapters four and five

1

Of course, in giving any account, one must make interpretive decisions that someone will undoubtedly disagree
with, but this is a problem for anyone trying to lay out Aristotle’s moral theory. As much as I can, I rely on standard
interpretive moves or interpretations offered by scholars who do not present controversial interpretations. This is
because my aim is not to present a novel view of Aristotle’s theory of responsibility in his EN. The novelty of my
interpretation of Aristotle’s moral theory comes in chapters four and five.
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from Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Politics is novel, I first must sketch the standard view. I will make
the connections later to what I do in chapters four and five and in chapter six when I respond to a
prominent objection made by situationists against Aristotle’s moral theory.
I argue that while Aristotle’s ethical view put forth in the EN surely does not suppose that
only what is under our direct control is susceptible to moral judgment or a constituent of
happiness (eudaimonia), he does strive to exclude, or at the very least greatly limit, factors that
lie outside of our control as grounds for praise or blame or living a happy life. So while he
acknowledges that a good life will require some external goods (like friendship, money, or a
good upbringing) (EN, I.10, 1101a14-16) which are caused by luck (I.8, 1099b7)2 and that
happiness is vulnerable to great misfortunes (I.9, 1100a6), he rejects the common view that
eudaimonia is the result of fortune (I.9, 1099b18-19) and his account of responsibility instead
favors those things that are “up to us” (eph’ēmin) (III.5, 1113b14).3 More specifically, in his
account of moral development and responsibility at EN II.1-3 and III.1-5, Aristotle gives an
account in which the early habituation process leads to the culmination of a state or hexis, from
which a person can go on to make free choices that solidify her4 character, making it one that is
imbedded with her choices: a hexis prohairetikē. It is this type of character for which one is most

2

See also Magna Moralia (II.8, 1207b18-19) where Aristotle (or at least a view that can be plausibly assigned to
him. Cf. (Bobonich, 2006, pp. 15-16) for some discussion on the authenticity of Magna Moralia) claims that good
luck (eutuchia) is an auxiliary (sunergos) to happiness (eudaimonia). He also acknowledges good luck (eutuchia) as
the cause of external goods in the Rhetoric (I.5, 1361b40-1362a11).
3

See Nussbaum (2001) for a detailed analysis of the Ancient Greek understanding of moral luck. See Tess (1997)
who analyzes the extent to which the Nicomachean Ethics excludes factors that are susceptible to luck (pp. 73-79).
4

Although Aristotle envisions his account of virtue and virtuous character in the EN to apply only to Greek men, I
use the general interpretative strategy of universalizing his claims and applying them to men and women alike. An
indication of this is that I use either feminine or masculine pronouns when referring to the person undergoing
habituation. I do recognize that there are criticisms of this approach to reading the history of philosophy, but I do not
believe these criticisms apply as easily to Aristotle as they do to Kantian or utilitarian views since Aristotle’s view
does not exclude emotions. I do not address these worries in full here as they are far outside the scope of this project.
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responsible. In brief, the standard account of responsibility for action in EN III.1-5 requires that
an action be voluntary (III.1, 1109b31) and performed by an agent capable of making choices in
order for one to be held responsible, that is, to be praised or blamed for performing it. As I will
show in more detail later, this account excludes the role of “lucky factors”5 such as natural
differences, like age, that can influence behavior and instead emphasizes those things that are
“up to us.” After presenting Aristotle’s account of character and responsibility in the EN, I spend
chapters four and five developing his account of the character of the ordinary person in the
Rhetoric and Politics. Taking these three texts together gives us a fuller picture of character and
responsibility in Aristotle’s ethics, one that is consistent with growing empirical data on
character.
Aristotle argues at EN III.5 that we are responsible for actions that stem from our
habituated states (hexeis) because we are responsible for forming those states (1114a4-5).6 So, in
order to fully treat the account of responsibility for action that is presented in EN III.1-5, one
should begin by analyzing the formation of one’s habituated states that occurs during one’s
moral development described in EN II.1-3. For having a state (hexis) is required for

5

That is, factors we do not directly or indirectly control. An example of having indirect control is the control we
exercise over our passions: we can order them by choosing actions that will result in habituated emotional responses.
See Kosman (1999) for discussion of the problem of being held responsible for our emotions despite their not being
“up to us.” See Lewis (2012) who shows how Aristotle’s theory of habituation is supported by recent work in
psychology and neuroscience.
6

Our responsibility for forming our states will need to be further qualified in what follows given how much these
states are affected by factors outside of our control, such as upbringing. Aristotle does not think that we need to have
been fully responsible for forming our character in order to be responsible for actions that follow from it. See Meyer
(1993, ch. 5) for extended analysis of responsibility for character. See also Irwin (1980, pp. 138-141) for related
discussion.

63
responsibility (1111b6),7 and the acquisition of one’s state occurs first.8 In this chapter, I present
the standard account of moral development in EN II.1-3 and responsibility presented in EN III.15. The aim is to present a full picture of the relationship between habituation, state (hexis), and
responsibility, as it is stated in the EN. In chapter four, I show how this model contrasts with the
one that emerges from the Rhetoric.
I. Habituation in EN II.1-3
Aristotle’s moral theory stands out from other Kantian and Utilitarian theories in its
emphasis on moral development. Book II of the EN presents an outline of moral development
through his account of habituation where a person develops a certain quality of character that
corresponds to the kinds of actions she has habitually performed. So, habituating moral virtue
begins in childhood through the repetition of virtuous acts. For Aristotle claims that unlike sense
perception, which is first a developed capacity9 and then an activity whenever an object of
perception is nearby, moral virtues begin in activity before becoming a disposition or state
(hexis) (EN, II.1, 1103a28-30). That is, by repeatedly performing just acts, one may eventually
become just.10 The same will go for habituating vicious traits. And so, he claims,
characteristics (hexeis) develop from corresponding activities (energeiai). For that
reason, we must see to it that our activities are of a certain kind, since any variations in
them will be reflected in our characteristics. Hence it is no small matter whether one habit
7

Choosing an act is required for full responsibility, that is, praise or blame for a virtue or vice (EN, II.4, 1105a32)
and a state (hexis) is required for choice (prohairesis) (EN, VI.2, 1139a33), at least in the fullest sense of choice. See
Sherman (1991) for discussion of prohairesis and the limited sense in which children make choices. I discuss her
view in section one.
For other views that acknowledge the importance of considering moral formation alongside Aristotle’s view of
responsibility in EN III, see Nussbaum (2001), Sherman (1991), and Burnyeat (1980). See also Nussbaum who
argues that treating action as falling into only two types (voluntary actions of children or animals versus actions of
adults capable of choice) makes the move from childhood to adult action mysterious (2001, p. 286).
8

9

That is, we have the capacity to see at birth, without having to develop it.

10

Granted her life is not impeded upon by a tragic amount of bad luck or fortune.
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or another is inculcated in us from early childhood; on the contrary, it makes considerable
difference, or, rather, all the difference (tr. Ostwald, II.1, 1103b21-25).
Even for the child, whose deliberative faculty is not yet fully developed (Politics, I.13, 1260a1214), and thus who does not make choices, the sorts of actions he or she performs will be partially
formative of his or her state (hexis).11
To better understand how the child develops into an adult, it is useful to distinguish
between two major stages of moral development: the early habituation process and a later
development where an adult capable of choice makes decisions that solidify her character. 12
Throughout the early habituation process, the child performs certain acts that partially form her
state (hexis), as Aristotle states at the close of EN II.1. While some scholars hold that the moral
development of a child deals strictly with the material aspects of character, viz. the nonrational
parts of the soul such as the emotions and feelings of pleasure and pain,13 other scholars have
suggested that the moral development children undergo is not limited to the training of the
appetite, but rather, involves cognitive training as well.14 Contrary to those who think only the
material constituents of character, such as her feelings, desires, or passions, is habituated in the
child, Nancy Sherman gives a compelling argument to suggest this view is false. For it would
indeed be mysterious that a child suddenly becomes an adult capable of full virtue if prior to
adulthood she was only capable of feeling appropriately – moral perception, the proper seeing of
one’s circumstances calling for moral action, does not form immediately when one becomes an

11

For discussion on the account of the child in Aristotle’s work, see Tress (1997).

12

See Meyer (1993, ch. 5, esp. pp. 124-125), and Destrée (2011) for more discussion on this two-stage theory.

13

See Irwin (1996) and Brickhouse (1991).

14

See Sherman (1991) and Burnyeat (1980). I endorse this view in what follows. See Kerr (2011) for discussion on
the mechanical and the cognitivist views of moral habituation in Aristotle.
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adult. So, Sherman claims that during a child’s training, he does not just perform certain actions,
but also responds to situations and decides how to act (Ibid., p.175). At the first stage of moral
development, then, the child is cognitively engaged and the level of cognitive engagement
increases as a person’s deliberative faculty develops. In other words, there is no mindless
habituation, as some scholars have argued, but rather, moral development includes the
development of a person’s moral perception that will in turn aid in the development of her
practical reasoning.
While many scholars agree that for Aristotle early habituation involves a cognitive
element, they differ in their account of the ways in which the child’s moral perception is
engaged. Burnyeat argues that the cognitive engagement is in the child’s grasping of the “that,”
which involves taking pleasure in the good and seeing virtue as intrinsically good (1980, pp. 7678). Frede also acknowledges that it is through early habituation that we acquire the ethical
“starting points” – the “thats” – but further claims that since character virtues involve being
responsive to reason, they do not develop independently of it; through punishment, blame,
praise, reward, and verbal instruction a child is mentally engaged (2013, pp. 23-27, 31). Kerr
argues similarly that habituation involves grasping the “that,” but claims also that habituation is
the best suited for this task and that there is no additional “why” that gets added to one’s ethical
knowledge. The “that” refers to the first principles of ethics and so do not need further
demonstration. It is knowledge of the intrinsic goodness of virtue (2011, pp. 650-653).
Kristjánsson argues that the development of phronēsis is in a large part externally motivated, but
it also involves other factors like the natural affection a child has for his parents, mingling with
the right people, listening to the right kind of music, and training one’s perceptual faculties
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similar to the development of skills,15 all of which contribute an internal element (2006b, p. 113).
Sherman focuses on other elements of critical engagement besides the “that.” She claims the
child is cognitively engaged through the gradual refinement of his ability to perceive moral
situations and the actions for which they call. She emphasizes Aristotle’s view that the emotions
are not just irrational responses to one’s environment, but sources of motivation and evaluation
(1989, pp. 169).
I do not intend here to contribute my own account of exactly how the early habituation
process involves the training of a child’s cognitive faculty, though I rely heavily on Nancy
Sherman’s account in my exposition of the early habituation process. I assume that there is more
than the brute training of a child’s appetite during early habituation and that this partially
explains her ability to fully develop and exercise reason as an adult. If it turns out that a child’s
cognitive engagement occurs in one way rather than another, or in a mix of some or all of the
ways suggested above, nothing in my argument will be affected. Instead, I will focus on the
transition from the first to the second stage of moral development, which can be tracked by
considering the difference between the full choices that adults make and the limited way in
which children make choices, which contribute to the development of their moral perception.
Nancy Sherman argues that though their deliberative processes are not yet sophisticated –
children do not take into account very many factors or their final ends – children deliberate
nonetheless (Sherman, 1991, p.175). She claims that throughout the habituation process, the
child is capable of simple means-ends deliberation, but not yet of full choice (prohairesis) (Ibid.,
p. 174). This means that the child, though without choice in the fullest sense, can still make

15

See Kristjánsson (2014a) and Annas (2011) for more on virtue as analogous to skill.
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simple choices resulting from their instrumental reasoning. Although the distinction between
simple and complex choices is not explicitly made in Aristotle, Sherman argues that this
interpretation is not ruled out by what he does claim about the choices of adults (Sherman 1991,
p. 164).16 Sherman’s claim is further supported by what Aristotle says about the choices that
young people make in the Rhetoric (II.12, 1389a35). There, he uses the verb hairountai, rather
than the verb prohaireisthai, to describe young people’s choices. The latter verb, prohaireisthai,
reflects his use of prohairesis to refer to the choices adults make as a result of their sophisticated
deliberations.17
Sherman argues that through the child’s simple choices, she acquires some things that
partially constitute virtue, namely, the seeing of circumstances and feeling the proper emotional
responses (Ibid., p.189). Sherman supports this claim from a comparison of virtue to craft at
Metaphysics IX.8. There, Aristotle claims that the moral trainee shares in virtue just as the craftlearner shares in the knowledge of the teacher as he produces a craft. Aristotle claims:
But since, of that which in general is changing, some part must have changed (this will be
clear in the case of change) so, equally, the one who is learning must, it would seem,
possess some part of the knowledge he is learning (tr. Sherman, Metaphysics, 1049b281050a2).
Aristotle claims that the learner of a craft must have some part of the knowledge he is learning.
Similarly, the child who is learning to be fully virtuous will contain some knowledge of it,
acquired during the early habituation process as she learns how to see situations as calling for
virtuous action. In other words, before she has practical wisdom, she will have some pieces

In Terence Irwin’s article, a similar distinction is made between a simple and complex theory of responsibility.
Children can meet the simple theory’s conditions since they act voluntarily (Irwin, 1980, p. 124). The complex
theory is then reserved for adults (Irwin, 1980, p. 141).
16

17

More on deliberation and choice in section II.
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needed for practical wisdom, such as having the right values or ends. This claim is not found at
EN II.4, according to Sherman, because there Aristotle is concerned with what it takes to call one
virtuous, rather than to habituate virtue (1991, pp. 187-188).
Throughout the process of responding to situations and making simple choices, the
child’s moral perception develops. Since virtuous actions are not going to be identical – they are
context-specific and thus will appear differently in different situations – the child cannot simply
be doing the same thing over and over. The child must be able to see how a situation calls for
courage, even if her distinctions are not fine enough to always read the situation correctly and
she is not developed enough to balance competing values.
The result of the early habituation process is the development of a habituated state (hexis)
that requires the maturation of internal faculties occurring while one is interacting with one’s
environment. As a child begins to pick out salient features of circumstances that call for action,
she gains experience (empeiria), which Aristotle defines as arising from the memories of several
perceived instances of a particular type (Metaphysics, I; Posterior Analytics, II.19). Over time,
experience helps make finer distinctions to better apply virtues (see for instance: EN, III.8,
1116b6-7; VI.8, 1142a13-19; VI.11, 1143b13-14).
As the child reaches the second stage of moral development, she has slowly acquired
finer perceptive skills, the appropriate emotional responses, and has developed her feelings of
pleasure to correspond to the appropriate objects. She has a state (hexis) that expresses some
conception of the good she has acquired through her childhood development. But, these results
are not sufficient for a fully formed state (hexis prohairetikē). Instead, it is the judging and
choosing of actions aimed at one’s final end that fully forms one’s state, and this occurs after
childhood. So when Aristotle claims that one is responsible for one’s habituated state (hexis)
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because at the beginning (archē), one could have done otherwise (EN, III.5, 1114a4-5),
Brickhouse argues rightly that the beginning (archē) refers to a time when we are in control of
our states (EN, III.5,1114b30-1115a2). If this is so, Aristotle could not be referring to children,
who do not exercise such control (Brickhouse, 1991, p. 143). Instead, Aristotle refers to the point
of time when a child has finished the first stage of early habituation and is in a position to fully
form her state so that it expresses her choices. Aristotle must think that after childhood and
before one’s state (hexis) is fully formed – that is, before it is a hexis prohairetikē – a person
exercises control over acquiring a fully habituated state (hexis prohairetikē). Thus, Aristotle
claims we are co-responsible (sunaitioi) (III.5, 1114b23) or responsible in “some way” (pōs
aitios) (III.5, 1114b3) for becoming virtuous or vicious; our upbringing brings us much of the
way as we begin to form states (hexeis) of character that reflect some conception of the good, but
at the second stage of moral habituation, once we reach a point where we are capable of making
choices, we are in greater control. This point is further supported by Aristotle’s claims at EN X.9,
where he states,
Presumably, however, it is not enough if they get the correct upbringing and attention;
rather, they must continue the same practices and be habituated to them when they
become men… As we have said, then, someone who is good must be finely brought up
and habituated, and then must live in decent practices, doing base actions neither
willingly nor unwillingly (tr. Irwin, 1180a1-3, 15-17).
Thus, it is not enough to have properly habituated the right feelings or to have begun developing
one’s perceptive skills, but one must continue to perform good actions when one becomes an
adult capable of making choices in order to form a character in the fullest sense, that is, a state
imbedded with one’s choices, or a hexis prohairetikē. Once the child develops her perceptive
skills, emotions, and feelings of pleasure and pain, she will become capable of making the sort of
choices that stem from a habituated state (hexis). In other words, these choices are prohairetic,
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rather than the simple choices that children make, because they are more complex in their aiming
at a conception of the good. Brickhouse argues that these choices are of the kind for which one is
held responsible (1991, p. 147).
In sum, as a child enters adulthood, she has not yet fully formed his character (hexis) into
a virtuous or vicious one, but she has developed dispositions (hexeis) to feel appropriately;
correct education (orthē paideia) is, after all, concerned with finding pleasure or pain in the right
things (II.3, 1104b13). Though her cognitive faculties have been engaged, they will not be fully
developed until adulthood, and so she is neither virtuous nor vicious, but still has a state (hexis)
from which she is capable of making choices. Only when she becomes an adult can she make
choices because it is only then that she will have a state (hexis) formed through her upbringing
that sets the end for deliberations, and her reason will be fully developed, making thought
(dianoia) possible.18 For Aristotle states that choice (prohairesis) “requires understanding (nous)
and thought (dianoia), and also a state of character (hexis)” (EN, tr. Irwin, VI.2, 1139a33). When
a child reaches this stage of development, her choices will form her character (hexis) into a good
or bad one, and her state will become a hexis prohairetikē, having been formed by her choices.19
If an adult becomes fully virtuous, she will not only have habituated the appropriate
feelings and desires from childhood or made several good choices, but she will have acquired
practical wisdom (phronēsis): the virtue of the calculative part of the rational part of the soul

18
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See Blundell (1992) who discusses the relationship between dianoia and ēthos.

See Lawrence (2011) who distinguishes four types of character that arise through the stages of moral
development: natural character, habit or proto-character, experiential or proper character, and full character. For the
most part, these distinctions correspond to what I’ve said here. The child is born with certain natural inclinations and
has a natural character. After receiving moral education, she has a proto-character (hexis) ready to be formed into a
full character, or a hexis prohairetikē. I do not mark a difference between what Lawrence calls an experiential
character and full character, though it’s possible there is such a distinction to be made in one’s moral development.
Whether or not there is such an “almost virtue” stage does not affect what I say in this chapter.
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(VI.1, 1139a4-15). Aristotle defines practical wisdom (phronēsis) as “a state (hexis) grasping the
truth, involving reason, concerned with action about things that are good or bad for a human
being” (tr. Irwin, VI.5, 1140b5-6). The involvement of reason in a virtuous person’s grasping of
the truth about what is good or bad for a human means that he can deliberate well, that is,
deliberate free from error and about the right goals (VI.9, 1142b24-25), which makes practical
wisdom (phronēsis) distinct from cleverness. Unlike practical wisdom (phronēsis), cleverness is
the capacity that allows one to reason effectively about any end for which one wishes: good or
bad (VI.12, 1144a25-26). The practically wise person (phronimos) instead has the right goal on
account of his moral virtue (VI.12, 1144a7) and is called clever only because he is good at
achieving this goal (VI.12, 1144a28). Along with good deliberation, practical wisdom
(phronēsis) also involves perception of what is good: either in terms of determining the mean
(II.6, 1103b31-34; III.5 1114b29, VI.1, 1138b20) or what action is the right one (II.9, 1109b20;
IV.5, 1126b2). The exercise of intelligence (nous) enables the practically wise person
(phronimos) to grasp the ultimate particular, that is, the contingent fact that will serve as the
minor premise of the practical syllogism, which I discuss in section II (VI.11, 1143b3-4). In sum,
practical wisdom (phronēsis) is necessary for full moral virtue, which can be acquired once an
adult’s rational capacity is fully developed and she is able to deliberate and has the experience to
help make finer distinctions about what situations call for moral action.
A further puzzle remains, one that gets dubbed “the paradox of moral education.”20 The
problem cast in Aristotelian terminology is how we can acquire practical wisdom (phronēsis) if
all we have had was externally guided habituation. Even though a child is cognitively engaged
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(Kristjánsson, 2006b, p.102). The term is originally coined by R.S. Peters (1981, ch 3).
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throughout the habituation process, his cognitive development is monitored and urged in certain
directions by his moral educator. Thus, he develops a desire for certain things – those things he is
exposed to first, as Aristotle puts it – that are controlled by those adults with whom he is in
contact. This also poses a problem for responsibility for character since the ends that guide the
voluntary actions that solidify our character are set by those who have trained us.21 We shall deal
with problems concerning responsibility in chapters four and five. For now, we limit ourselves to
asking how an externally motivated moral perception can develop into a self-guided,
autonomous practical wisdom (phronēsis).
Kristján Kristjánsson argues that we (philosophers) do not know. But, this is not a fault
with our theory. Our ignorance is not due to some lack on our part, but because the answer to this
question is not within our domain. While we might recognize that good early habituation is
needed for developing practical wisdom (phronēsis), we cannot determine how humans are the
kind of animals whose development works this way without much empirical work in moral
psychology (2006b, p. 114). This point is not at all in conflict with Aristotle’s general disposition
towards empirical study. He, for example, states that in order to understand how one moves from
a state of ignorance to a state of knowledge, we need to consult the natural scientists
(physiologoi) (EN, VII.3, 1147b7-9).22 So while we can recognize that our moral perception and
knowledge is significantly impacted by our upbringings, if we are to understand the step between
this early stage and the later stage where practical wisdom is fully developed and autonomous,

Aristotle raises a similar objection at EN III.5: “But someone may say that everyone aims at the apparent good,
and does not control how it appears, but, on the contrary, his character controls how the end appears to him”
(1114b1-4). See Meyer (1993, ch. 5) for insightful analysis of EN III.5.
21
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The physiologoi to which Aristotle refers can mean those who do natural philosophy, such as the Pre-Socratics or
medical doctors. In this passage, Aristotle is likely referring to the latter – those who study the human body.
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we may need to consult (or do) the empirical work on this matter. How this work turns out,
however, does not change what I say here about the role the early habituation process plays in
her development.
Still, Sherman has done much work on Aristotle on the habituation of reason that
suggests ways in which externally guided reason can develop into autonomous reason. Drawing
from Aristotle’s work on the emotions in the Rhetoric, which contain cognitive elements such as
images and beliefs, Sherman argues that the development of the emotions of a child engages her
cognitive faculties. A child learns to see her environment and make finer distinctions as her
parents describe and explain what actions she should perform and why (1991, p. 171-174). As
the child develops and continues to mimic virtuous actions, she makes further distinctions,
eventually acquiring the experience needed for knowledge (Ibid., pp.190-199). So while much of
the child’s development is externally guided, the child contributes internal elements such as her
emotions, which contain a cognitive dimension. Kristjánsson recognizes this point as well,
though he argues that a physical explanation provided by natural scientists will contribute to this
explanation (2006b, p. 113). Burnyeat argues that the acquisition of moral virtue from early
habituation is a less than rational process, but necessary for one to truly understand why virtue is
good (1980, pp. 80-81).23 Taking into account these considerations gives us some direction in
understanding how the early habituation process leads to fully autonomous practical wisdom,
even if we must turn to the sciences for physical explanations of this movement.
In my exposition of the process of moral development, I have presented a view that has
taken Sherman’s account of the moral development of children to explain the process of early
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See Kerr (2011) who argues that habituation is the method most suitable to acquiring the starting points of ethical
life.
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habituation: a child makes limited choices and develops through the repetition of acts that
contribute to the development of her moral perception. While I have focused on the development
of moral perception in Sherman, I also indicate that the child’s feelings will develop throughout
the habituation process so that she learns to take pleasure in the right things. This is in line with
Burnyeat’s view that moral education involves learning to find good things pleasant. In addition
to the insights I have gathered from Sherman and Burnyeat, I argue for a second-stage of moral
development, where a person can solidify her state (hexis) into one that is imbedded with her
choices, viz. a hexis prohairetikē. Once a child has reached adulthood, her rational faculty is fully
developed and she becomes capable of making choices in the fullest sense, that is, choices that
result from a more sophisticated process of deliberation. The state (hexis) that results from early
habituation sets ends that an adult pursues through deliberation. In section two, I say more about
the kind of deliberative processes an adult undergoes when I discuss Aristotle’s theory of
responsibility at EN III.1-5. In sum, the sort of responsibility one has for one’s actions as an adult
requires first that one has a habituated state, or hexis. Once one’s state is formed, one may be
held responsible for actions that are voluntary since she is capable of choice, which are the
conditions emphasized in EN III.1-5.
II. EN III.1-5’s Conditions for Responsibility
Aristotle’s account of moral responsibility requires that the action for which one is held
responsible is both voluntary (III.1, 1109b31) and involves choice (III.2, 1111b6). So, this
section examines the conditions Aristotle claims must be met for something to be either
voluntary or chosen. The result is an account that emphasizes what is “up to us” (III.5, 1113b14),
that is, one that primarily assigns responsibility for what we can control over what merely
happens to us or what we unreflectively acquire as part of who we are. For Aristotle claims that
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we “seek something more” than what comes naturally (VI.13, 1144b7). The sort of state (hexis
prohairetikē) that is subject to praise or blame on this view is one that issues in actions that are
(1) voluntary and (2) either a) chosen or b) performed by adults capable of choice.
At EN III.1, Aristotle defines the voluntary (hekousia) as “one in which the initiative
(archē) lies with the agent who knows (eidoti) the particular circumstances in which the action is
performed” (tr. Ostwald, III.1, 1111a21-23). Here, he states that the two criteria for the voluntary
are: (1) the agent’s having initiated the action24, and (2) the agent’s knowing what she is doing
where “knowing” (eidoti) is understood broadly to include the awareness with which even an
animal operates. These two conditions are broad as Aristotle thinks that not only adults are
capable of voluntary movement, but so do children and animals (III.1, 1111a23). What makes an
agent the beginning (archē) of what is voluntary can include one or more of the following:
desire, belief, or choice. Desires, Aristotle claims, are either rational or irrational (Rhetoric, I.11,
1370a18-27). I will discuss rational desires shortly as they refer to an agent’s choices. Irrational
desires are natural desires of the body, e.g. hunger, thirst, or sex. Aristotle claims they do not
arise from any opinion of the mind. So, these are desires even animal and children have. They
explain the behaviors of both animals and children, who do not act according to Aristotle (EN,
VI.2, 1139a21).
Belief and choice, by contrast, are elements that are proper to the adult who can engage in
reasoning. For Aristotle, these internal elements are what best explain an action as voluntary for
an adult since they refer back to the motivations of the agent. In other words, they reveal her
character (hexis).25 For example, what explains my voluntarily typing this chapter is not that the
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Here I focus on action, though the voluntary (hekousia) is broader than action. A state of character, for example,
could be acquired voluntarily.
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muscles in my fingers are contracting in certain ways that allow them to strike the various plastic
keys on my keyboard. A better explanation, according to Aristotle, refers to my desire to
complete the third chapter of my dissertation, my belief that typing these words attain or help
attain these goals, and my choice to engage in this activity. My desire, belief, and choice partially
constitute the voluntariness of my action.
But these alone are not sufficient. For Aristotle also claims that knowledge of the
particulars is also necessary. For animals and children, knowing what they are doing involves a
basic awareness of their behavior. A lion, for example, desires to eat and engages in behavior
that will result in his eating. In some sense, the lion knows what he is doing even though he lacks
conceptual awareness of the act. For adult humans, by contrast, knowing what they are doing
involves cognitive effort whereby they can grasp the particulars of an act. The sorts of particulars
Aristotle has in mind are the following:
who is doing it; what he is doing; about what or to what he is doing it; sometimes also
what he is doing it with –with what instrument, for example; for what result, for example,
safety; in what way, for example, gently or hard (tr. Irwin, III.1, 1111a4-7).
Unlike an animal or a child, the adult has conceptual awareness of the particulars of the act and
can distinguish between more complicated descriptions of the same act.
Aristotle claims it is unlikely a person would be ignorant of all of the particulars he lists,
but she is said to act involuntarily if she is ignorant of any one of these, especially if the
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Contemporary social psychologist will often reject these kinds of folk explanations that refer to various
psychological aspects of a person in order to determine her motivations. Given that people’s behavior is so often
caused by minor situational factors, of which people tend to be unaware, some social psychologists prescribe to
situationist thinking where behavior is believed to be primarily determined by the kind of situation a person is in
rather than an abiding character or a person’s motivations. While I acknowledge that this is true for the ordinary
person, and I speak more to the kind of character that is fragmented and highly sensitive to situations in the second
part of in chapters four and five, here I stick to the views put forth in the EN, where Aristotle is concerned with
character in the fullest sense – character that will, among other things, be a better way to explain one’s behavior than
reference to her circumstances.

77
ignorance is of the particular that most defines the action (III.1, 1111a8, a17-18). For example, if
I think I am typing this chapter, but I am actually inadvertently sending a code to some hacker
who can and will use it to rob a bank, I can be said to write a chapter voluntarily, but not to have
aided in a robbery voluntarily. Similarly, at EN V.8, Aristotle distinguishes between, for
example, knowing that a victim is a human and knowing that he is one’s father. This means that
the same action can be both voluntary and involuntary under different descriptions: the act of
killing a human was done voluntarily because it was chosen in knowledge, but the act of killing
one’s own father was not because that was not done in knowledge (V.8, 1135b4-6). Irwin
expresses this criterion for voluntary action when he claims that not only must one believe her
action x is F, but her action x must actually be F (1980, p. 124). Requiring that one knows the
particulars of the action involves distinguishing between the intention of the agent and the action;
what the agent intends to do is not always the same as what she actually does. When an act is
caused by ignorance,26 the initiative does not lie in the agent since the act is not explained by the
agent’s beliefs, desires, and choice. Further, Aristotle claims that the agent who acted because of
ignorance will feel regret (III.1, 1110b18-19). In short, the absence of belief, desire, or choice
and the presence of regret are psychological indicators that an act was caused by ignorance.
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Aristotle also distinguishes between acts caused by ignorance and those done in ignorance (EN, III.1, 1110b25).
An act is caused by ignorance in the way we have been discussing: one does not know one or more of the particulars
constituting the situation. By contrast, an act is done in ignorance if, for example, one is drunk and acts in ignorance
of what she is doing. Her act is ultimately caused by her drunkenness, rather than ignorance. One can be held
responsible for doing an act in ignorance, according to Aristotle, because she is responsible for the origin of that
ignorance, i.e. she chose to get drunk (III.1, 1110b30). For example, I may become verbally aggressive when I
drink, causing me to say hurtful things I would otherwise never say to a family member. While drunk, I behave in
ignorance of the fact that what I say is hurtful, but since I chose to drink in the first place, my act is not excusable
due to my ignorance. If, by contrast, I am playfully teasing my sibling about something that seems harmless and
innocent, like his new shirt, but I wind up hurting his feelings, not knowing that he is actually very self-conscious
about how this shirt looks on him, my action would be caused by ignorance and not totally voluntary. While I
voluntarily engaged in teasing my brother, I did not voluntarily hurt his feelings.
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In sum, the first condition for responsibility is voluntariness, which requires an internal
principle of change for the action (i.e., the action is caused, or explained, by an agent’s desire,
belief, or choice) and knowledge of the particulars constituting the action. Though voluntariness
is necessary for responsibility, it cannot be sufficient since children and animals are capable of
voluntary action, but are not properly praised or blamed (III.2, 1111b6).27 The internal principle
required for voluntary action is satisfied by appetite for children and animals (III.1, 1111a25-27),
but, unlike children and animals, adults can also act on their choices (III.2, 1111b8).28 So, a
person must also have chosen the act to be held responsible for it. For virtue and vice require
action (I.7, 1098a15) and action requires choice (VI.2, 1139a21).
The second condition for responsibility, then, is choice. As the result of deliberation of
which children (and animals) are not capable, choice in its fullest sense (prohairesis) is reserved
for adults. Aristotle says of choice,
what is decided is what has been previously deliberated. For [choice] involves reason
and thought… [what is decided, prohaireton] is chosen [haireton] before [pro] other
things (tr. Irwin, III.2, 1112a16-18).29
For Aristotle, choice is the result of deliberation, a choosing of something before others. Because
of this, Aristotle gives an account of deliberation that emphasizes what is up to us (eph’ēmin)
and human agency (praxis) (III.3, 1112a31). For, he claims, no one deliberates about what is

That is, virtue and vice, the proper objects of praise and blame, require more than one’s passions being in a good
state; they require choice (VI.2, 1139a35) and right reason (VI.13, 1145a5), both of which children are incapable.
27

28

In fact, later Aristotle denies that animals act at all. For he claims that there are three capacities of the soul that
control action and truth: sense perception, understanding, and desire (VI.2, 1139a18-19). And of these three, he
eliminates sense perception as a principle of action since this is shared with animals, who do not act (VI.2,
1139a21).
Irwin translates prohairesis as “decision” rather than “choice” because he claims it better captures the thought that
it is the result of deliberation. “Choice,” he thinks, is too weak; it could be used to express mere preference, but this
is not the full sense of the word as it is utilized in EN III.2. Thus, this passage is translated as “what is decided,” and
could also be translated as “what is chosen,” as long as the meaning is clear that it is more than mere preference.
29
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caused by nature, necessity, or chance (III.3, 1112a23-30). Instead, an agent deliberates about
what he should do, thinking through what critics call the practical syllogism. The practical
syllogism consists of a major premise expressing a desire for some good and a minor premise
that expresses a belief about how to achieve that good that is in the agent’s power (Cf. VII.3,
1147a1-9). Unless something intervenes, the major and minor premises will lead to action (MA,
700b19-701a25). For example, I might desire to be courageous and subsequently act
courageously when the situation calls for it. The major premise would be something like
“Courage is good,” while the minor premise involves some perception of the particulars of a
situation that will tell a person how to act courageously, e.g., “The courageous person would fire
his weapon.” These two premises lead to the conclusion: a choice to fire one’s weapon. Unless
something intervenes such as luck or a competing desire (such as what happens when one acts
incontinently), the choice will lead to the firing of the weapon.
The major or universal premise of the practical syllogism sets some end for the chain of
reasoning to promote. While Aristotle claims at III.3 that deliberation concerns not ends (to
telos), but what promotes ends (ta pros ta telē) (1112b33-35), he does not mean that the
deliberative process an adult undergoes is merely instrumental reasoning. Rather, deliberation
can also be constitutive of our ends, as he elucidates outside of book III.30 For instance, one of
his criterion for a person to truly act virtuously is that she chooses the act for its own sake rather
than for the sake of some other end (II.4, 1105a33). Further, he emphasizes in book VI that the
kind of deliberation that is a part of practical wisdom (phronēsis) – i.e., correct deliberation
concerning the good of the human life (VI.5, 1140b6) – issues in actions that are ends in

30

For more discussion on the seeming conflict between the instrumental deliberation described at III.3 and that
which is constitutive of ends in book VI, see Sorabji (1980) or Wiggins (1980).
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themselves rather than productive of other ends (VI.2, 1139b4; VI.5, 1140b7; VI.12, 1144a1). In
other words, the good activity of practical reasoning partially constitutes the end for a human
being, whether or not it is productive of some further end.
Good deliberation concerning the good for a human is not only an activity constitutive of
a human’s final end, viz., eudaimonia or happiness, but it is also formative of one’s desires. For
Aristotle claims that what we deliberate about is what we choose to do, which is what we also
desire to do once we have decided upon it. So, Aristotle calls choice a “deliberative desire”
(bouleutikē orexis) (III.3, 1113a12): after deliberating about what actions are the right ones to
take, we decide on a course of actions that we can do and desire them insofar as they bring about
our end. This process is one of which only adults are capable because it involves an eye towards
one’s final end that takes into consideration many factors, such as different values (VI.5,
1140a28). Although children may be capable of instrumental reasoning and making choices in a
limited sense, only adults whose rational faculty has been fully developed can engage in the
deliberative process within the context of the “bigger picture” of life. Children makes choices,
but unlike adults, they neither consider how one action will promote a certain end far off into the
future, nor how that action will fit in with other values and other ends. In other words, an adult
has considered the alternatives when making her choice and has thought about how to balance
the values at stake whereas a child has not. For example, contemplation may be valued, and one
may deliberate about the best means to securing time to contemplate, but this does not mean that
one will maximize time for contemplation at the expense of all else, such as being a good friend
or relative.31 One will instead consider how to balance the value of contemplation alongside

A similar argument is given as an objection to the exclusivist, or intellectualist, position that holds that Aristotle’s
conclusion to the function argument at I.7 means that contemplation is the highest good for a human, excluding all
other goods such as virtue: “And so the human good proves to be activity of the soul in accord with virtue, and
31
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other values. In sum, deliberation concerns things that are within our control and promotes ends
for which one wishes. The result of deliberation is choice, where an adult chooses something
over the alternatives.32
Although choice is an important condition for a person’s being held responsible, it is an
unreasonably high standard to hold that a person must have chosen each particular action for
which she is held responsible. Further, an incontinent person could not be held responsible for
actions that run contrary to her reasoned choice, and Aristotle clearly thinks incontinence is a
state (hexis) for which one should be held responsible (VII.4, 1148a3). Certainly, a person should
be blamed or punished for reflectively choosing to act badly. But, a person might still voluntarily
do some wrong and be held responsible for it, even if she did not actively engage in the
deliberative process or even if her desire to act overrode or bypassed her deliberative process, as
it does in the case of the incontinent person. For Aristotle claims that an adult can still be praised
or blamed for an action as long as the action is voluntary (V.8, 1135a19-23). So, while voluntary
action is not sufficient for responsibility, adding choice needs to be further qualified. For it is not
the actual exercising of choice that makes a person responsible, but her capacity for choice,

indeed with the best and most complete virtue, if there are more virtues than one” (EN, tr. Irwin, I.7, 1098a11-19).
The objection goes, if Aristotle does mean to exclude moral virtue as constituting one’s final end, viz. eudaimonia,
then he would agree that doing whatever one can to maximize contemplation, even morally wrong actions, would be
permissible, even laudatory. But, this is obviously not a consequence Aristotle would accept and thus happiness
(eudaimonia) must also be partially constituted by moral virtue (which is the inclusivist position). For readings on
the inclusivist view see Annas (1999), Irwin (1991), and Ackrill (1980). For readings on the exclusivist, or
intellectualist, view see Kraut (1989), Cooper (1975), and Nagel (1972). For a middle-ground view, see Lear (2004).
Deliberation and choice do not only guide a person’s actions, but they are also formative of one’s desires.
Although on first glance it seems that desires are not “up to us” and so it would not be reasonable to hold someone
accountable for them, the responsibility assigned to one for her desires can now be explained. It is because our
choices form our desires that we may be held derivatively responsible for them. See Kosman (1999) for further
discussion of the indirect control we exercise over our passions.
32
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which is only there if she is an adult whose rational faculty has been developed and who has
formed a settled state (hexis) so that she is capable of deliberation.33
III. Conclusion
Thus in Aristotle’s account of moral development and responsibility put forth in the EN,
moral development is a sort of training of the appetite that does not necessarily exclude cognitive
elements such as: (1) perceptive skills required for picking out salient features of one’s
circumstances or (2) choices made in limited means-ends deliberations. This account of moral
development in Aristotle is in agreement with Sherman’s view of habituation. What I have also
put forth in this chapter is the relationship between this account and the second stage of moral
development: the outcome of early moral development is a child ready to form a character in the
fullest sense (i.e., a hexis prohairetikē), and become an agent who: (1) has the capacity to
deliberate and make sophisticated choices (prohaireseis) that promote ends, while aiming at
one’s final end, and (2) performs voluntary actions that express her choices, desires, and beliefs.
On this view, full responsibility is assigned exclusively to adults by virtue of their fully-formed
characters (hexeis prohairetikē), but adults who have the capacity for choice, i.e., who have a
developed state (hexis) can also be held responsible for what is voluntary, even before they have
fully formed their characters (hexeis) into a hexis prohairetikē. And so along with an account of
early and later habituation, I have also shown how Aristotle’s account of responsibility in the EN
relates to character (hexis); one needs a hexis in order to be held responsible for her voluntary
actions because a hexis makes one capable of choice in the fullest sense, i.e., where one can
choose from alternatives with an eye to one’s final end. While Sherman and Burnyeat do not
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This qualification is reflected in Irwin’s final definition of responsibility (1980, p. 132).
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develop full accounts of responsibility in relation to habituation, Brickhouse has argued that we
are in full control at the second stage of habituation. My view differs insofar as I claim, in
agreement with Meyer, that we are not in full control of the quality of our characters (hexeis), but
co-responsible for them since our upbringing has a significant effect on their development, as
Aristotle discusses at EN III.5.
Aristotle’s view in the EN sets a high standard for full responsibility insofar as it requires
control (voluntariness) and awareness (knowledge of all or at least the most important
particulars, such as the nature or the results of an action). But, I will show in chapters four and
five that Aristotle’s relaxed view of responsibility takes into account contingent factors such as
age or a bad upbringing over which we do not exercise a high degree of control and which can
affect our moral knowledge. As I have argued in chapter two, the standards of control and
awareness should not be too high; given the empirical evidence that suggests limits to both of
these, we should have a more reasonable standard. Otherwise, most people could not reasonably
be held responsible for many of their actions or their characters. If we consider Aristotle’s
account of moral development and responsibility in the EN as one that assumes a person has
been met with good moral fortune in her genetic and social inheritances, we can still account for
the development and character of the ordinary person – one who hasn’t be as fortunate – and
show how contingent factors affect one’s being rightly held responsible. The theoretical account
of virtue, habituation, character and hexis is still important in determining responsibility, but
another element arises from what Aristotle says in the Rhetoric and Politics: one’s capacity for
developing virtue and performing virtuous actions is also important to consider. In chapters four
and five, I develop this account of responsibility by focusing on the ordinary person and showing
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how a relaxed account of responsibility corresponds to it. I further show that the standard for
judging a person as fully virtuous is not so high so as to be unreasonable and impossible to reach.

CHAPTER FOUR
GENETIC INHERITANCES AND NATURAL TEMPERAMENTS:
CHARACTER, CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT,
AND RESPONSIBILITY IN ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC
Aristotle’s account of character and responsibility in the EN certainly presents a high
standard for the individual insofar as it assumes that she has been met with a great deal of good
character luck. Because of this, virtue is indeed a rare achievement. While it still presents a
standard by which we may judge our own failings, it does not on its own provide enough to
judge whether we are responsible for our characters. For it is important to make a distinction
between having a virtuous character and being responsible for it. I shall argue that considering
Aristotle’s views of the ordinary person in the Rhetoric and Politics helps us make such a
distinction by considering how one’s capacity to develop virtue affects how responsible she is for
her character and what follows from it.
In this chapter, I begin to develop a less stringent account of character and responsibility
in Aristotle, focusing on what he says in the Rhetoric about the ordinary citizen. I argue that
while his EN presents a narrow view of character and responsibility that emphasizes what is “up
to us,” the Rhetoric broadens this view with an account of the character of the ordinary person
and how she may still be held responsible for her character. In other words, while the EN
assumes one has been met with
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good character luck and therefore has a great capacity for becoming virtuous, the Rhetoric (and,
as I show in chapter five, the Politics) provides more material on the ordinary person that reveals
the various ways one’s capacity for virtue is impinged upon. Thus, the Rhetoric (and Politics)
further elaborates the need to consider not only how close or far one is from virtue, but whether
her capacity for virtue has been limited by her nature or circumstances. Doing this allows us to
address the problem of character luck within Aristotle’s ethics. Specifically, this chapter
addresses the type of character luck that has to do with our genetic inheritances or natural
temperaments – either those with which we are born or those we naturally develop on account of
physical changes that come with age rather than conscious choice. In chapter five, I focus on
social inheritances – those having to do with the kind of government and circumstances in which
we develop morally. There I focus on Aristotle’s Politics. In chapter six of this dissertation, I
also show how this account is consistent with the current empirical research on character. This is
important to establishing the viability of an Aristotelian framework which has recently been
rejected by moral philosophers who think that moral development of character is a hopeless
endeavor.
I. Responsibility in the EN and Ideal Candidates for Virtue
Whereas the account of responsibility at EN II.1-3 and III.1-5 suggests that one is only
held responsible for voluntary actions issuing from a fully habituated state (viz., a hexis
prohairetikē), I focus on three commonly neglected chapters in the Rhetoric1 and show how they

1

Aside from Garver (1994), whom I address in section III, the few scholars who have mentioned the passages in
Rhetoric II.12-14 have failed to note their significance for an account of responsibility. Nussbaum only uses these
chapters show that even those with a virtuous state will find virtue hard to retain; as they enter into old age, bad
experiences pile up, and it gets more difficult to trust others and the world, which is required for many virtues (2001,
pp. 338-339). At most, Nussbaum mentions in passing that these temperaments are those of ordinary people, not the
virtuous (though she acknowledges that what is said applies also to the virtuous), but she does not elaborate what
how it fits into an account of responsibility. Sherman concludes from these chapters that the emotional vulnerability
of children described in II.12 may in some instances make them more responsive to concerns than adults, who are
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suggest a broader account of responsibility. Because the audience in mind for the EN consists of
young free Greek male citizens, Aristotle’s account does not have much need for discussion
about the natural dispositions that accompany the various ages of moral agents.2 The account
there assumes one has already been lucky with respect to one’s genetic and social inheritances
and natural temperaments: one is a free, Greek male citizen, who, according to Aristotle, is the
ideal candidate for virtue given his natural temperament3 and moral upbringing.4 So, the focus in
the EN is on those things that are “up to us.” But if we are to investigate how our natural
dispositions factor into an account of responsibility, we must turn to the Rhetoric. Since the
Rhetoric is written for the orator whose aim is to persuade the ordinary person, the accounts of
the various characters (ēthē), or temperaments, extend beyond the population that is in mind in
the EN. Rhetoric II.12-14 instead emphasize the differences in natural dispositions (phusikai
hexeis) that accompany age, rather than choice or habituation. Here the audience the orator will
address is composed of ordinary people who may not have had the ideal upbringing and whose
characters are fragmented enough so that they are capable of being persuaded in either direction.

described as becoming hardened over time at II.13 (1991, p. 173). She also claims that the chapter on the youth
(II.12) shows how experience, particularly of disappointment and failure, is needed to address a youth’s naivety and
overconfidence (1991, p. 197). Only in passing does Sherman note that it may be unfair to blame a youth for her
mistakes given her lack of experience (1991, p. 198). (It is this final claim of Sherman’s that is elaborated and
textually supported in this paper.) Lastly, despite being published a year after his 1994 article exploring the accounts
of temperaments given in Rhetoric II.12-14, Garver mentions nothing from these passages in his book, Aristotle’s
Art of Rhetoric. All the focus on character is given to the character of the orator as the best means of persuasion
(Garver, 1995). Overall, these chapters in the Rhetoric are either ignored altogether or are mentioned without more
than a nod to an Aristotelian account of responsibility.
2

For more on the audience of the EN, see Tessitore (1996, esp. ch.1) where he argues that the EN is best read in
light of the type of audience Aristotle is addressing – namely those who will go on to become either legislators or
philosophers.
3

(Politics, VII.7).

The audience for Aristotle’s EN is one who knows the “that” and seeks to understand the “why” of ethical truths
(EN, I.4, 1095b4-8). In other words, he has had a good enough upbringing to know that courage is a noble trait and
that certain actions are courageous.
4
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Thus, the Rhetoric offers more insight into the kind of people we encounter in our everyday lives
and for this reason it may broaden the account of responsibility found in the EN because from it
we can construct a less stringent account of responsibility that applies to the ordinary person.
This chapter examines the relationship between these two accounts. I argue that from the
Rhetoric we can construct an account of responsibility that applies to more people and judges
responsibility on the basis of natural dispositions (phusikai hexeis) and one’s capacity for virtue
rather than fully habituated states (hexeis prohairetikai). While I acknowledge the effect that age
may have on a person who has a fully habituated state (hexis prohairetikē) – it affects the mean
for that individual – I focus on the natural dispositions of the ordinary person, arguing that her
temperament (phusikai hexeis) may be understood as a rational capacity (dynamis meta logou) in
some respects, and a developed state (hexis) in other respects. An example of this is having what
Aristotle calls “natural virtue”; without full virtue, one’s trait will not always be expressed in
action, but one will still have inclinations in the direction of that virtue. The upshot is that this
account from the Rhetoric can be taken together with the account in the EN to present a fuller
understanding of character and responsibility in Aristotle’s work.
II. The Rhetoric on Temperament and Responsibility
I begin this section with a disclaimer. The chapters in Aristotle’s Rhetoric that treat the
various temperaments (ēthē)5 that accompany age rely on stereotypes of the young person,
person in his prime, and old person, describing each age in ways Aristotle thinks captures the
tendencies of most, but not necessarily all, members of the group. While some of the descriptions

The word ēthos is a general term for character in Aristotle. It can refer to mere temperaments or fully formed states
(hexeis prohairetikai). So, while Aristotle refers to ēthē (the plural of ēthos) in the chapters I will discuss, I specify
that he is talking about temperaments, which are ēthē that are composed of natural dispositions or phusikai hexeis
rather than fully formed states or hexeis prohairetikē. To do this, I use the word “temperament,” but in parenthesis I
include “phusikai hexeis” (natural dispositions).
5
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seem apt – young people do seem to be rather passionate creatures – I do not intend to endorse
all that Aristotle says as necessarily characteristic of each age group. I refrain from doing so for
various reasons: while there may be some universal human tendencies that accompany age, I do
not take the men of the Ancient Greek world to be a timeless representation of people of all
cultures or genders. I further acknowledge that while Aristotle relies on stereotypes, he makes no
indication that his description of the temperaments (ēthē) are to be taken as exhaustive or
exclusive. In other words, a young person may tend to have other temperaments not explicitly
stated in his chapter on the youth and people of other ages may have inclinations that are
stereotypical of the young. For Aristotle claims it does not matter if a person is young in years or
in character (ēthos) (EN, I.3, 1095a7).
Still, there may be a further worry that Aristotle’s observations are not grounded in the
kind of rigorous study characteristic of contemporary social psychologists who work on
character and personality. So the more empirically-minded philosophers and ethicists may be
concerned that Aristotle’s armchair psychology fails to meet the current standards of scientific
observation. Because of these worries, I suspend judgment concerning the soundness of
Aristotle’s claims and attempt to show that the study of these chapters on temperament (ēthos)
are of value because of the implicit principles Aristotle uses in his description of them that
suggest various degrees of responsibility. In my discussion of these temperaments (ēthē), then,
my aim is not to endorse each claim, but to infer an Aristotelian account of responsibility from
the kind of evaluative language Aristotle uses in describing them.
In the first subsection, I compare moral development in the EN with natural development
found in Aristotle’s discussion of the various ages and their characteristics in the Rhetoric. The
moral development of the youth in the EN requires the training of the appetite as well as the
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exercise of perceptive faculties that attempt to mold the natural into virtue. By contrast, the
Rhetoric gives a descriptive account of the development from youth to old age that occurs
naturally, and thus seems to make virtue and vice continuous with other natural conditions like
aging. The second subsection focuses more explicitly on the contrast between the application of
responsibility in the EN and that in the Rhetoric, as is seen in the virtues and vices that are
attributed to the various ages and what Aristotle names as the causes of their wrongdoings. I
construct an account of responsibility in the Rhetoric that is broader compared to the account of
responsibility in EN III.1-5 insofar as it can apply to more people.
1. Moral and natural development. The contrast between EN and Rhetoric when it
comes to the development of character corresponds to two degrees of character (ēthos): fully
habituated states (hexeis prohairetikai) in the EN and temperaments (ēthē), which are composed
of natural dispositions (phusikai hexeis) in the Rhetoric. In both texts, Aristotle uses ēthos as a
general term that refers sometimes to settled states (hexeis or hexeis prohairetikai), other times to
natural or innate dispositions (phusikai hexeis) which may develop as we age or are those with
which we are born. But, while a fully settled state such as virtue is “neither natural nor contrary
to nature” in the EN (II.1, 1103a24-25), the temperaments (ēthē) of the Rhetoric are composed of
natural dispositions – they have not been molded into virtue, but they can be if the agent were to
undergo the process of conscious habituation that I outlined in chapter three. The former (hexis
prohairetikē) develops through repetition and practice, and the latter (phusikai hexeis) develop
naturally and over time, that is, without conscious habituation.
The significance of the distinction between moral development in EN and natural
development in the Rhetoric lies in the degree to which one’s character is formed. While the
fully formed character of the EN will be more stable and dependable, the naturally developed
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character of the Rhetoric will be fragmented and unreliable. This has implications for one’s
responsibility for one’s character. For a person is held responsible to a greater extent for her
consciously habituated state than a person whose temperament was not the result of conscious
habituation and choice. As adults capable of choice, each is held responsible for actions if they
are performed voluntarily or result from their characters. But, they are also held responsible in
proportion to their capacity to have developed a virtuous state. Whereas the person of the EN
whose fully habituated state is the result of conscious habituation has a greater capacity for
virtue, the ordinary person of the Rhetoric has a lesser capacity and thus is held responsible to a
lesser degree.6
To understand natural development, we can look to Aristotle’s descriptive accounts of
the various temperaments that accompany age. He introduces the chapters on temperaments
(ēthē), saying,
Let us now consider the various types of human [temperament] (ēthē), in relation to the
emotions (pathē) and moral qualities (hexeis), showing how they correspond to our
various ages and fortunes. By emotions I mean anger, desire, and the like; these have
been discussed already. By moral qualities, I mean virtues (aretas) and vices (kakias);
these also have been discussed already, as well as the various things that various types of
men tend to will and to do. By ages I mean youth, the prime of life, and old age (tr.
Roberts, II.12, 1388b31-1389a1).
In each of the chapters on age, Aristotle gives an account that focuses on the sorts of emotions
and moral qualities that tend to accompany age. The young people he discusses here are likely
young adults – those in their late teens or early twenties. Aristotle is not specific about their ages,
but since they are potential members of a political audience, they must be older than the children
he has in mind when he emphasizes the importance of a good upbringing in the EN. Aristotle
claims that the prime of life in relation to one’s physical body occurs at age 35 and in relation to

6

See section III.3 for more on responsibility for a capacity.
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one’s mental ability occurs at age 49 (Rhetoric, II.13, 1390b10). He claims that the old person is
past his prime, though he does not specify how much older he is than the person in his prime
(II.14, 1389b11).
As we will see, the development of temperaments (ēthē) according to age occurs as a
person ages and her body undergoes physical changes. For Aristotle’s descriptions of the
temperaments (ēthē) highlight many of the changes in one’s appetite and passions. By contrast,
throughout the process of moral development described in the EN, a person develops as her
repetitive practices form her state. The practices in which she engages are necessary for the
development process. As I have argued in chapter three, this process engages the child’s
cognitive faculties and involves making choices in a limited sense. Once the child becomes an
adult, she begins the second stage of moral development where she can make choices that
determine the quality of her character (ēthos). In other words, the moral development described
in the EN is a conscious one. By contrast, the characters distinguished according to the natural
dispositions which appear at different ages is tied essentially to one’s lifetime and the changes
one undergoes as one ages. The natural development occurs not because of some conscious or
semi-conscious choice in the individual – though it can be affected by conscious habituation.
Rather, natural development occurs as a person’s feelings and inclinations naturally change over
time. For example, the excessive appetites characteristic of young people weaken with age as the
body undergoes physical change. So, the account of development given in EN differs from that
which is given in the Rhetoric since the former emphasizes the exercise of one’s reason in
conscious choice and action and the latter emphasizes the physical changes a person experiences.
In comparison to the moral development that occurs through practice, the natural
development that comes with age suggests a different model of responsibility. In the EN, full
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responsibility is assigned to those acting from fully developed states (II.4, 1105a34). But, acting
from a temperament (ēthē) that has developed naturally, that is, simply on account of age and the
underlying feelings that accompany it, may suggest that assigning responsibility to those people
is not as stringent as the account in the EN that requires voluntary action and the capacity for
choice. For Aristotle describes the character of the virtuous person in the EN as a hexis
prohairetikē – a state imbedded with choice. Yet, one’s natural dispositions are not the result of
conscious choice. Any responsibility one might have for them, then, would have to be
diminished if it is to be fair. The evaluative language Aristotle uses to discuss these
temperaments (ēthē) suggests such a mitigated account.
2. Responsibility in the Rhetoric. Shortly before Aristotle introduces the temperaments
(ēthē) in the Rhetoric, he claims that they are important for the orator to know since they
regularly accompany certain actions.
We must consider what kinds of actions and of people usually go together; for while
there are no definite kinds of actions associated with the fact that a man is fair or dark,
tall or short, it does make a difference if he is young or old, just or unjust (tr. Roberts,
I.10, 1369a24-26).
Aristotle claims that just as a fully habituated state (hexis prohairetikē) with traits such as being
just or unjust correspond to just or unjust actions, so too does age correspond to certain
tendencies. Aristotle opens his chapters on the various ages (youth, prime of life, and old) by
stating that he will examine the temperaments (ēthē) that tend to accompany each.7 The
temperaments he introduces can be categorized into four aspects of the person: desires, emotions,

In chapter six, I broaden Aristotle’s use of temperament (ēthē) according to age. I assume that while these may be
stereotypical temperaments (ēthē) of the young, old, and person in her prime, nothing Aristotle says conflicts with
the idea that anyone, regardless of age, could have these temperaments (ēthē). In fact, he claims in the EN that “it
does not matter whether [a person] is young in years or immature in character (ēthos)” (I.4, 1095a7).
7
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attitudes, and actions.89 So for example, he describes the temperament of the young as follows.
Their desires are strong, especially bodily desires, fickle, and violent though fleeting (II.12,
1389a3-9). Their emotions include being hot-tempered, easily angered, and lovers of honor
(II.12, 1389a9-16). Their attitudes are described as their tendency to see the good rather than the
bad. They’re hopeful, confident, courageous, and high-minded (II.12, 1389a17-34). Lastly, they
tend to act in accordance with what’s noble rather than what’s useful. Their wrongdoings are
caused by arrogance or insolence (hubris). Their actions are often excessive and they are ready to
show pity and enjoy themselves (II.12, 1389a34-1389b12).
Of the old, Aristotle claims that their desires are weak or nonexistent. Of their emotions,
he claims they have violent, but weak anger (II.13, 1390a11-16). Of their attitudes, Aristotle
claims they are cautious, pessimistic, cynical, distrustful, small-minded, ungenerous, and
cowardly. Their fondness for living and selfishness causes their attention to be fixed on the
useful rather than the noble. Further, they care not for what others think of them and they are not
hopeful (II.13, 1389b15-1390a6). Lastly, Aristotle claims that their actions are aimed at what’s
useful rather than what’s noble and their wrongdoings are caused by malice (kakourgia) (II.13,
1390a16-24).
After describing the temperaments of the young and old person, Aristotle describes those
in their prime. He claims that they enjoy the advantages of the young and the old and are free
from their defects. So, their emotions and desires are not excessive like the young person or
deficient as those of the old person (II.14, 1390b2-3). Their attitudes align more with reality,
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Consider the similarity to the CAPS model of personality, popular among social psychologists who define
personality with respect to both cognitive and affective units that issue in “behavioral signatures.” See Snow (2010,
ch. 1) for more discussion on the CAPS model. For criticism, see Doris (2002, pp. 76-85) and Miller (2014a, ch.5).
9

Although Aristotle does not explicitly categorize the natural dispositions this way, they seem to fall under these
categories. See Grimaldi (1988) who makes such a categorization.
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neither trusting nor distrusting too much, being overly confident nor overly fearful (II.14,
1390a30-33). They are temperate like the old person and courageous like the young one (II.14,
1390a30-1390b6). Lastly, they act both for what is noble and for what is useful (II.14, 1390a341390b1).
As I have stated at the opening of this section, my aim in cataloging the various
temperaments is to infer the principle behind Aristotle’s remarks and not to endorse each claim
as definitely characteristic of all, or even most, people who are members in each age group. So,
while some of Aristotle’s claims seem plausible, what is interesting here is what we can infer
about what counts as a temperament. Within the three age groups, Aristotle focuses on
temperamental inclinations concerning one’s desires, emotions, attitudes, and actions. The
young, for instance, have a temperament (phusikai hexeis) that is characterized by excess; they
are courageous only because of an excess of confidence and lack self-control because of their
strong desires. Their temperaments, thus, consist of a variety of emotional, cognitive, and
behavioral inclinations that are not necessarily unified: a young person’s excessive desire for
bodily pleasure may conflict with her love of the noble. Further, they are natural states; they
develop according to one’s physical state rather than because of one’s choices.
Still, I do not take his list of temperaments as exhaustive of the types of temperaments a
person can have. For Aristotle has an agenda in writing these chapters on the temperaments
(ēthē) that focuses on those features that are most relevant to an orator who will attempt to
persuade his audience to choose a political course of action, convict or release a defendant, or to
praise or blame a person. Thus, his concern is only for the inclinations that are most relevant to
those types of situations. A person’s being inhibited, for example, is just one temperament we
could add to the list that would be consistent with everything Aristotle says here, but is
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unnecessary for an orator to consider since one’s being shy will not bear much on whether, for
example, she finds a person guilty or innocent compared to her readiness to pity others.
Having discussed the framework within which Aristotle catalogues the temperaments
(ēthē) that accompany age, we can now consider how the particular temperaments (ēthē) he
attributes to each age group are described with evaluative language suggestive of an implicit
account of responsibility. Of the youth, Aristotle says they have strong appetites, fickle desires,
lack self-control, are inexperienced, and that they are easily angered (II.12, 1389a3-10, 17-18).
These characteristics coincide with claims from EN about children lacking experience and being
guided by feelings (EN, I.3, 1095a3-5). To some extent, then, a youth will live like a child whose
actions are motivated by his passions rather than reason. Yet, at Rhetoric II.12, Aristotle also
gives an account that shows that as a child becomes an older youth, he develops certain
inclinations that become characteristic of him; his hexis has begun to form with respect to his
emotions, feelings, and he has begun to form a conception of the good – one that he has acquired
through early moral habituation. And while his behavior is still motivated by his appetite, he
develops an appetite for the noble. When Aristotle discusses the attitudes and actions of the
youth, the contrast to EN is more salient.
[The young] look at the good side rather than the bad, not having yet witnessed many
instances of wickedness. They trust others readily…They are sanguine; nature warms
their blood as though with excess wine; and besides that, they have not yet often been
cheated… they have exalted notions because they have not yet been humbled by life or
learnt its necessary limitations… [They] would always rather choose (hairountai) noble
deeds than useful ones: their lives are regulated more by moral feeling (ēthei) than by
reasoning; and whereas reasoning leads us to choose what is useful, moral goodness
(aretē) leads us to choose what is noble (kalon) (tr. Roberts, Rhetoric, II.12, 1389a33-35).
Concerning their attitudes, Aristotle here claims that the young are hopeful, high-minded, and
see the good over the bad because of their lack of experience. When it comes to their actions, he
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claims they live by character (ēthos)10 and aim at the noble (kalon). And so, by considering the
passage on the youth from the Rhetoric, we can see there is progression between the very young
child in EN and a youth who shows a greater capacity for virtue in his inclinations towards the
noble. Both in his attitudes and actions, a youth expresses an attraction to the noble and so these
natural inclinations partially constitute his temperament (phusikai hexeis). The youth is not
outside the realm of moral judgment; he not only seeks the noble, but is naturally courageous
(II.12, 1389a26), a virtue which is to be praised in EN when it is accompanied by practical
wisdom (phronēsis) (VI.13, 1144b10).11
Insofar as they incline towards the noble and contain a natural disposition for courage,
the temperaments of the youth are not morally neutral. In other words, they provide some
grounds for assigning responsibility. Still, they are not held as responsible for the actions that
follow from their temperaments as they would be if they were fully virtuous or vicious. For
instance, Aristotle claims in the Rhetoric that the wrongs the youth commit are not on account of
vice:
And the wrongs [youth] commit come from insolence (hubris), not maliciousness
(kakourgia) (tr. Garver, II.12, 1389b7-8).
Rather than vice, the wrongs that a young person commits are attributed to hubris. In an earlier
chapter on anger (II.2), Aristotle describes acts hubris when he catalogues three types of

While it is evident that ēthos is a general word for character in Aristotle, in these passages on age, he uses ēthos in
a narrower sense – one that has moral implications. For he claims that character (ēthos) is concerned with virtue
(aretē) (Rhetoric, II.13, 1390a18).
10

Consider Garver: “The dynameis of the ages of men both are, and are not, outside moral evaluation. They tend
towards certain ends… but they, like the akratic and the self-controlled, lack effective prohairesis, and so stand
outside moral judgment in the fullest sense” (1994, p. 188).
11
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slighting – the active holding of an opinion that something is valueless (II.2, 1378b10) – one of
which is insolence (hubris).12
Insolence (hubris) is also a form of slighting, since it consists in doing and saying things
that cause shame to the victim, not in order that anything may happen to yourself, or
because anything has happened to yourself, but simply for the pleasure involved.
(Retaliation is not ‘insolence,’ but vengeance.) The cause of the pleasure thus enjoyed by
the insolent man is that he thinks himself greatly superior to others when ill-treating
them. That is why youths and rich men are insolent (hubristai); they think themselves
superior when they show insolence (tr. Roberts, II.2, 1378b22-28).
While this passage concerns acts of hubris, rather than hubris as a trait, considering it helps
provide context for an understanding of the significance of the term in Aristotle’s view. If acts of
hubris are those aimed at pleasure, then a hubristic person is one whose wrongdoings are often
motivated by her desire for a certain kind of pleasure: the pleasure of feeling superior to others.
Aristotle’s claim that the cause of the young person’s wrongdoing is insolence (hubris) suggests
that her wrongdoings are ultimately caused by her excessive appetite and lacks the intention to
harm others. Although insolence (hubris) may carry the full blameworthiness of a vice in one’s
willingness to do wrong to others for the sake of passing one’s ego, Aristotle seems to diminish
blame when it comes to calling a young person insolent rather than malicious. Compare how
Roberts translates the line quoted above where Aristotle states the young person’s wrongdoing is
on account of insolence (hubris), not malice (kakourgia):
If they do wrong to others, it is because they mean to insult them, not to do them actual
harm (II.12, 1389b7-8).

While Roberts translates hubris as “insolence,” another translation of hubris that makes sense here is “arrogance.”
Insolence refers to the aspect of the trait where a young person is ready to insult or disrespect others, but since this is
done for the sake of feeling superior, arrogance also captures part of this notion. Neither English word is a perfect fit
and so I follow translators by using “insolence,” though I sometimes refer to hubris as “arrogance” when that aspect
of the trait is being referred to.
12
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The suggestion that both Garver13 and Roberts make is that wrongs caused by insolence
(hubris) are not as serious or blameworthy than those caused by malice (kakourgia) because they
do not involve the intention to harm another person. While Grimaldi challenges this
understanding, the evidence he presents in support of his objection is very weak. For he claims
that at Politics IV.11, 1295b9-11, Aristotle claims that wrong actions (adikēmata) are caused by
either hubris or kakourgia and that the former are serious wrongdoings, while the latter are minor
(Grimaldi, p. 199). But, what Aristotle actually says in the passage that Grimaldi quotes is that
those who are excessively wealthy, beautiful, strong, or well-born “turn more to hubris and
grand wickedness (megaloponēros)” while those who are the opposite, excessively poor, ugly, or
weak “to malice (kakourgia) and petty wickedness (microponeroi)” (IV.11, 1295b9-11). First,
Aristotle does not seem to be identifying hubris with “grand wickedness” and kakourgia with
“petty wickedness,” but rather, identifying two characteristic features of the rich, well-born, and
powerful compared to the poor, ugly, and weak. Second, he does not mention the young here,
who he claims in Rhetoric II.12 also act from hubris. Thus, his description may not be intended
to apply to them. A person may act from hubris, but may not necessarily be wicked.
Still, Grimaldi identifies two kinds of wrongdoing (adikēmata) in Aristotle: one issues
from deliberation and choice and the other from emotion.14 Grimaldi claims that it’s not clear
which of these kinds are being discussed in the chapter on the youth, but given that the
temperaments Aristotle describes are constituted by a set of emotional inclinations and lack
choice, it is most plausible to think the wrongdoings are caused by emotion. Aristotle claims that
actions caused by emotion are voluntary,15 but without choice, are not grounds for full
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Cf. (Rhetoric, I.13, 1373b36)
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responsibility.16 Thus, the young person’s wrongdoing, insofar as it is caused by his excessive
desire for superiority and not a desire to actually harm another,17 is not as serious an offense as
one caused by maliciousness (kakourgia), which includes a desire to harm. Perhaps the hazing
that is often done by fraternity and sorority members is an example of the insolence or arrogance
(hubris) of the young. While this behavior is very unsavory and rightly condemned, the purpose
of the behavior seems to be aimed at the pleasure involved in embarrassing another person that
allows the young person to assert superiority over him or her. Of course in some cases the aim is
to humiliate another person completely, but I do not mean to include such cases here. Compared
to sadistic acts where the aim is to cause real harm to another and the pleasure is taken in the
suffering of the other, the act of hazing in order to cause mild embarrassment is not as
blameworthy. I use this example somewhat ambivalently since I recognize that there are many
instances of hazing that are excessive and do cause great harm. I restrict what I say here to more
“innocent” acts of hazing, such as making a male pledge where a dress to a party, rather than
other acts that put the individual in serious psychological or physical harm.
Still, the young person is not blameless for acting out of insolence (hubris) as he is at the
stage where he is capable of making choices that form his character. The young person who has
the disposition to insult others for the sake of pleasure has a bad trait even if his aim is not to do
harm. The wrong acts of the youths that are caused by insolence (hubris) are acts for which they
can be held responsible, at least to some degree, despite the lack of choice-imbedded state (hexis
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(EN, III.2, 1111b6).
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(Ibid., 1111b8), (III.5, 1114a4-7), (VI.2, 1139a21).

I suppose then that if the youth’s superiority could be established another way, he or she would forgo causing
harm.
17
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prohairetikē) corresponding to them because the youth is capable of making right choices. By
contrast, in the EN, it is acting from a habituated state (hexis) formed by choice (prohairesis) that
confers responsibility (III.5, 1114a4-7), and a person with a habituated state who does wrong
would be at best incontinent and at worse vicious, both of which are subject to blame in the EN
(VI.4, 1148a3; III.5, 1113b14).18
Aristotle’s description of the youth here calls to mind the incontinent person of the EN:
just as the incontinent person has the right principle, but acts contrary to it when overcome by
desire (EN, VII.8, 1151a6), young people choose (hairountai) the noble (kalon), but act wrongly
because of their excessive appetites.19 Yet, there is an important difference between the two.
While the young person chooses (hairountai) the noble over the useful, he may only be capable
of making choices that are not the result of complex deliberations about the ends that constitute a
good life.20 Alternately, the young person might be at the beginning of the second stage of moral
habituation, where his rational faculty is developed and he is capable of making complex
choices, but he has not yet fully formed his character.21 So while the preference for the noble that
is attributed to youth is indicated by hairountai, the verb for choosing, it either does not have the
force of a choosing something before other things, or prohairesis, as is the case when the
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Aristotle claims in the EN that both continence and incontinence are of the same kind (genos) as virtue and vice
(VII.1, 1145b2), which he argued are states (hexeis) (II.5, 1106a14). States (hexeis), he claims, are the only things in
soul that are subject to praise or blame (II.5, 1106a1-8). And, on my interpretation, his claim at EN III.5 that we are
responsible for our virtuous and vicious actions because we are responsible for the states that cause them (III.5,
1114a20-22) refers to the kind of state that is solidified through one’s choices, viz. a hexis prohairetikē, the state that
is formed at the second stage of habituation when a young adult is old enough to deliberate and make choices in the
fullest sense.
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In fact, Aristotle is not confident that any audience member, regardless of age, can follow a long chain of
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He has some dispositions (hexeis) that have formed from his upbringing, but his character is still a mere
temperament (phusikai hexeis) because he has not yet fully formed it into a hexis prohairetikē.
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incontinent person has right reason, but acts contrary to it (VII.9, 1151a30; VII.10, 1152a20), or
it is not a choice that issues from a fully formed state (hexis prohairetikē). Unlike the incontinent
person who has right reason, the wrongdoings of the youth are caused by affective inclinations:
“all their mistakes are in the direction of doing things excessively and vehemently…they love
too much and hate too much, and the same with everything else” (II.12, 1389b3-5). Thus, the
young person is not like the incontinent person who has the right reason, but acts wrongly
because the young person has not yet developed right reason.
By showing the contrast between, first, the youth and the child in the EN, and, second,
between the youth and the incontinent person, it is evident that the Rhetoric offers more insight
into the temperaments (ēthē) of the youth. For, unlike the child of the EN, the youth do have
tendencies that characterize them in some sense and are subject to moral judgment, but unlike the
incontinent person, they have not acquired right reason and so are not going to be held as
accountable for their actions as an adult in the EN is. Young people in the Rhetoric occupy some
middle ground between having no responsibility for their actions or attitudes and having full
responsibility for them.
To understand what explains the middle ground youths occupy, it is illuminating to
compare what Aristotle says about them with what he says about the old in the following chapter
(Rhetoric, II.13). For the old also have certain inclinations constituting a natural temperament
(phusikai hexeis), yet, unlike young people, they seem to be held accountable for their
wrongdoings to a greater degree. Aristotle claims that the old act for the sake of what is useful
(sumpheron), not noble (kalon) and that their wrongdoings are from malice (kakourgia):
In [the old person’s] manner of life there is more calculation (logismos) than character
(ēthos), for calculation is concerned with that which is useful (sumpheron), character with
virtue (aretē). And the wrongs the old commit come from malice (kakourgia), not from
insolence (hubris) (tr. Garver, II.13, 1390a16-19).
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By contrast to the youth whose wrongdoings are on account of insolence (hubris), the old are
seemingly held more responsible given that malice, because it involves the intention to harm
another, is very close to a vice, if not itself a vice. Kakourgia, translated here as “malice,” is also
translated as “vice” 22 or “small-minded malice,”23 suggesting some disagreement amongst
scholars as to how serious this trait is. Aristotle does not offer any definition of kakourgia in his
EN, Politics, or Rhetoric. He uses it to name the cause of the wrongdoings of the old, but not the
young in the Rhetoric (II.13, 1390a18-19). He mentions it alongside the small-scale evils
(microponeroi) of the poor in the Politics passage cited above (IV.11, 1295b9-11) and as a
general word for “evildoing” in the EN (IX.3, 1165b13). So, we are left to guess whether it is a
vice or a less serious, though still reproachable, cause of wrongdoing. Certainly our modern
understanding of malice is that it is a terrible vice; Robert Adams, for one, claims malice
involves opposing the good for its own sake and is thus a very serious vice.24 That “malice” is
too strong of a word to translate kakourgia is possible, but kakourgia is often used to refer to
wickedness, evil, villainy, or vice.25 The word comes from the verb kakourgeō, meaning
wrongdoing, and describes the doings of a kakourgos, a criminal or wrongdoer. And so, insofar
as it means wrongdoing, it involves the intention to harm rather than merely describe an act as
being a bad or harmful one. For Aristotle talks about kakourgia as a cause of wrongdoings
(adikēmata) and so being a kakourgos and harmful acts are distinct. Still, there are other senses
of the word in other contexts. For example, Aristotle uses kakourgeō in a similar way as Plato
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does when referring to arguments that one falsifies or corrupts (Rhetoric, III.2, 1404b39). In his
Republic, Plato uses it to mean “bad workmanship” or “badly made” (422a). Despite the wide
usage of the term, when speaking of people, it is often used to refer to their being villainous since
they perform wrong actions intentionally. Thus, there are grounds for considering it a more
serious flaw than arrogance or insolence (hubris), which does not include the intention to harm
but to get pleasure.
We can compare the old people Aristotle describes to the inattentive people of EN III.5 as
both seem to be responsible for having developed a faulty character. In response to the
suggestion that an inattentive person may be exculpated, Aristotle claims that “only a totally
insensible person (anaisthētos) would not know that a given type of activity is the source of the
corresponding state (hexis)” (tr. Irwin, III.5, 1114a10-11). Aristotle argues that at the time a
person is able to form her character (hexis), she is free to act in ways that determine its quality,
that is, whether it has virtues or vices (III.5, 1114b30-1115a2). Brickhouse notes that this time
must be sometime at the beginning of adulthood, when one is able to make choices that will fully
form one’s character (1991, pp. 143-144). It is not the child who is at the first stage of moral
habituation who would be called anaisthētos for not knowing certain actions will form a bad
state; he is still in the process of learning this. Even the young adult at the start of the second
stage of moral habituation will not have had enough experience to always know better. The old
person, by contrast, should know better on account of his life experiences. As Susan Meyer
claims, the assumption Aristotle makes at III.5 is that a person already knows which activities
are unjust or intemperate by virtue of his Athenian upbringing (1993, pp. 140-141). Thus,
Aristotle argues that once a person has reached a certain age, she cannot appeal to ignorance or
carelessness as an excuse for her behavior since she should have known better, assuming her
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upbringing has been adequate.26 Like the inattentive person, the old person could have chosen to
act in ways that would have made her into a better person. Unlike the young person, who is
approaching the time when he is able to form a fully habituated state (hexis prohairetikē), the old
person has passed this period and has failed to do so; she is still in many ways driven by her
desires and feelings rather than thought and choice. She lives according to feeling (kata pathos)
and not according to choice (kata prohairesin).27
Since a person acting from malice, which involves an intention to harm, possesses greater
responsibility than a person acting from hubris, where this intention is lacking, the older person
is more responsible for her behavior because she should have known better; she has a greater
capacity to form virtue and has failed to take advantage of the opportunities to do so. A bad act
caused by hubris, by contrast, does not necessarily involve knowledge of the badness of the act
(i.e., the harm it causes) and the youth’s ignorance may be excused in a way that an older
person’s cannot. Compared to the youth, the older person has a greater capacity for virtue on
account of his extra years of experience that enable him to discern the good, and because of this
the old person is more responsible for his wrong actions than on the young person for his.
The likeness of the older person to the inattentive person helps make an important
distinction in assigning responsibility. If Aristotle’s view is that a person is held responsible to
the greatest degree on the basis of her fully habituated state (hexis prohairetikē) and actions that
follow from these, he does not seem to properly acknowledge a person’s capacity and
responsibility for developing or failing to develop a good character. For if a person has been
blessed with good genetic fortune and good social fortune, yet fails to develop virtue, he seems
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to be more blameworthy than a person who has suffered extraordinary abuses as a child and as a
consequence develops vices willingly. Even if the former does not develop vices, he has less of
an excuse for poor behavior than the latter who might commit the same bad act, but because she
is vicious. In other words there is an important difference between how virtuous a person’s
character is and how much credit she deserves for her character. But, if acting from a fully
developed state (hexis prohairetikē), like virtue or vice,28 makes one a greater candidate for
responsibility, than the latter is, contrary to intuition, more blameworthy than the former for
one’s character and what follows from it.
While it seems Aristotle gets things wrong when it comes to this particular case, the
emphasis on one’s upbringing helps clear things up. For Aristotle says a good upbringing “makes
all the difference” when it comes to a child’s moral development; a child needs to begin desiring
the right things and developing her cognitive capacities to accurately perceive moral situations.
When an upbringing is particularly heinous, a child will develop badly. Aristotle, for example,
claims that a “bestial state,” that is, a state that is characterized by taking pleasure in morbid
things, can be caused by an abusive childhood (EN, VII.5, 1148b30). In this case, a person
develops states that go beyond vices because of her tragic upbringing, but the same can apply to
those who develop vices on account of a bad upbringing.29 For this person has lacked adequate
opportunity to develop virtue, and so has a lesser capacity for it. She is thus not as responsible
for her vices as someone who had the opportunity to develop virtues, but failed to take it.30 Still,
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Lawrence suggests there are multiple ways an upbringing could be bad. The child’s educators and parents might
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neither of these people are as responsible as a person who had the opportunity to develop well,
but chose to develop vices. This third person is most responsible because she is not only vicious,
but had the opportunity to develop a virtuous character. Given her settled state (hexis
prohairetikē), she is more responsible than the person who failed to develop virtues, despite his
good upbringing, but who did not develop vices either. And she is more responsible for her
character than the person whose vices were the result of a bad upbringing given her greater
capacity to avoid vice.
The third and final passage of the Rhetoric that treats the feelings that accompany age
focuses on those who are in their prime of life and describes them as having natural virtues.
Aristotle claims that those in their prime of life have the virtues of youth and age, such as
courage (andreia) and temperance (sophrosunē), and so comparing this person to the person of
practical wisdom (phronimos) in the EN further shows the role of natural dispositions in a full
account of responsibility. Aristotle says of the people in their prime:
Their rule of conduct is neither the noble (kalon) nor the useful (sumpheron) alone, but
both at once… [they] preserve the mean. It is the same in regard to passion (thumos) and
desire (epithumia). Their self-control (sophrosunē) is combined with courage (andreia)
and their courage with self-control, whereas in the young and old these qualities (tauta)
are found separately; for the young are courageous (andreioi) but without self-control
(akolastoi), the old are self-controlled (sophrosunēs) but cowardly (deiloi). Speaking
generally, all the advantages that youth and age possess separately, those in the prime of
life possess (echousin) combined; and all cases of excess or defect in the other two are
replaced by due moderation and fitness (tr. Freese, Rhetoric, II.14, 1390b3-9).
Aristotle claims that the person in his prime possesses the advantages of youth and age, such as
temperance (sophrosunē) and courage (andreia) (II.14, 1390b8-9). On first glance, it may seem
that even without conscious habituation an individual will have virtue at the prime of his or her
life as a settled state or hexis. For Aristotle claims those in their prime possess the virtues of
social inheritances and I argue that a person’s upbringing can inhibit her moral awareness, which limits the extent to
which she can be held responsible.
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temperance (sophrosunē) and courage (andreia), and so an individual will become virtuous at the
prime of his or her life, whether or not he or she has habituated virtuous traits through practice. If
this were so, there would be a discrepancy between the prudent person (phronimos) in EN and
the person in the prime of life in the Rhetoric. The prudent person (phronimos) is praised for
virtue that requires choice and habituation, yet the person at her prime is merely the result of
aging and is said to have virtues like courage and temperance, virtues that the youth and old are
said to have, respectively. Further, Aristotle claims of the person in her prime, “It is evident that
the character (ēthos) of those in the prime of life will be the mean between that of the other two
[youth and old age]” (tr. Freese, II.14, 1390a29).
Rather than liken the person in his prime to the prudent person, there is a better
connection to what Aristotle claims of “natural virtue” in the EN. He says,
It seems that the various kinds of character (ēthē) inhere in all of us, somehow or other,
by nature. We tend to be just, capable of self-control, and to show all our other character
traits from the time of our birth.31 Yet we still seek something more, the good in a fuller
sense, and the possession of these traits in another way. For it is true that children and
beasts are endowed with natural qualities or characteristics (hai phusikai…hexeis), but it
is evident that without intelligence (nous) these are harmful. This much, to be sure, we do
seem to notice: as in the case of a mighty body which, when it moves without vision,
comes down with a mighty fall because it cannot see, so it is in the matter under
discussion (tr. Ostwald, VI.13, 1144b4-12).
Aristotle thus distinguishes between natural and full virtue on account of the presence or absence
of intelligence (nous).32 People have natural temperaments, and when these natural inclinations
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I take Aristotle here to mean that we are born with certain natural temperaments that resemble the virtues insofar
as they constitute some of the emotional aspects of the virtue. Take for example his claim about natural bravery:
“The bravery caused by spirit would seem to be the most natural sort, and to be genuine bravery once it has also
acquired decision and the goal” (EN, tr. Irwin, III.8, 1117a3-6). Natural bravery thus includes the spirited part of the
virtue, but not the intellectual part.
While it is phronēsis constitutes the intellectual virtue that accompanies moral virtue, Aristotle claims at VI.11
that nous, along with grasping primary terms and definitions, is also the faculty through which we perceive ultimate
particulars (VI.11, 1143a37-1143b1). The ultimate particular is the variable or contingent fact that is the starting
point of practical reasoning because it supplies the minor premise (VI.11, 1143b2-4). That is, nous perceives
ultimates at both ends; it grasps the unchangeable facts required for demonstrative reasoning as well as the
32
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are good – like the courage of the youth or the temperance of the old or those in their prime – the
trait is merely a natural virtue. But this is distinct from full virtue, i.e. virtue that includes
practical wisdom (phronēsis). The temperament of the person in her prime is composed of
natural states (phusikai hexeis); it is not a fully developed state (hexis prohairetikē). Natural
virtue will not always be successful in causing the agent to perform a good action since it lacks
the guidance of reason. Just as a strong body needs sight to guide its movements, so too does
natural virtue need intelligence to achieve full virtue. Its lack of dependability indicates that
natural virtue is not a virtuous state (hexis prohairetikē). And so, the natural state with which one
is born is made up of inclinations, but unlike a virtuous or vicious state, which is consciously
habituated, these natural states will not be expressed consistently in action. In fact, Aristotle
claims that, despite being natural virtues, they will sometimes cause harm (VI.13, 1144b10).33
For example, the natural spiritedness of a young male might make him naturally courageous, but
without practical wisdom (phronēsis), his natural virtue might cause him to overreact when
defending a bullied friend and become violent. Similarly, the temperaments (ēthē) described in
the Rhetoric are not full habituated states (hexeis prohairetikē) and so they will too be capable of
producing contrary actions.34 The reason for this is that the set of traits are not unified as they are
in a fully habituated state. The character of the ordinary person is fragmented and, as such, will
display certain aspects of her character depending on the situation or her mood. So, for example,
the young person Aristotle describes as having a love for the noble might act nobly when it

particular, contingent fact required for practical reasoning (Ibid.). So, nous is involved in phronēsis by perceiving
the particular fact that aids in good reasoning because universals are derived from particulars (VI.11, 1143b3-5). It is
thus necessary for full moral virtue.
33

Compare to Garver’s claim that natural virtue will usually produce good actions (1994, p.187).

34

I discuss such a capacity for contraries in detail in section III.2.
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comes to courageously standing up for a bullied friend, but because of his excessive appetite, he
may fail to do so if it requires postponing his attendance at a party.35 In situations where this
young person is free from other tempting pleasures, she will behave in noble ways, but alter the
situation or her mood,36 and she will behave differently. By contrast, a person with a more
unified character, like the virtuous person, will consistently do the right thing because she will
neither be tempted by bodily pleasures nor will she be deterred from acting nobly when she is
not in the optimal mood or when acting nobly becomes difficult, such as when it involves
defending a friend against an attacker who may become violent.
Understanding the virtues attributed to the youth, old person, and person in her prime
(namely, courage and temperance) as natural virtues, and the vices of the young (intemperance)
and the old (cowardice) as natural vices, helps to explain the contrast between the temperaments
(ēthē) of the Rhetoric and the fully habituated states (hexeis prohairetikē) in the EN. Because the
temperaments are not fixed traits in the individual, the extent to which she is held responsible for
her temperament and what follows from it is mitigated. In the following section, I explain what it
means for these temperaments (ēthē) to be considered both rational capacities (dynameis meta
logou) and habituated states (hexeis) and how this understanding explains the broader sense of
responsibility assigned to them.
III. Another Model of Responsibility
The temperaments (ēthe) of the Rhetoric present a better picture of the ordinary person’s

Compare to Darley and Batson’s seminarians whose helping behavior was affected by their time constraints (or
lack thereof) (1973). I discuss this study more in chapter six.
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Aristotle acknowledges the role the ordinary person’s mood plays in determining the way she will think and
choose; he spends the first eleven chapters of book II of the Rhetoric describing various emotions and how to arouse
them so that the orator might put his audience in the right frame of mind and make it easier to persuade them. I will
discuss this point in greater detail in relation to recent work in psychology in chapter six.
36
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inclinations that aid in understanding Aristotle’s wider notion of character (ēthos). For instance,
the ordinary citizens Aristotle describes in the Rhetoric are not the virtuous or vicious people of
the EN, but rather, people with ordinary temperaments (phusikai hexeis). This is evident in that
their behavior is highly susceptible to situational influences – being in a good mood might
change a person’s decision concerning another’s innocence. The orator of the Rhetoric relies on
the audience’s capacity for opposite actions in order to persuade its members to choose one side
over another. By contrast, a person who has a fully habituated state (hexis prohairetikē), may be
affected by the physical changes that occur as she ages, but has a more settled state and so her
behavior will not be as determined by these changes as it is by her choices. I consider the
relationship between a fully habituated state (hexis prohairetikē) and the temperaments (phusikai
hexeis) of the Rhetoric in subsection 1. I then derive the broader account of responsibility that
corresponds to Aristotle’s broad notion of character (ēthos).
1. Natural virtue and habituated states. If the traits attributed to the temperaments
(phusikai hexeis) at Rhetoric II.12-14 are simply natural virtues and vices, then the descriptive
account presents a picture of the tendencies that people of certain ages have while still
accounting for the fact that their behavior is often heavily influenced by situational factors.
Although the traits of the young, old person, and the person in her prime are not as fixed as the
traits of a fully habituated state (hexis prohairetikē) would be, they still share some important
features: they can play some role in either predicting or explaining how one will react to one’s
surroundings.37 As I will argue, however, they will not tell the whole story, as the behavior of a
person who does not have a fully habituated state will often be influenced by the situation she is
in rather than her temperament (phusikai hexeis). A person’s natural dispositions (phusikai
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They also have an evaluative dimension insofar as they are praiseworthy or blameworthy. For a discussion of this
often-neglected aspect of character in recent social psychology, see Kamtekar (2004, pp.461, 478-479).
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hexeis) may affect her behavior in the following ways: (1) if she has yet to form a fully
habituated state (hexis prohairetikē), her temperament (phusikai hexeis) will contribute to her
behavior along with her circumstances and be a major factor in explaining action, or (2) if she
does have a fully habituated state (hexis prohairetikē), her temperament (phusikai hexeis) will
cohere or conflict with her choices, making it easier or more difficult for her to act on them. The
latter person’s temperament (phusikai hexeis) may help explain behavior, though it will not be as
predictive as her fully habituated traits (hexeis prohairetikē) are. Briefly stated, whether or not a
person has a fully habituated state (hexis prohairetikē), her temperament (phusikai hexeis) plays
some role in either predicting or explaining her behavior.
In the latter case, a person, through practice and habituation, has formed a fully
habituated state (hexis prohairetikē) that determines her actions, but she may still have natural
inclinations that either make her decision making process easier (when her inclinations
correspond to what she chooses) or harder (when they do not). For example, an old person who
is naturally timid will find it difficult to behave in a courageous manner, but may overcome her
natural tendency and behave courageously if she has habituated the virtue courage. The strength
of the opposing tendency will partially determine, and help explain, her state: whether she is
virtuous or merely continent. One’s natural inclinations may in some cases even help a person
strike the mean. In his discussion of generosity, Aristotle claims that the extravagant person (the
excessive vice corresponding to generosity) is not as bad as the ungenerous person because he
can be cured “by growing older and by poverty” (EN, tr. Irwin, IV.1, 1121a21). He further
claims that if this person is changed “by habituation or some other means… he will be generous”
(EN, tr. Irwin, IV.1, 1121a24-25). Thus, the weakening of one’s appetite that comes with age can
turn one’s vice into a virtue even if this change is caused by “other means” such as natural events
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like aging or circumstantial ones like poverty. Lastly, the strength of one’s temperament
(phusikai hexeis) may make a person incontinent; she may aim at the good, but get overcome by
opposing desires, such as those characteristic of the youth in the Rhetoric (II.12, 1389a2). For the
person with a fully habituated state (hexis prohairetikē), natural inclinations partially explain her
behavior, though they are not as predictive of her behavior as her state (hexis prohairetikē) and
choices are.
Let these brief remarks suggest a way in which the descriptive account of temperaments
(phusikai hexeis) in the Rhetoric can either provide the physical underpinnings of the fully
habituated states (hexeis prohairetikai) in the EN or account for the character of the ordinary
person who does not consciously develop her character. For one who has a fully habituated state
(hexis prohairetikē), age may play a more explanatory role than a predictive one. While a person
who fully develops her character into a hexis prohairetikē trains her feelings and emotions to hit
the mean, she is not totally unaffected by the physical changes that come with ages and thus her
natural dispositions (phusikai hexeis) might alter her traits, making them better or worse. But, the
sorts of states marked by virtue, vice, continence, or incontinence do not exhaust the type of
character one may have. In other words, there is character in the strong sense, signified by hexis
prohairetikē – a state imbedded with choice – and character in the weaker sense, an ēthos
composed of natural inclinations that are hexeis, but less dependable since they are the result of
physical changes rather than one’s conscious choices. The ordinary person does not have a
character in the strong sense. Thus, her natural tendencies (her phusikai hexeis comprising her
ēthos) will be more predictive and explanatory of her behavior and will be more easily
manipulated by her circumstances. Without a fully habituated state (hexis prohairetikē) that
causes her to regularly behave in corresponding ways, her natural tendencies towards virtue or
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vice, coupled with her circumstances, will be what influences her behavior. For the ordinary
person can be swayed in one direction or another depending on how her circumstances are
presented to her. In other words, her traits will be far more situationally dependent than those
comprising a fully habituated state (hexis prohairetikē).38
2. The genus of the temperaments of the ordinary citizen. Drawing upon the
metaphysical distinction between state (hexis) and capacity (dynamis), Susan Allard-Nelson
argues that the temperaments (ēthē) of the ordinary are capacities (dynameis) because they make
an agent capable of opposing behaviors (2001, pp. 254-255). Thinking of the temperaments in
Rhetoric II.12-14 as capacities (dynameis) rather than states (hexeis) might initially have appeal
as it accounts for the fact that the ordinary person’s behavior is often heavily influenced by
situational factors while still maintaining that she is the source of the action.39 For Aristotle
claims that a rational capacity is the capacity to produce contrary effects depending on the choice
(prohairesis) or desire (orexis) of the agent, e.g. the art of medicine can produce either illness or
health depending on how the doctor uses his art (Metaphysics, IX.2, 1046b4-5, 1048a11).
Like a rational capacity, the temperament (phusikai hexeis) of the ordinary person may
cause him to choose the noble in some cases, but not others, such as when he is overcome with a
desire for pleasure, like the young person of Rhetoric II.12. This person is not as dependable as
the virtuous person who can be counted on to do the right thing when the situation calls for it.40

A person with a fully habituated state (hexis prohairetikē) will certainly be sensitive to her circumstances; she is
able to make fine distinctions and see what actions are called for in a given situation. But, the way she reacts to her
circumstances will be caused by a state of character that she has consciously habituated. If she has habituated virtue,
her reaction will be the appropriate one. By contrast, the reactions of a person with an ordinary character can be
manipulated since they are not guided by practical wisdom (phronēsis) or choice (prohairesis).
38
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Or, at least, one of the two sources of action. For a rational capacity requires choice or desire in order to produce
an effect (Metaphysics, IX, 1048a11).
The virtuous person’s character is neither a rational nor an irrational capacity, but a hexis. Garver (1989a) argues
that the hexis of the virtuous agent is a third kind of dynamis to perform morally virtuous acts and achieve
40
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Allard-Nelson concludes that because the audience members can be persuaded to perform either
virtuous or vicious actions, their temperaments must be rational capacities rather than states
(hexis).
The initial appeal of conceiving of these temperaments (ēthē) as capacities is lost,
however, when we consider that the dispositions of the ordinary person do characterize her, even
if they are not as stable as a virtuous or vicious state. Aristotle argues that virtue is a state (hexis),
and the character (ēthos) of the virtuous person is a hexis prohairetikē; it is a state embedded
with choice. In other words, at the second stage of moral habituation, a person can become fully
virtuous by choosing to perform virtuous actions until she forms a corresponding state (hexis).
By contrast, the character (ēthos) of the ordinary person is composed of natural dispositions
(phusikai hexeis) constituting his temperament that may issue in certain characteristic behaviors,
but because they are not formed through choice (prohairesis), they are not as stable and thus the
agent is capable of opposites, like a rational capacity.41 He has the capacity to go on to develop
virtue or vice and can be more easily persuaded or influenced by his environment to behave
virtuously or viciously.

eudaimonia, somewhere between rational and irrational since it has elements of both. On the one hand, it is
prohairetikē and so it requires choice as a rational capacity does. But, it differs from a rational capacity insofar as it
does not require another choice for an action to be performed. For the virtuous person does not always choose in
each circumstance what to do; sometimes the act is produced immediately from her character (EN, III.8, 1117a1821). On the other hand, like an irrational dynamis, it is also deterministic of one’s behavior when confronted with a
particular situation. But, unlike an irrational dynamis, it involves choice and desire (pp. 11-13).
Aristotle distinguishes between capacities (dynameis) and states (hexeis), claiming, “by ‘capacities’ (dynameis) I
mean that by virtue of which we are said to be affected by these emotions, for example, the capacity which enables
us to feel anger, pain, or pity; and by “characteristics” (hexeis) I mean the condition, either good or bad, in which we
are in relation to the emotions (EN, II.5, tr. Ostwald, 1105b20-26). While Aristotle defines “capacity” or “faculty”
(dynamis) as a capacity for feeling here, this differs from the definition of capacity in Metaphysics IX as a source of
change either in another thing or upon oneself as another thing (1046a14). See Garver (1989a) for more discussion
on dynamis in the EN compared to its definition in the Metaphysics. Garver argues that since the EN is dealing with
a practical (versus theoretical) science, Aristotle moralizes the metaphysical distinction between dynamis and hexis
by defining them with respect to pathē (p. 19).
41
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Garver also argues, as I have, that temperaments (ēthē) resemble both rational capacities
and states. While the calculative power of the old is like a neutral capacity for opposites (1994, p.
188), other characteristics, such as the old person’s caution or temperance and the young
person’s courage or desire for the noble, are not neutral and instead show an inclination in one
direction over the other (Ibid., p.197). And so, Garver rejects the view that they are rational
capacities since that would imply that they are neutral capacities for opposites.42 He instead
argues that the youth, prime, and old have types of temperaments (ēthē) “straddle the line”
between capacity (dynamis) and state (hexis) (Ibid., pp. 187-188), though he refers to them as
dynameis throughout his article insofar as they are potentialities for virtues. Though Garver does
not specify what it means to “straddle the line” between capacity and state, it becomes clearer if
we specify that the temperament (ēthos) of the ordinary person is composed of natural
dispositions (phusikai hexeis), and in that way is a hexis, but insofar as the ordinary person has
the capacity to form full virtue or vice and is more vulnerable to persuasion than a fully virtuous
or vicious person, her temperament (phusikai hexeis) is like a capacity for opposites. For while
the temperaments in the Rhetoric tend towards virtue or vice, they are not fully habituated states
(hexeis prohairetikē).
3. Responsibility for a temperament. If we reject the notion that a temperament
(phusikai hexeis) is merely a rational capacity, we can understand how the ordinary person may
be held responsible with respect to her temperament. A temperament (phusikai hexeis) certainly
bears a similarity to a rational capacity insofar as it is capable of opposites: one can go on to
habituate either virtue or vice, and one will perform neither virtuous nor vicious actions
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Garver does not hold that the characters cannot be considered dynamis in any sense; he claims that these
characters are dynameis that can be developed with phronēsis into full virtue (1994, p. 188). This sense of dynameis
is one that identifies age with matter to be informed by phronēsis rather than with its capacity to produce contraries,
which is true of things other than matter, such as the form of medicine.
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predictably, that is, on the basis of her temperament alone. Still, its capacity for opposites is not
free from inclinations towards one opposite over the other.43 In this way, it is also a hexis, though
not as determinate or stable as a hexis prohairetikē. Its inclinations, in the form of natural virtues
or vices, are phusikai hexeis: they are natural, appetitive dispositions. But, these hexeis are not
stable or dependable because they are not formed through choice (prohairesis), as full virtue and
vice are. The genus of a temperament (phusikai hexeis), then, is in some ways a rational capacity
and in others a state (hexis). For example, a person with a temperament (phusikai hexeis)
characterized by natural courage will be inclined towards courage under favorable conditions or
when successfully prompted,44 but will also be capable of reacting with cowardice when
conditions aren’t as favorable.
These temperaments account for the individual’s capacity to: (1) form a habituated state
or (2) produce virtuous or vicious actions.45 Insofar as the EN is concerned with the formation of
a virtuous or vicious state, the natural dispositions (phusikai hexeis) that accompany the various
ages in the Rhetoric may be understood as mere capacities for being formed in a fully habituated
state (hexis prohairetikē). Treating the temperaments also as capacities for either virtuous or
vicious actions gives them a status analogous to a virtuous or vicious state insofar as they

The picture is further complicated if we consider how situationally sensitive a person’s temperament (phusikai
hexeis) is. This makes it similar also to an irrational capacity insofar as a person will often react in a certain way
when presented with a kind of situation. Still, the relation is not one of necessity. While a person may tend to find a
person innocent when in a friendly mood, her friendly mood does not guarantee her belief in another’s innocence in
the way that paper, when met with fire, will burn.
43
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Such as the prompting achieved by a good speech or by being put into a good mood, which may occur
intentionally when the orator influences the audience’s mood, or unintentionally, when a person has experienced a
pleasant situation. More on the latter sort of influences in chapter six.
45

It may be helpful to understand this distinction as one that distinguishes between first and second potentiality (See
De Anima II.5, 417a22-32). By virtue of being human, an individual is in first potentiality to form a settled
disposition, or hexis, one that is actualized in the corresponding activities. But, an individual’s temperament as a
second potency emphasizes its natural disposition towards certain types of acts, i.e. virtuous or vicious ones, similar
to a hexis, but differing in its being also a capacity for a hexis.
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produce moral actions, while also explaining why the status of a temperament is not at the level
of a fully habituated state (hexis prohairetikē): it lacks choice (prohairesis) and is not fixed and
dependable. The level of responsibility attributed to a temperament, then, will correspond to its
lesser degree.46
According to this view, a person can thus be held responsible with respect to the sorts of
inclinations or states (hexeis) she has as a result of her nature or upbringing,47 coupled with her
capacity to form a virtuous state and to perform virtuous actions. So, a person who has a great
capacity for virtue, but fails to develop it will be more blameworthy than someone who has a
lesser capacity and has failed on account of her bad character luck. Consequently, those in their
youth, prime of life, or old age will act with varying levels of responsibility. For, a youth may be
excused for behavior, such as harming others, that is not excused of someone in old age. Like the
inattentive person of the EN, the old person has a greater capacity for forming her state48 than the
youth and this is what confers greater responsibility on her for her wrong actions compared to the
young person. The difference in the way we assign responsibility according to one’s capacity for
virtue is indicated in our response to the person who performs a vicious action – the young
person is punished to deter her from acting wrongly again for fear of punishment, while the adult
may be corrected with an appeal to right reason. When it comes to natural virtues, the individual
youth may be praised only to encourage her to cultivate her natural goodness into a virtuous state
rather than praised as the person responsible for that trait; she is praised or blamed for the sake of
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Similarly, Garver claims these temperaments (ēthē) exist inside the realm of moral judgment, but they are still not
praise- or blameworthy in the fullest sense, i.e. in accordance with the standard account of responsibility in EN,
because they lack choice (prohairesis) (Ibid., p. 188).
47

More on one’s upbringing in chapter five.

48

Assuming she has not developed in a depraved society, as Aristotle assumes of his intended audience.
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aiding in her improvement of character rather than as a judgment of her praise- or
blameworthiness. The temperance of the old may be treated as praiseworthy, but to a lesser
extent than the temperance of the prudent person (phronimos) since the old person’s temperance
is explained better by her weaker appetite than by her correct ordering of her passions.49
Taking into account one’s natural dispositions (phusikai hexeis) with respect to one’s
capacity for virtue allows us to widen Aristotle’s account of responsibility in a way that can
assist in making valuable distinctions between having a good state and being responsible for that
state. Certainly we can judge whether or not a person’s inclinations are desirable or not and how
well they approximate virtue. Yet, these judgments alone do not indicate responsibility. For one
can receive praise for a positive quality, but not necessarily held responsible for it. In other
words, we can distinguish between good or bad traits and being responsible for those traits and
what follows from them. Garver admits the praise we would bestow upon a youth for her love of
the noble is not praise in the fullest sense since actions following from such love do not involve
choice (prohairesis) (1994, p. 188). Yet, he claims she rightly receives credit for her natural
qualities (Ibid., p. 198). But, the praise we give seems to be more akin to admiration or a
recognition of the good in others without holding her responsible for that good.50 Taking into
account her capacity for virtue is thus necessary for establishing whether or not she is
responsible for her good state.
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Although, as I have mentioned, Aristotle does claim that an extravagant person may become generous later in life
as age corrects her excessive appetites. Perhaps the difference is that, when it comes to generosity, one’s appetite
contributes to the virtue, but is not the primary material with which the virtue is concerned. By contrast, temperance
is primarily concerned with desire for pleasure and requires that that desire is not so weak as to make the person
insensible rather than temperate.
50

Though he acknowledges there are good reasons to distinguish the two, Garver thinks that what is subject to
praise and what is to one is credit overlap (1994, p. 198).
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So, the ordinary person is still held responsible for her character (ēthos) and what follows
from it to the extent that she had the capacity know better and to develop virtue, and this will
depend upon the quality and length of life experience an individual has.
IV. Conclusion
I have argued that the contrast between the EN and Rhetoric when it comes to assigning
responsibility to individuals is on account of the different degrees of character for which we are
held responsible. While the habituated states of the EN are fully habituated states (hexis
prohairetikē), the temperaments of the Rhetoric span both rational capacities (dynameis meta
logou) and states (hexeis). Both those with fully habituated states (hexeis prohairetikē) and those
who have not developed a settled state are held responsible insofar as their actions are voluntary
and they have to capacity to make choices from an abiding state. But, I have shown that these
two criteria are not sufficient and must include a person’s capacity to form a virtuous state and
perform virtuous actions. This further entails that the temperaments (ēthē) of the Rhetoric are not
all equally held responsible since with age comes a greater capacity for virtue – one’s experience
of the world makes one unable to claim ignorance.51
The virtue of this discussion extends beyond its exegetical value because it speaks to
difficult issues of assigning responsibility on the basis natural dispositions that are unchosen. By
presenting a view that does not exclude all natural or uncontrollable factors from influencing our
moral judgments, we are closer to understanding the responsibility attached to our actions in the
face of lucky or unlucky circumstances. And so we may avoid an account that is emphasizes
self-sufficiency more than is reasonable given our human abilities. For our natural dispositions
are not excluded from judgment even when we have not fully formed a habituated state (hexis
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Unless, as I will argue in chapter five, their experience has been greatly limited by poor circumstances.
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prohairetikē); though we may not control the sort of natural inclinations with which we are
endowed, we exercise indirect control over them insofar as we are able to learn and choose the
good.52
In some cases, however, we lack even indirect control over our ability to choose the good
because we are in situations that impede on our moral awareness. Because our understanding
requires experience, and our experience depends on the kind of environment in which we
develop, we do not always have access to moral truths on account of unfortunate situational
factors. For instance, a person who develops in a racist or sexist society may not be able to
overcome her upbringing, and, as a result, form racist or sexist attitudes that affect her behavior
without being aware that they are morally wrong. In this case, she lacks the ability to learn moral
truths on account of her poor social circumstances and is thus not held responsible for her
ignorance.53 In chapter five, I consider the type of character luck that addresses the quality of
one’s upbringing within Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Politics. Together with this chapter, we can
identify the sources of the ordinary person’s fragmented character and capacity for virtue (or lack
thereof) – bad moral luck with respect to one’s genetic and social inheritances and one’s natural
temperaments – by focusing on the development of those characters. In chapter six, I show how
this account is consistent with the recent work done on character in social psychology.
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We may choose to engage in certain actions that naturally develop our emotions in the right way, we exercise
indirect control over those emotions (Kosman, 1999, p. 271). Similarly, we may form our natural dispositions into a
virtuous state by learning what is good and choosing it.
53

See Calhoun (1989) who argues that a person is only blameworthy for ignorance of progressive moral knowledge
when it is publicly available.

CHAPTER FIVE
SOCIAL INHERITANCES:
CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT AND MORAL UNDERSTANDING
IN ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS AND RHETORIC
In previous chapters, I have established that good character luck at the start of a person’s
character development involves one’s natural temperaments, which include genetic
predispositions to virtue or vice or the temperaments that develop in relation to physical changes.
Good character luck also involves one’s social inheritances – being born into good social and
political circumstances: one’s family or friends and one’s community. The focus of chapter four
was on genetic inheritances and natural temperaments and their bearing on our being responsible
for our characters. I now consider social inheritances: the effect that a person’s circumstances
have on her development, exercise of virtue, and on her responsibility for her character and what
behavior follows from it. I bring together textual evidence from Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Politics
that speak to his position on social inheritances. By including Aristotle’s Politics in a discussion
of his ethical theory, we are not only faithful to his conception of ethics as a part of politics, but
we can better understand the significant role that one’s political community plays in one’s
character development and character maintenance, especially when it comes to one’s moral
awareness. This important feature of Aristotle’s ethical view squares well with, and even
anticipates some of, the recent findings in social psychology that emphasize the significance of
one’s circumstances in her behavior and character traits, as I will show in chapter six.
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I. Ethics, Politics, and the Non-Ideal in Aristotle
Though his discussion of virtue and character in the EN is focused on the individual’s
development and exercise of virtue and her attainment of happiness, or eudaimonia, Aristotle
claims at the start that the study of ethics is subordinate to politics (EN, I.2, 1094b12). So while
Aristotle limits himself to an analysis of the development and exercise of virtue in the individual
in the EN, he all the while conceives of such a process as occurring within one’s political
community. For humans are political animals (zōon politikon) in need of a city to live well
(Politics, I.2, 1253a2). And so, he closes the EN on a transitional note to the Politics. For he
claims that to become good, one needs to live where there are good laws (X.9, 1179b34), and
legislative science is a subcategory of political science (X.9, 1180b32). So, according to
Aristotle, in order for statesmen to best educate young people, they should have knowledge of
political, especially legislative, science. Another way to understand the contrast between the EN
and Politics, as well as the need for both, then, is that the EN gives us an account of how virtue
develops in the abstract, and the Politics is aimed at realizing this process in concrete world.
I have argued in chapter four that the EN presents a theory of virtue and character that
assumes one has been met with good character luck. I also argued that this theory can be
broadened with what Aristotle says about the ordinary person in the more empirically-grounded
text, the Rhetoric. A similar claim can be made for the Politics. For while Aristotle’s political
investigation culminates into the presentation of the ideal constitution,1 he claims that this

1

This assumes the traditional ordering of the texts. Some scholars think that the discussion of the ideal constitution
in Books VII and VIII were originally meant to come between Books III and IV since Aristotle seems to be
transitioning to talk of the ideal constitution at the end of Book III. But, it is possible that the transitional note found
at the end of Book III was a later editorial addition not intended by Aristotle. Whichever the proper ordering of the
books is of no matter here; nothing in my argument rests on whether Books VII and VIII come at the end or the
middle of the Politics. See Kraut (2002, pp. 183-189), Miller (2009, pp. 540-541), or Destrée (2015, pp. 207-209)
for discussion on the ordering of the books.
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constitution is not practicable. Instead, it is “the city of our prayers” (euchē) (VII.4, 1325b36),
and relies on a great deal of good luck: freedom from external obstacles (IV.1, 1288b23-24),
access to the most favorable resources like size and quality of land (VII.4, 1325b40, VII.5,
1326b30), number (VII.4 1326b2) and quality of citizens (VII.4, 1326a 19-20; VII.7), and a good
location (VII.6, 1327a35-37, VII.11-12). In short, he says, “We pray (euchē) that our polis will
be ideally equipped with the goods that luck controls (tuchē kuria)” (tr. Reeve, VII.13, 1332a29).
Aristotle is quick to note that while this city depends on luck governing the conditions
necessary for its development, it is not impossible (VII.4, 1326b39). Thus, even in his
conception of an ideal constitution, Aristotle does not limit himself to an unreachable standard.2
Throughout his discussion of the ideal constitution, he also makes suggestions that the ideal city
will not necessarily be free from the difficulties that accompany life. For one thing, Aristotle
includes laws that make provisions for citizens who are in need of food (VII.10, 1329b41-30a2).
So, even in the ideal city, poverty may still exist. Aristotle also recognizes that even the best will
err from time to time3 so his ideal city will have laws to punish those who do wrong: adulterers
will be punished with a loss of honor (VII.16, 1335b38-1336a2), and adults who say or do
something forbidden will be dishonored in a way appropriate to a slave (VII.17, 1336b8-12).4

As Fred Miller claims, “Aristotle’s ideal state is not a utopia in the literal sense of ‘no place’ (ou-topia)” (2009, p.
540). Compare to Kraut’s claim that Aristotle is thinking of a utopian city where several virtuous people get together
and start a new city, rather than perfect an already existing one (2002, p. 196). Destrée argues, by contrast to Kraut,
that one can work to better his own constitution using Aristotle’s advice for making oligarchies and democracies
closer to polities, while still keeping an “eye on the ideal” (2015). See also Balot (2015, p. 120) who argues that a
good education might help citizens of a polity move from aiming at stability, courage, and goods of the body to the
higher goods of human flourishing.
2

3

4

For related discussion on Aristotle’s fallible phronimos, see Drefeinski (1996).

Aristotle does not specify what this punishment would entail, but it would presumably be severe or humiliating for
a free man to be publicly treated like a slave.
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The laws Aristotle suggests are not limited to punishing wrongdoers, but also present
safeguards to prevent virtuous citizens from acting against the common good. For example,
although the citizens of the ideal city will be fully virtuous (VII.9, 1328b37), they will still at
times be unable to help being biased towards laws that benefit themselves at the expense of
others. So, Aristotle claims that citizens of the ideal city should each own two properties – one
near the city and one near the sea – in order that they do not favor laws or political decisions that
benefit one area over another (VII.10, 1330a15-6).56
Despite there being some realistic restrictions on the ideal constitution and city that make
them not only possible, but also do not require extraordinary virtue in the citizens,7 the ideal city
is still far from what can be achieved through human effort alone and thus would be very rare.
Recognizing this, Aristotle thinks it practical to dedicate most of the Politics to study of the
various types of constitutions (Books III-IV), their causes of faction (Book V), and how to
preserve them (Books V-VI). For he claims that the statesman must not only know how to
establish a constitution, but how to correct one that is already in place, and these two endeavors
take equal effort just as learning and correcting what one has learned require the same amount of
effort (IV.1, 1289a1-4). For one thing, the statesman must understand that there are four senses
of “best” (aristos): the best absolutely (haplōs), the best given one’s ends, one’s circumstances,

5

In the ideal city, resources will be abundant enough for all citizens to own two properties. For owning property is
necessary to exercise virtue (Politics, II.5, 1263b10-11) and Aristotle also thinks that education and good birth
commonly occurs amongst those with wealth (IV.8, 1293b36). So ideally, citizens with full virtue would own
property.
We might also consider Aristotle’s discussion of music as a kind of leisurely activity in Politics VIII. This suggests
that while the ideal city will be best suited for living the best life, which Aristotle identifies with the philosophical
life of theoretical contemplation (theoria), not every citizen will be capable of philosophical activity and might
approximate it by listening to (good) music, see Kraut (2002, p. 201) and Destrée (2013, pp. 317-318).
6

7

See Kraut (2002, p. 209) who claims that even the natural virtue of the citizens of the ideal city is not exceptional.
If this is so, then the ideal condition that the citizens are of a certain quality does not require an abundance luck with
respect to one’s genetic inheritances.
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and the best in general (IV.1, 1288b20-34). While the ideal constitution is the best haplōs, other
constitutions are best in a qualified sense. If, for example, the goal of a city is wealth, the best
constitution that will further that goal is an oligarchy. The best given one’s circumstances
suggests that one might need an oligarchy for a temporary period of time, say during a rebuilding
period where a city needs to increase its wealth.8 While all three senses of “best” aside from the
best haplōs are good in some qualified way, it is the fourth kind, best for the most people or the
general best, at which Aristotle thinks the statesman should aim. For he claims that the polity – a
city ruled by the many for the sake of the common good9 – is the best in general and most
practicable (IV.11, 1295a36-37) and that this is the best of the constitutions (IV.11, 1296a6). In
his further discussion of how to preserve constitutions, Aristotle’s aim is to increase their
stability, which turns out to be making them closer to polities.10 Thus, while we would certainly
prefer an ideal constitution, or at least to be ruled by the best person or people (kingship or
aristocracy), these constitutions are hard to come by. Instead, our goal is what is most practicable
and best suited for the average person, and so we should aim towards making our current
constitution more like a polity.11 Aristotle’s Politics, then, is a treatise that is concerned primarily

8

See Garver (2011, p. 115) who argues that knowing the best in general can help the best given the circumstances
by making a current, bad constitution (the circumstances) closer to a polity (the best in general).
9

For discussion on how we should understand the common good in Aristotle, see Morrison (2013). Those whose
good the rule aims at are the citizens, though Aristotle thinks that slaves and women are benefited by their being
ruled by their masters and husbands (Politics, I.5, 1254b14, 19-20).
10

Preserving a tyranny as making it more like a polity: V.12 1315a40-b10, an oligarchy: V.8 1308a5-15 and VI. 6-7,
a democracy: V. 8 1309a15-19 and VI. 5. See Garver (2011, ch. 5) and Destrée (2015) for discussion on preserving
deviant constitutions by making them into polities.
11

In his division of types of constitutions, Aristotle begins with the common division of rule by the one, the few,
and the many, but further distinguishes between good and bad constitutions based on whether their rule aims at the
interests of the ruler(s) or ruled (III.7 1279a28-31). So, rather than three constitutions distinguished by how many
rulers they have, Aristotle finds six: three good and three bad. Of the good constitutions, he names kingship (rule by
one), aristocracy (few), and polity (many). Of the bad constitutions, he names tyranny (rule by one), oligarchy (few),
and democracy (many). (He later distinguishes between more specific types of each constitution in III.14
(kingships), IV.4 (oligarchies and democracies), IV.7 (aristocracies), IV. 9 (polities), IV. 10 (tyrannies), and VI.4
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with the contingent factor of one’s political context that affects the moral development and
character of the ordinary person.
In sum, Aristotle’s work in the Politics focuses on the non-ideal in ways that not only
shed light on the nature of the ordinary person, but indicate that the ideal may not conform to as
stringent a standard as previously thought – virtue and good living may be rare, but are not
impossible for human beings. Focus on the non-ideal gives the Politics a practical value,
presenting the statesman with information needed to make conditions better suited for his
citizens’ abilities to develop virtue and live a good life.12 In what follows, I discuss the ways in
which a person’s character and moral awareness is affected by her social upbringing, according
to Aristotle, before I consider what bearing this picture has on Aristotle’s theory of
responsibility.
II. Aristotle’s Account of Moral Awareness in the Politics
1. The roles of law and family in upbringing and moral awareness. In the opening
chapters of the Politics, Aristotle famously states that humans are by nature political animals
(I.2, 1253a2-4). While this claim is made in the context of a larger argument concerning the
naturalness of the polis and its aim at perfecting its citizens, it also means that a human being
needs a city13 to live well. For he claims that while the polis is originally constructed for the sake
of living, it remains for the sake of living well (I.2, 1252b28-29). That a human requires a city

(democracies).) He further claims that a polity is a mean between a democracy and an oligarchy (IV.9, 1294b13),
and is best because it is most stable (IV.11, 1296a7). Aristotle claims we can order these six types of constitution
from best to worst in the following way: aristocracy, kingship, polity, democracy, oligarchy, tyranny (IV.8), though
some types of democracy are worse than some types of oligarchy if they are more extreme and further from the
mean.
12

See Balot (2015) for discussion on the relationship between the polity and human flourishing.

I use “city” here broadly to refer to where citizens and others live under the laws of a particular constitution. So,
this may include urban and rural areas.
13
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for good living could be interpreted in different ways. One suggestion is that this is a statement
concerning her desire to form relationships with others. For even though Aristotle values selfsufficiency (EN I.7, 1097b15; X.6, 1176b5), he explains that this is not to be taken as being
isolated from others:
What we count as self-sufficient is not what suffices for a solitary person by himself,
living an isolated life, but what suffices also for parents, children, wife, and, in general
for friends and fellow citizens, since a human being is a naturally political animal (EN, tr.
Irwin, I.7, 1097b8-13).
We might also interpret the human need for a city as her need for a community in which to act
well. For Aristotle claims that one must not only be brought up well, but “must continue the
same practices and be habituated to them when they become men” (X.9, 1180a3). Aristotle’s
claims address the need for a city if one is to develop into a morally good person and remain so.
For, Aristotle claims that all people14 have the weapons (hopla)15 for virtue (aretē) and practical
wisdom (phronēsis), but that without justice and law, these weapons can be used for opposite
purposes (Politics, I.2, 1253a32-34). In the EN, he articulates this point when he says that “it is
difficult…for someone to be trained correctly for virtue from his youth if he has not been
brought up under correct laws; for the many, especially the young, do not find it pleasant to live
in a temperate and resistant16 way” (tr. Irwin, X.9, 1179b33-34). So, by living under the
constraints of good law, one is better able to develop her virtuous capacities since she will be
prevented from engaging in base actions.

14

“All people” for Aristotle, of course, only refers to Greek men.

“Weapons” is a literal translation of hopla, but the idea is that human beings have the natural capacities to develop
virtue and practical wisdom. Compare to the opening of book II of the EN where Aristotle claims that virtue exists
neither by nature nor contrary to nature (1103a24-25). In other words, we have the capacity to develop virtue, but
without habituation or training, it will not develop on its own.
15

16

Aristotle talks about the resistant person in book VII of the EN. This person is distinct from the continent or
temperate person, who is able to overcome pleasure, and instead is able to overcome pain (VII.7, 1150a13-16).
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The benefits of living in a city are not limited to merely being prevented from doing
wrong, but can also play a positive role in one’s moral development. In his early remarks on
habituation, Aristotle claims that legislators make citizens good by forming habits in them (EN,
II.1, 1103b2-5). Aristotle later claims that in order for adults to receive proper teaching and listen
to good arguments, they need to have been brought up well, which requires being brought up
where there are good laws, in order that they form the “good soil” needed to learn (X.9,
1179b23, 32). This idea is repeated again at the close of the EN when Aristotle claims that
legislators must “urge people toward virtue and exhort them to aim at the fine” (tr. Irwin, X.9,
1180a8). His earlier remarks provide examples of this very point:
Now the law instructs us to do the actions of a brave person – for instance, not to leave
the battle-line, or to flee, or to throw away our weapons; of a temperate person – not to
commit adultery or wanton aggression; of a mild person – not to strike or revile another;
and similarly requires actions in accord with other virtues, and prohibits actions in accord
with the vices. The correctly established law does this correctly and the less carefully
framed one does this worse (EN, tr. Irwin, V.1, 1129b19-25)
Thus, the legislator not only restrains citizens from performing bad actions, but promotes good
behavior. Both contribute to forming good habits or the “good soil” from which an adult might
eventually develop virtue. Later, we will see how civil law also promotes good living in adults
by compelling them to continue to do good acts.
We recognize that it is not only civil laws that influence a child’s development, but the
child’s parents also play a role. Aristotle acknowledges this, but claims that while parents
contribute to the child’s moral development, their role is not sufficient and good law is needed to
supplement. The success parents have in motivating their children to desire the noble and act
well is due to the natural affection between parents and their children (EN, X.9, 1180b5-7). But
while this affection is initially a positive factor in the child’s development, it is also a source of
problems. For sometimes correcting the child needs to take on a harsher form than a parent is
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willing to give on account of her love for the child. The law, by contrast, has the strength to
compel good behavior while also being impartial and thus avoiding resentment in the child (EN,
X.9, 1118a18-24).17 For example, the youth who commits a burglary might be enabled by his
soft and overly forgiving parents, but if he is caught and justly punished, his deviant behavior
may be corrected. Since moral education is so important and is best done publicly, Aristotle
concludes that it should not be left to a child’s family, but should be a public endeavor (EN, X.9,
1180a30).18 Even though giving individual attention to the child’s unique needs can be better and
more effective than using a general standard not tailored to individual differences, Aristotle
argues that the person who educates the child will be even better if she is educated in legislative
science (EN, X.9, 1180a31). And so, Aristotle transitions to the Politics.
Uncovering just how knowledge of legislation can help a statesman educate the people
according to Aristotle reveals much about the important role a city plays in the development of
virtue. It does not, on the face of it, seem like knowing which laws are best suited for which
constitutions or how different existing (II.7-12) or theoretical constitutions (II.1-6) are organized
can shed light on how to educate the citizen to be morally virtuous. But, because the goal (telos)
of a polis is the happiness of its citizens (Politics I.2, 1252b29, III.6, 1278b22, III.9, 1280a31,
VII.21324a25, and EN I.2, 1094b8), studying laws can help a legislator better realize this goal
since good laws will be defined with respect to their ability to promote happiness for citizens,
which for Aristotle requires moral virtue.
Still, there is an interesting tension in the Politics that concerns the ultimate end of
Aristotle’s polis. For while Aristotle has explicitly stated throughout the EN and the Politics that

17

18

See Blitz (1985) on the advantage of public over private moral education in relation to Aristotle’s EN.

See also (Politics, VIII.1 1337a21) where Aristotle argues that moral education should be communal since it has
one end (happiness or eudaimonia).
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the goal of the city is happiness, the goal of Books IV-VI of the Politics instead seems to be
stability, rather than good living.19 For, Aristotle describes the polity as the best constitution
given its stability (Politics, IV.11, 1295a36-27, 1296a6) and in his discussion of correcting bad
constitutions, the advice he gives is aimed at increasing stability, not promoting happiness.20 This
goal appears on the face of it to be worrisome since it seems wrong to advise a statesman on how
to make, say, a tyranny last longer. Stabilizing a constitution to make it lasts longer is only a
worthy goal if the constitution is good in the first place.
But, Aristotle has more in mind when he discusses stability so that it means more than
durability. Making constitutions more stable involves more than merely making them last longer;
it involves reforming them. So, for example, making an oligarchy more stable involves moving it
closer to a polity, which is a better constitution, by spreading out political power to citizens who
are not wealthy (V.8, 1309a19-20), such as the poor who typically comprise a majority of the
population (III.9, 1279b36). Thus, the problem with stability as a goal is not in its neutrality in
the face of corrupt regimes. It is instead that the goal is a far cry from human happiness as it
favors mediocrity.21 If the goal is mere stability, where might virtue and good living fit?
One suggestion is that making a current, though bad, constitution more stable is better
than a complete overthrow.22 While it is difficult to flourish in a corrupt regime, it would be
impossible in a state of anarchy. Certainly this view would be endorsed by Aristotle, who thinks
that a city is necessary for good living. But, stability might also just be the best we can do given

19

See Garver (2011, ch.5, esp. pp. 148-151) or Destree (2015) for more on stability as the final end of the polis in
Books IV-VI. See Balot (2015) on Aristotle’s discussion of the “mixed regime” and its relation to other mixed
regimes in Greek politics as well as Aristotle’s account of human flourishing.
20

See footnote 10 above.

21

Kraut describes the citizens as having “conventional decency” compared to full virtue (2002, p. 443).

22

(Destrée, 2015, p. 214)
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what we have. Without the resources that we “pray for,” the best constitution will be one that
best avoids faction and vice. If stability for Aristotle involves increasing the power of the middle
class (IV.12, 1296b34-36),23 and the middle class is composed of those who avoid the vices of
the wealth and the poor (IV.11, 1295b8-11), then increasing stability involves spreading out
power amongst those who will be better fit to rule – those who are the most virtuous of the
bunch, even if they do not reach full virtue. A polity will not only be ruled by better people, but
its constitution will impose laws on the people that make them more moderate by preventing any
one group from hoarding the wealth or power. It will give more power to the middle class (hoi
mesoi) whom Aristotle thinks have good habits and will listen to reason (IV.11, 1295b6). While
the “virtues” of the middle class are not at the level of full virtue – they are not as durable as they
rely heavily on one’s circumstances to come into and remain in existence – they are a start.24
Thus, knowing legislative science can help a statesman best educate his citizens since the
knowledge of the best constitution in general, viz. the polity, includes practical knowledge of
how to stabilize existing constitutions in ways that help form good habits in the people. These
habits can serve as the “good soil” upon which citizens might go on to develop virtue since they
allow a person to listen to reason. Exactly what this entails is, again, a matter I leave to others
writing on the cognitive understanding of moral habituation to determine, but one of the
important contributions Aristotle makes it to prompt us to think of issues that empirical work can
figure out. I will make a couple of plausible suggestions, but these are only imagined ways in
which a person’s upbringing might affect her cognitive development – they may turn out to be

23

Our current notion of the middle class is very broad and includes a range of economic classes, some who might
better be described as upper or lower class. It is not clear exactly who composes the middle class of which Aristotle
speaks, and what their means are. He does claim that (at least one type of) polity is ruled by the hoplite class –
military who would own modest amounts of property (III.7, 1279b1-2).
24

More on the virtues of the middle class in the following section.
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unsupported by the evidence. A child’s good habits might prevent her from being overcome by
selfish desires that make practical reasoning difficult. For example, it may be hard to deliberate
about how a person ought to help her neighbor if she gives undue weight to her own interests.
This is precisely the problem with the incontinent person.25 Another suggestion is that a person’s
upbringing affects her conception of what is good or valuable and sets the ends for her adult
deliberations.26 A bad upbringing will cause a person to value something that is not valuable or
to an extent that exceeds its actual value. For example, a person born into great wealth might
value money more than is reasonable and this can prevent him from obeying right reason when it
comes to behaving temperately.27
2. Moral education and moral awareness. Aside from law and family, but no less
important, the way children are educated contributes to their moral development. While
knowledge of the laws that best suit a polity can aid in forming good habits in the citizens by
preventing them from wrongdoing and setting up circumstances that help facilitate the
development of good habits, formal education plays a more direct role in the citizens’
development. It is obvious Aristotle thinks a good moral education program is extremely
important to a person’s moral development and her long-term goal of happiness given that he
spends a majority of his discussion of the ideal constitution on the topic of education (VII.13-

25

See Burnyeat (1980, p. 85) who argues that to understand why a strong desire overrides reasoning in the
incontinent person, one needs to understand how a person became incontinent in the first place.
26

In other words, when a child has a good upbringing, she acquires the “that” of morality (EN, I.4, 1095b4-8).

Cf. Rhetoric, II.16, 1391a18. The effect of wealth on one’s ability to reason is often discussed by Aristotle, but
relies on his own observations and stereotypes of the wealthy, poor, and middle-class. While his view is not
grounded in the kind of rigorous study characteristic of contemporary work in the social sciences, it opens up an
interesting question about the effect of wealth on one’s moral or cognitive perception. This is one of the examples of
the way in which Aristotle’s views, though grounded in his “armchair psychology,” raise questions that are relevant
to psychologists today. See for instance Gasiorowska et al (2016) who show the damaging effect of wealth on
generous behavior.
27
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VIII). There, Aristotle presents the most concrete discussion of his program for moral education.
Unlike the abstract account in the EN where like actions will eventually develop like states,
Aristotle’s discussion in the Politics includes concrete suggestions for moral education and also
hints at the ways in which the child will be cognitively engaged in his development. The latter
point is of particular interest for this chapter because it involves the way in which one’s
upbringing affects one’s moral awareness. He claims, for instance, that because the child’s body
is undergoing too much change in the first five years of life, education should be focused solely
on physical development as learning may interfere with physical growth (VII.17, 1336a23-24).
But, between the ages five and seven, Aristotle says a child should prepare for intellectual
training, which involves being introduced to what she will eventually learn (VII.17, 1336b3537). Thus, Aristotle’s account of habituation is not limited to the training of the body, though he
claims this should be done first as reason develops later (VII.15, 1334b22-24), but includes some
intellectual engagement insofar as a child begins to be exposed to lessons he will learn between
age seven and twenty-one (VII.17, 1336b40).
Another way Aristotle is concrete in his discussion of moral habituation in the Politics, as
well as how his plan incorporates both physical and cognitive training, is in his inclusion of
moral exemplars, guides, or good examples in the moral education of children.28 From the start,
he thinks a child should be exposed to moral exemplars from plays, stories, and art (VII.17,
1336a29-31). A child is also in need of a moral guide (agoge). In his opening comments on
habituation at EN II.1, Aristotle says,
The sources and means that develop each virtue also ruin it, just as they do in a craft. For
playing the harp makes both good and bad harpists, and it is analogous in the case of
builders and all the rest; for building well makes good builders, and building badly makes
28

See Zagzebski (forthcoming) who argues for an exemplarist interpretation of Aristotle where the virtues are
defined in terms of moral exemplars.
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bad ones. Otherwise no teacher (agoge) would be needed, but everyone would be born a
good or a bad craftsman (tr. Irwin, 1103b10-13).
While we do not want to overstate the similarity between virtue and craft in Aristotle,29 there are
still several instances where he does note some similarities between the two (II.2, 1104a9-10, 17,
Metaphysics, 1049b28-1050a2), including this passage where there is a similarity in the way
virtues and skills are developed.30 In both cases, performing like actions will correspond to like
states (II.1, 1103a32-1103b1) and a person will be in need of a teacher or guide (agoge) (II.1,
1103b13). The need for a guide in moral development is also highlighted in the Eudemian
Ethics, in a passage mirroring the opening of EN II.1, where Aristotle states,
Now character (ēthos), as the word itself indicates, is developed from habit (ethos); and
anything is habituated which, as a result of guidance (agoge) which is not innate, through
being changed a certain way repeatedly, is eventually capable of acing in that way (tr.
Woods, II.3, 1220a39-b2).
Just as an expert in some craft instructs an apprentice, a guide (agoge) in moral education, such
as a parent, teacher, or fellow citizen, can help a child in her development of good habits by
encouraging her through praise, pointing out what is good about certain actions, as well as
correct her when she errs through verbal instruction, blame, or punishment. These all involve
some sort of cognitive engagement in the process, as Frede points out (2013, pp. 23-27, 31).31

29

See Kristjánsson (2014a, pp. 161-162) for discussion of this worry in Annas (2011).

30

See Russell (2015) on the similarly between virtue and skill, especially in the development of both.

31

In keeping with the skill analogy to virtue, another relevant passage concerning the learning process is at
Metaphysics IX.8, where Aristotle claims that the learner has some of the knowledge constitutive of the craft
knowledge.
But since, of that which in general is changing, some part must have changed (this will be clear in the case
of change) so, equally, the one who is learning must, it would seem, possess some part of the knowledge he
is learning (tr. Sherman, 1049b28-1050a2).
In early stages of moral habituation, the child has not yet acquired the “that,” but before full virtue, there must be a
time where she acquires part of that knowledge, indicating that moral education involves some intellectual training.
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Having good friends is also a matter of good fortune that can aid in a person’s moral
development. Vakirtzis argues that friendship between those of unequal moral quality can be
beneficial to the person whose virtue is of a lesser degree by helping her become better. This can
occur because the more virtuous friend acts as a moral exemplar to the friend and also because
the more virtuous friend can offer helpful criticism or advice (Vakirtzis, 2013).
Not only will a child require good examples, but Aristotle claims she should be protected
from bad company or influences – such as the company of bad people, bad stories, bad art, and
the use of foul language (Politics, VII.17, 1336b4, 13-14). For Aristotle, this includes limiting
the time a child is in the company of slaves (VII.17, 1336a41) and making sure he has no
exposure to comedies or iambus32 until he is old enough33 to be secure from harm to his
character (VII.17, 1336b19-20). The city should also be organized in ways that promote good
habits in the youth. So, Aristotle states that the statesman should organize temples and principal
messes (shared meals) for officials near the young since being under the scrutiny of important
people encourages shame (VII.12, 1331a38-40), which is appropriate to the young person
learning to be good.34 For Aristotle claims, “whatever we encounter first we like better. That is
why everything bad and vulgar should be alien to the young, particularly if it involves vice or
malice” (tr. Reeve, VII.17, 1336b30-33).
Aristotle’s practical advice for moral education focuses heavily on the kinds of company
to which a child is exposed, suggesting that the child’s acquisition of the “that” involves the
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Iambus is the name of a type of mocking song sung at some religious festivals (Reeve, 1998, p. 225, fn. 106).

33

Aristotle likely thinks one will be safe from the harms of iambus and comedy when one is 21. For he claims that
the stages of life are separated in years of 7 and so the stages of the child’s learning are from seven to puberty and
puberty to age 21 (Politics, VII.17, 1336b39-40).
34

(EN, IV.9, 1128b15-22).
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development of her moral perception, that is, of her ability to see situations that call for good
actions and to see the way a good trait functions in a person’s character and behavior. For the
child is not simply mindlessly compelled to perform certain actions repeatedly, but to behold
good examples that will motivate her towards the good.35 Aristotle claims that “[since] virtue is a
matter of enjoying, loving, and hating in the right way, it is clear that nothing is more important
than that one should learn to judge correctly and get into the habit of enjoying decent characters
and noble actions” (tr. Reeve, VIII.5, 1340a14-17). And so, the young are educated to judge
correctly by recognizing noble actions and being pleased by them.36 These concrete remarks in
the Politics flesh out the process of early habituation that I outlined in chapter three, especially
the way in which a child is cognitively engaged.
One’s upbringing, therefore, contributes significantly to one’s moral awareness as it
involves the development of her moral perception under the guidance of an “expert.” While I
have focused on early development of the child in this section, the following section will address
the impact of a person’s circumstances on the further development and maintenance of her
character. We will then be in a position to understand the relationship between responsibility and
the fortune involved in one’s early and later development, as well as that involved in the
maintenance of one’s character.
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The connection between being motivated towards the good and perceiving it as good might be explained by
Burnyeat’s claim that learning to take pleasure in performing good actions is the same as learning to do good actions
for their own sake because it involves learning their intrinsic value. So, through habituation one learns the “that”: he
learns that a good thing is enjoyable and intrinsically good (1980, p.78).
36

For more on education and the good, see Miller (2001) who brings together the discussion of locomotion in De
Anima with Aristotle’s ideal of moral education to explain the role of reason and appetite in action. He argues that
moral education involves learning to distinguish the good from the apparent good so that the object that inspires
movement in a person is the actual good.
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III. Character Development and Maintenance and One’s Circumstances
The need for a city is not limited to a child’s need for public moral education, but
continues to serve a purpose for adults who must continue in their good habits if they are to
maintain their virtue. Thus, Aristotle claims in Book X of the EN,
Presumably, however, it is not enough if they get the correct upbringing and attention;
rather, they must continue the same practices and be habituated to them when they
become men… As we have said, then, someone who is good must be finely brought up
and habituated, and then must live in decent practices, doing base actions neither
willingly nor unwillingly (EN, tr. Irwin, X.9, 1180a1-3, 15-17).
Having had a good upbringing and a good start to moral development, thus, does not guarantee
one will become and remain good throughout one’s life.37 Aristotle emphasizes this point in his
transition to the Politics as he prepares the potential legislators of his audience to learn the best
way(s) to make laws that promote virtue and good living in their future citizens. While a Greek
man’s virtue is sufficient on account of nature (EN, X.9 1179b18-20; Politics, V.9 1309b21-33),
it will be difficult to become fully virtuous unless he lives under a good constitution that will
help him avoid corruption and realize his natural talents. Full realization may only occur under

While Aristotle claims that one’s upbringing will make “all the difference” (EN, II.1, 11103b25), it does not
follow that one’s upbringing will completely determine the moral state one will have. Brickhouse, for one, argues
that a good upbringing is necessary, but not sufficient for developing virtue. I, by contrast, understand Aristotle’s
claim that a good upbringing “makes all the difference” to mean that it will be very difficult, though not impossible,
to become virtuous. In other words, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for virtue, although developing virtue for
the ordinary person will be challenging without it. A person may, however, be blessed with a good nature (eutuchia
phusei) that may help her overcome her poor circumstances, as Aristotle discusses at Eudemian Ethics VIII.2. One’s
upbringing, thus, makes all the difference insofar as it will be very difficult to develop virtue without it, but a good
upbringing is not sufficient to form one’s character into a fully habituated state (hexis prohairetikē). As I have
shown in chapter three, it is the judging and choosing of actions aimed at one’s final end that forms one’s state, and
this occurs after childhood. See Kristjánsson (2014b) who argues that treating a good upbringing as necessary is
ingrained in Aristotle’s theory of moral education, and that we might reconstruct Aristotle’s view by considering
how contemplation can undo a bad upbringing. Consider Aristotle’s example of a man brought up in bad habits who
can, with sufficient time, make slow progress towards virtue and eventually change completely (Categories 13a2231).
37
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the ideal constitution,38 but under a secondary (monarchy or aristocracy) or tertiary (polity)
constitution, citizens might realize virtue to the highest degree possible for them given their
limited resources. In other words, the ordinary person may only achieve virtue incompletely
(Politics, III.5, 1286a30-35), but this may be the best she can achieve given her limited genetic,
temperamental, and social fortune. Thus, the polity does not aim at virtue that is unreachable for
ordinary people or an education that relies on great natural gifts39 that depend on good fortune
(Politics, IV.11 1295a26-28).
While I have been gathering textual evidence from various places in the Politics and EN,
I will now focus on two texts that I think best bring out how vulnerable Aristotle thinks the
ordinary person’s character is to her circumstances and that suggest that a person’s moral
awareness is affected by her circumstances. These two texts are Rhetoric II.15-17 and Politics
IV.11. In the former set of chapters, Aristotle discusses the types of temperament (ēthos) that
accompany good fortune (tuchē) such as good birth, wealth, and power. In the latter chapter,
Aristotle talks about the hoi mesoi, the middle-class people who are best suited to rule in the
polity because of their moderation.
1. Rhetoric II.15-17 and Politics IV.11 on the importance of circumstances for
development and moral awareness. At Rhetoric II.15, we start off small. While this particular
chapter does not say much about one’s moral awareness, it does have some implications for
responsibility. After mentioning the temperament (ēthos) of the well-born, Aristotle distinguishes
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(Ober, 2015, p.240).

The Greek male’s nature is sufficient, but it does not exceed the ordinary (Kraut, 2002, p. 209). In fact, Aristotle
thinks that having extraordinary good fortune can make people arrogant (hyperēphanōteroi) and thoughtless
(alogistoteroi), though pious (philotheoi) (Rhetoric, II.17, 1391a35-b2). In the Politics, he states, “It is admitted that
moderation and the mean are best, and therefore it will clearly be best to possess the gifts of fortune in moderation;
for in that condition of life men are most ready to follow rational principle” (tr. Jowett, IV.11, 1295b2-6). See also
Politics, V.8, 1308b12-13.
39
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between eugeneia and to gennaion: being well-born and being noble, or true to one’s good birth
(1390b22-23). The former is a good caused by fortune (tuchē), but the latter implies some sort of
action on the part of the lucky person such that she does not let her good nature degenerate. For
Aristotle claims that the offspring of good families are not always good: the descendants of
highly gifted families (euphua genē), such as those of Alcibiades and Dionysius, degenerated
into maniacs, and those of stable families (stasima), such as those of Socrates, Cimon, or
Pericles, became fools and dullards (II.15, 1390b27-30).
Aristotle thus recognizes that being blessed with good fortune at one’s start is not
sufficient to develop a good character. This coincides with his claims at EN X.9 that a person
must continue doing good if she is to remain good. But, we might also infer that a person can be
held responsible for degenerating from her good birth when she has had opportunity to become
good. For Aristotle’s distinction shows that it is not enough to be born well, something more
must be added in order to develop well and become noble. Filling in the gaps here with
Aristotle’s account of moral development, the missing piece is habituation both at the start of
one’s development (EN, II.1-3) and through adulthood (EN, III.5, X.9). Those who fail can be
blamed for having failed to exercise their capacity to develop virtue on the less stringent account
of responsibility I constructed in chapter four, assuming their failure was not caused by some
external force, such as living in corrupt conditions (Politics, III.16, 1287a31-32).
For the moment, I will jump to Rhetoric II.17 on power since the chapter on wealth is
nicely connected to his discussion of the middle class (hoi mesoi) in Politics IV.11. Again,
Aristotle does not say much about the effect of power on moral awareness, but we are still able
to further recognize how his view appreciates the effects that a person’s circumstances have on
her ordinary character as well as how responsibility relates to it. For Aristotle describes the
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temperament (phusikai hexeis) of those who have power in a positive way while noting that their
good qualities are the result of their circumstances. For example, Aristotle claims that because of
their ability to do great deeds, those who have power tend to be ambitious (philotimoteroi) and
manly (andrōdesteroi) (II.17, 1391a22). Because they must always be watchful in looking out
for their power, they become energetic (1391a25). Lastly, he claims that they are more dignified
and less pompous because they are more conspicuous given their rank (1391a26-27). Thus, he
says, they are moderate and have dignity (semnotēs), which he describes as a mean between
arrogance and servility at EE, II.3, 1221a8, III.7,1233b34-38 and MM, I.28, 1192b30-38. The
powerful person’s dignified temperament (phusikai hexeis) is primarily caused by his being in
the spotlight rather than a conscious effort, yet Aristotle’s mention of his moderation and of a
trait that hits the mean (dignity) suggests this person has virtue to some degree. For he has a
positive trait and is simply missing practical wisdom (phronēsis), which would make his natural
virtue full virtue.
I now turn to Aristotle’s remarks on the effect that wealth has on a person’s ordinary
character in order to show how sensitive Aristotle is to the significant effect one’s circumstances
has on one’s character. Here, he does speak explicitly to its effect on one’s moral awareness. At
Rhetoric II.16, Aristotle describes how the temperament (phusikai hexeis) of a person is affected
by wealth, claiming that the wealthy are insolent (hubristai) and arrogant (hyperēphanoi)
because they think they possess all good things, mistakenly taking money as the standard of
measurement (1390b32-34). They are luxurious and ill-mannered because they are so taken by
wealth they believe all others wish to emulate them (1391a2-7). Thus, being wealthy can
severely impede upon a person’s character by affecting her standard of value and consequently
causing her to develop poor qualities. Aristotle further notes that the temperament of the newly
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rich is affected in a different way than those who come from old money because the former have
not been educated in wealth and thus their vices (ta kaka) are more numerous and present to a
larger degree (1391a14-17). Aristotle lastly attributes their wrongdoings to a mix of insolence
(hubris) and incontinence (akrasia) (1391a18-19).
Unlike his discussions of good birth and power, Aristotle’s discussion of wealth mentions
the effect that money has on one’s ability to reason or understand. He claims that the wealthy
become insolent and arrogant because “their possession of money affects their understanding...
wealth becomes a sort of standard of value for everything else” (tr. Roberts, II.16, 1390b33-34).
Similarly, in his discussion of the middle class (hoi mesoi) in the Politics, Aristotle claims that
those in the middle class are better able to listen to reason (IV.11, 1295b6). More than good birth
and power, how much money a person has seems to affect her moral awareness insofar as it sets
the wrong standard to judge value. Aristotle’s explicitly stating that money has this effect, but
not mentioning this connection with respect to good birth and power40 is perhaps accidental. He
observes in the EN that the common beliefs (endoxa) about happiness, and thus the standards by
which to judge value, are that it is pleasure, wealth, or honor (I.4, 1095a23). That he does not
mention power or good birth may simply be the result of the common beliefs concerning
happiness; it does not mean that a person who pursues the expansion of her power over all else or
who thinks a good life is primarily constituted by having come from a good family is not
similarly affected in her moral awareness. Wealth may also simply have a larger or more
conspicuous effect, especially in the context on political justice where the predominating
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At the very least, power and good birth (or being born to a notable family, not necessarily one of virtue) may not
affect moral judgment to the same degree. For example, the well-born person’s disdain for others implies a standard
of judgment based in the proximity (or lack thereof) of the cause of the good qualities with which she was born –
i.e., how far back her family line goes (Rhetoric, II.15, 1390b21-22). Thus, the effect on judgment may be limited to
praising a person’s character rather than extending to other actions.
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constitutions are democratic and oligarchic: based on the poor and the wealthy.41 If this is so – or
at least plausible enough – then we can apply what Aristotle says about the relation between
wealth (or lack thereof) and understanding to other circumstances in which a person’s
development is influenced by various goods of fortune. For he does explicitly mention beauty
and strength as additional goods of fortunes that can affect a person’s development and ability to
follow reason at Politics IV.11, 1295b2-6. The same can also be said about misfortune. For
Aristotle concludes his discussion of the temperaments (ēthē) that accompany good fortune by
stating that one can infer the opposite traits in those who are poor, unfortunate, or powerless
(II.17, 1391b6-7), and he states in the Politics that both excessively good or bad fortune will
make a person unable to follow reason (IV.11, 1295b6-8). Since he says more about the poor in
the Politics chapter that I will discuss next, I will focus on that source of misfortune in my
discussion of that chapter.
Aristotle concludes his chapters on the temperaments (ēthē) that accompany the goods of
fortune by stating that a person who is excessively blessed with good fortune will tend to become
arrogant (hyperphanōteroi) and thoughtless (alogistoteroi), though pious (philotheoi) (Rhetoric,
II.17, 1391a35-b2). So, we might consider how a moderate amount of good fortune (or simply,
neutral circumstances) might affect a person’s character and moral awareness. Aristotle argues
that having moderate good fortune is best when he discusses the middle class at Politics IV.11.
The passage is worth quoting in full.
Since it is agreed that what is moderate and in a mean is best, it is evident that possessing
a middle amount of the goods of luck is also best. For it most readily obeys reason,
whereas whatever is exceedingly beautiful, strong, well-born, or wealthy, or conversely
whatever is exceedingly poor, weak, or lacking in honor, has a hard time obeying reason.
For the former sort tend more toward arrogance (hubris) and major vice, whereas the
41

Aristotle claims that the pursuit of wealth and honor and avoidance of their opposites are the major sources of
conflict (Politics, V.2, 1302a32). Thus, his focus on wealth may also be because of its significant contribution to
conflict in a political community.
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latter tend too much toward malice (kakourgia) and petty vice; and wrongdoing is caused
in the one case by arrogance and in the other by malice. Besides, the middles classes are
least inclined either to avoid ruling or to pursue it, both of which are harmful to citystates (tr. Reeve, IV.11, 1295b2-12).
Aristotle argues that striking the mean is best since those who err in either extreme are worse off;
they tend to develop bad traits. When it comes to the goods caused by fortune, those with too
much become arrogant, while those with too little become petty and malicious. Aristotle
attributes the better qualities of the middle class – qualities that are in the mean as opposed to
being excessive or deficient – to their possession of a moderate amount of goods of fortune.
While I have been arguing that the account of virtue and character in the EN assumes one
has been met with good character luck with respect to one’s social and genetic inheritances and
one’s natural temperaments, here this is further elaborated upon: one’s fortune must not be
excessive if it is to be most conducive to developing virtue.42 As I have mentioned in my
discussion of the wealthy at Rhetoric II.16, Aristotle also claims here that having a moderate
amount of goods of fortune makes it easier to follow reason. Thus, one’s moral awareness can be
affected by her circumstances insofar as she will be more or less able to listen to reason
depending on her fortune.
Aristotle further describes the problems with having too many or too few goods of
fortune. Those with too much of the goods of fortune are unable to be ruled and only know how
to rule as masters do (IV.11, 1295b16, 20). Those with too few of the goods of fortune are too
humble to rule and only know how to be ruled as slaves (IV.11, 1295b18-19). Thus, a city-state
composed of many rich or poor will consist of slaves who are envious or masters who are
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One might argue that the ideal constitution relies on an excessive amount of good fortune, but this would be a
mistake. For while it does require a lot of good fortune, this fortune is in the form of the coming together of several
goods such as good citizens, a good location, sufficient resources, etc. None of these goods are needed in excessive
amounts. This is different from, say, being born into excessive wealth or with extraordinary beauty.
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arrogant (IV.11, 1295b21-22), and will not resemble a political community since this involves
civic friendship that cannot be formed between envious or arrogant citizens (IV.11, 1295b22-24).
Unlike the excessively rich or poor, those of the middle class are neither envious nor inspire
envy in others, which allows them to “live out their lives free from danger” (IV.12, 1296b33).
Thus, those in the middle class seem to be best suited for habituating virtue since Aristotle says
habituation is best done gradually (Politics, VII.17, 1336a18) and living free from danger can
contribute to a person’s ability to gradually develop virtue. The rich and the poor in Aristotle’s
analysis are each other’s targets, making it difficult for each to live free from the worries of
being ruled unjustly by the other.
We can apply this insight to other virtues as well: being excessively wealthy will make it
difficult to develop temperance when a young person gets accustomed to being able to
immediately satisfy his appetites on a grand scale. Generosity for Aristotle concerns matters of
the giving and taking of wealth, and more in the giving (EN, IV.1, 1119b25). A person with
excessive wealth will find it difficult to give the right amount to others since they judge goodness
by money and aim not at virtue, but at acquiring wealth.43 The poor may also desire the taking of
wealth too much in comparison to giving. Thus, by virtue of their moderate circumstances, the
middle class avoids the vices of the rich and poor and can enjoy a moderate level of virtue that
allows them to live decent lives. Unlike the rich and poor, they can listen to reason, which
determines what is virtuous, like those who have had a good upbringing and can listen to
arguments concerning the good (EN, X.9, 1179b23, 32). Their virtue is at this point only of the
natural sort; they have not developed practical wisdom (phronēsis), but are prepared to, should
they have access to a good public education that can perfect what they have begun to develop
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Cf. Rhetoric, II.16, 1390b32-34.
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due to their circumstances. Because of the goodness of the middle class, however limited,
Aristotle thinks the polity is best since those with a moderate amount of property, that is, the
military class, rule (Politics, IV.11, 1295b40).44 He claims the further evidence for this is that the
best legislators, such as Solon, Lycurgus, and Charondas, owned a moderate amount of property
(IV.11, 1296a18-19).
In sum, the large role that circumstances play in the development and maintenance of an
adult’s character is evident in Aristotle’s descriptions of those who are affected by good, bad, or
moderate fortune. The upshot is that a person’s character is not only heavily influenced by her
upbringing, but her circumstances continue to play a role in shaping her character throughout her
life. These circumstances are not limited to those that can corrupt an otherwise good character,
such as that mentioned at EN, I.10, 1101a7-8 or Politics, III.16, 1287a31-32.45 While Aristotle

44

Aristotle distinguishes constitutions on the basis of the organization of offices, in particular which element rules
over the others (III.6, 1278b8-9). He claims that a polity is essentially a constitution that is ruled by the many for the
sake of the common good (III.7, 1279a36-37). Here, he claims the polity is ruled by the hoplite class that pools
together their military virtue to rule. These men also tend to own a moderate amount of property and so they might
be the middle class. They may have other virtues to some degree, but it seems what primarily marks them as
moderately virtuous is that they have military virtue, which, unlike full virtue, can be found in many people (III.7,
1279a38-1279b3). See Kraut who argues that military virtue is a lesser form of civic virtue (2002, pp. (12.3). See
Bobonich (2015) for discussion of Aristotle’s claim that the incomplete virtues of many is superior to the few
virtuous at Politics III.11. However, in his discussion of the polity at Politics IV.9, Aristotle says that it is a mix of
democratic and oligarchic laws and principles, suggesting that in a polity, the rule would be shared by the rich and
poor – he does not mention a middle class here. What is further puzzling is that nowhere in his discussion of the
middle constitution in Politics IV.11-12 does he mention “polity,” suggesting to some that the mixed or middle
constitution is distinct, not to be identified with the polity. I think there is still good reason to think the mixed or
middle constitution is a polity. For, after introducing this polity, Aristotle calls it a mixed constitution (IV.8,
1294a22-23), and enumerates three ways in which we might mix a constitution. First, one might use laws from both
regimes, such as fining the rich for missing jury service and paying the poor for serving. Second, one might use a
middle law, such as striking a mean between high and low property qualifications (IV.9, 1294a36-b6). Third, one
might use elements of each, such as choosing those who will serve in office through voting (like an oligarchy) and
requiring no property qualification for office holding (like a democracy) (IV.9, 1294b6-13). While one might use all
three of these principles within one constitution by creating legislation and organizing politics offices in all of the
ways mentioned, we might also distinguish between species of polities on the basis of which principle explains the
mixture. Some polities may be governed by both rich and poor according to the first principle of the mixture, others
by the middle class, according to the second principle. Of the different polities, Aristotle clearly states that the one
organized on the basis of the second principle – striking a mean between oligarchic and democratic principles – is
the best because it is most stable (IV.11, 1296a7).
For discussion on the mixed or middle constitution, see Balot (2015) who argues that the constitution described as
middle in book IV.11-12 is indeed the polity. See Garver (2011, pp.115-122) who argues they are different.
45
See also Nussbaum (2001, pp. 337-339) who argues that one can lose virtue in corrupting circumstances.
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acknowledges that a good person might fall from grace under extreme circumstances, a person’s
character is also affected to a large extent by her ordinary circumstances; she will develop a
certain kind of character in light of her circumstances. For example, he claims that a person will
likely become arrogant if wealthy (Rhetoric II.16, 1390b32; Politics IV.11, 1295b10),
moderately virtuous if part of the middle class (Politics, IV.11, 1295b30-32), malicious if poor
(IV.11, 1295b10), slavish if severely poor (IV.11, 1295b18-22)46, and tyrannical if poor to a
lesser degree (IV.4, 1292a4-38; IV.6 1292b41-1293a10). In other words, the various degrees of
wealth will correspond to certain qualities of character, good or bad, though these virtues or
vices are only moderate since they do not develop through conscious choice but as a result of
one’s circumstances. And so, we can conclude that Aristotle’s understanding of character and
character development does not suppose independence from one’s circumstances; a person can
be virtuous (to a lesser, but still praiseworthy and desirable, degree) and live a good life while
still falling short of the ideal.
Not only do circumstances play a large role in the maintenance of character, but we have
also seen how a person’s moral awareness can be influenced by her circumstances such as
economic status. For Aristotle’s discussion of the various temperaments (phusikai hexeis) that
accompany fortune include mention of the effect of good fortune on one’s awareness that is
further supported by his claim in the Politics that those in the middle class are better able to
listen to reason. We might further ask how fortune affects awareness in other ways. Some
suggestions that may have grounding in the current empirical literature are that a person’s
awareness might be affected by causing her to desire something more than she ought, making her
ignore important moral matters or find it difficult to reason when in emotionally taxing or non-
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Aristotle claims that the severely poor will be too humble and envious, like slaves.

148
ideal situations where her cognitive resources are insufficient to address a moral problem.47
Alternately, a person’s excessive appetite might get in the way her reasoning, as it happens in the
case of the incontinent person. Briefly put, we have been able to establish that a person’s
awareness can be impeded upon by her circumstances in Aristotle’s view. This has implications
for an account of responsibility, to which I now turn.
IV. Responsibility and One’s Upbringing
In chapter four, I developed an account of responsibility based on Aristotle’s normative
claims about the temperaments (phusikai hexeis) of ordinary people in his Rhetoric. While the
focus was on natural dispositions with which we are either born or that develop without
conscious effort – generally these latter types include dispositions caused by physical changes,
such as a weakened appetite – here we can extend the results to the effects of one’s upbringing
on one’s character and responsibility. Like one’s natural temperament (phusikai hexeis), one’s
upbringing may result in a fragmented and changeable character. This is why Aristotle devotes
most of his discussion of the ideal constitution to moral education; without a good education, one
will most likely not develop full virtue.48 Aristotle mentions the changeable character of ordinary
people throughout the EN,49 and claims that, unlike the virtuous person’s character, it is not
stable since it can change with one’s circumstances (EN, I.10, 1100b35-1101a6). In the Politics’
discussion of the middle class, we see a concrete instance of the ordinary person’s character; the

This seems to be at work in many of the situationist experiments. For example, a person’s anxious mood affects
her helpful behavior. I discuss these experiments in chapter six. The emphasis that some philosophers and
psychologists give to psychologically salient situations over nominal situations is a possible way to account for the
how one’s circumstances affect her reasoning and subsequent behavior. Simply put, a person’s psychological traits
largely affect which features of the situation are salient to her.
47
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Unless, perhaps, she has been blessed with a good nature that allows her to overcome her poor upbringing. Cf. EE,
VIII.2.
Aristotle often contrasts the ordinary person’s character with that of the fully virtuous person in his discussion of
friendship. Cf. EN, 1156a20, 1156b13, 1156b19, 1157a14, 1158b5, 1158b10, 1159b5-10, 1164a12-13.
49
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moderate virtue a middle-class person has is heavily determined by her circumstances and thus
will be more vulnerable to change in her fortune than the character of the fully virtuous. In book
VII of the EN, Aristotle talks about the “soft” person who is vulnerable to intimidation and
manipulation (EN, VII.7, 1150b1ff).50
Between one’s natural dispositions and imperfect upbringing, one develops the kind of
character described in chapter four – one that spans both a rational capacity and a hexis, having
elements of both, viz. a temperament (phusikai hexeis). We have already discussed the difficulty
with assigning responsibility on the basis of one’s temperament (phusikai hexeis) on account of
its lack of stability and its being largely outside of one’s control. Yet, considering that an
ordinary person’s character (phusikai hexeis) is in some ways a capacity helps us to broaden
Aristotle’s account of virtue and character and speak to those who have not (yet) developed full
virtue or vice. For if we only have an ideal, we can only make judgments concerning how far we
fall short from the ideal – our judgments only address the goodness or badness of a person’s
character. But, if we also consider one’s capacity to develop virtue, we can address one’s
responsibility and make further distinctions between the person who has had a morally difficult
or inadequate upbringing and develops bad traits and a person with the same traits who had a
good nature and good upbringing and thus could have easily become virtuous. While both might
have the same bad traits, the latter has had a greater capacity to form virtue and thus is more
responsible for her bad traits than the former.
The fragmented character of the ordinary person is thus a reflection of the combination of
her natural dispositions and upbringing, two of the major sources of character luck. We have
now added further detail to the less stringent account of responsibility in Aristotle by considering
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how one’s upbringing and circumstances affect one’s moral awareness. In chapter two of this
dissertation, I considered the traditional understanding of responsibility in contemporary ethics to
include two criteria: control and awareness. On the one hand, a person is held responsible to the
extent the action in question was under her control. On the other hand, a person must have also
been aware of the significance or meaning of the action she performed. These criteria together
resemble Aristotle’s criteria for the voluntary: an action’s being “up to us” and free from
ignorance.51 When it comes to one’s character, however, these criteria can be difficult to apply.
Given the growing empirical literature that challenges the amount of control and awareness we
exercise, I argued in chapter two that we ought to use reasonable standards to responsibility. For
our social and genetic inheritances and natural temperaments are not “up to us,” but rather,
largely outside of our control. Further, as Aristotle recognizes, our moral awareness is greatly
affected by our circumstances.
Consider the objection he raises in his discussion of responsibility for character at EN,
III.5: “But someone may say that everyone aims at the apparent good, and does not control how
it appears, but, on the contrary, his character controls how the end appears to him” (1114b1-2).
Given that Aristotle sees moral education as an education in values (EN, X.9, 1179b34-36;
Politics, VIII.5, 1340a14-17), the character that a person develops as a result of her upbringing,
however fragmented, controls what a person aims for in her actions. For example, if a child is
brought up in an oligarchic community, she will tend to make choices that reflect her view that
wealth is the highest good. So, she may only help in cases where there is a monetary reward
involved or she may ignore features of a situation that do not speak to this value. In his response,
Aristotle does not reject the claim that a person’s character controls how the good appears. Nor
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does he claim that a person’s character is totally under her control. Rather, he simply states that
“if each person is in some way responsible for his own state [of character], he is also himself in
some way responsible for how [the end] appears” (EN, tr. Irwin, III.5, 1114b3-4, emphasis mine).
In other words, Aristotle’s view that we are in control of actions stemming from our characters
because we are in control of our characters does not assume a high standard of control. He claims
rather that we are merely co-causes (sunaitioi) of our characters (EN, III.5, 1114b23).52
Further, the textual evidence I have presented from the Politics in this chapter indicates
that the level of awareness, in its dependence on one’s upbringing and continued development
through adulthood, is not unreasonably high either. For while acting free from ignorance for
Aristotle requires that one knows “who is doing it; what he is doing; about what or to what he is
doing it; sometimes also what he is doing it with – with what instrument, for example; for what
result, for example, safety; in what way, for example, gently or hard” (EN, tr. Irwin, III.1,
1111a4-7), one’s knowledge of the values that guide one’s deliberation are greatly influenced by
one’s circumstances and upbringing. Thus, a person who pursues her self-interest over
everything else may have freely chosen to do so by rejecting the good values of her society. By
contrast, she may only have acquired this goal as the result of an upbringing that values
individualism excessively. Her capacity to understand the rightful place self-interest should take
in relation to other goods is less than what it would had she had a better upbringing. In the
Politics, Aristotle emphasizes this point when he holds the legislator, not the individual,
responsible for acquiring the wrong values. He claims that good cities should not aim only at
inculcating some virtues at the expense of others, such as those that are more conducive to
acquiring wealth or honor over those that enable unqualifiedly noble actions such as
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contemplation (theoria). Rather, a city should learn how to enjoy times of leisure such that they
pursue higher ends than honor from winning wars (Politics, VII.14, 1333b1-2, 9-10). He argues
that in cases where citizens value the wrong ends, honors of war rather than a life of virtuous
activity, it is the legislator, not the citizens, who is responsible for having poorly educated them
(VII.14, 1334a10).
In short, the account of responsibility is less stringent because the conditions for control
and awareness also factor in one’s capacity to exercise control or have moral awareness given
her social and genetic inheritances and natural temperaments. The result as that more people are
held responsible.
V. Conclusion
Thus, the less stringent account of responsibility in Aristotle still uses two criteria of
control and awareness to determine praise or blame, while recognizing that this account need not
be stringent. If we consider not only the good- or badness of one’s character when we assign
responsibility, but one’s capacity to form a good character, we can recognize the limited amount
of control and awareness one exercises without using these as reasons to completely undermine a
person’s responsibility for her character and the actions that follow from it. This account applies
to all people, not only the ordinary person, but since it considers one’s capacity for virtue, it
mitigates responsibility for the ordinary person when she has not been met with good character
luck. The emphasis on what is “up to us” rather than factors that mitigate responsibility that we
find in the EN is there simply because the audience for that text consists of those who have the
greatest capacity for virtue. The upshot is that we might not always or usually be full responsible,
but if we recognize the large role our upbringings and moral education play in our character
development, we can emphasize the need to build better communities that are more conducive to
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the development and maintenance of virtue. Making the necessary provisions to keep our
behavior and characters in check is not contrary to an Aristotelian account of virtue and
character, but is consistent with his view that a person’s character is dependent on her
circumstances.
Before moving on to chapter six where I discuss how Aristotle’s view of the character of
the ordinary person and the account of responsibly I have constructed relates to recent work in
social psychology, I shall summarize briefly the main insights I have gathered from his Rhetoric
and Politics. In chapter four on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, I focused on the temperaments that
accompany age as a way to understand how our natural dispositions (phusikai hexeis) affect our
character and responsibility. While everyone is born with his or her own inclinations towards
virtue or vice, and with age, people may unwittingly develop natural virtue or vice, some can
train those dispositions so that they strike the mean and contribute to a virtuous state – a state
formed through one’s repeated choosing of the good and development of practical wisdom, viz. a
hexis prohairetikē. Others allow their natural dispositions to develop on their own and develop
states corresponding to the kind of behavior in which they habitually engage, but do not
consciously choose to become a virtuous or vicious person. The result is a person whose
temperament is comprised of affective inclinations and whose thinking and behavior is easily
manipulated by circumstances. The orator can, for instance, easily persuade his audience by
putting them in a good mood. Any traits that resemble virtues or vices are merely natural virtues
and vices – states that are explained by the affective units that make up a full virtue or vice, but
are not chosen for themselves. The ordinary person is such a person who has either not yet fully
developed her character or has failed to do so.
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The ordinary person of the Politics also falls short of full virtue or vice. The middle class,
for instance, only has moderate virtue, which is like natural virtue in that it is unreflectively
developed, but is different insofar as it is caused not by the inclinations with which one is born or
which develop on their own as one ages, but rather, by the effects that one’s circumstances have
on instilling good habits in a person and facilitating her ability to listen to reason.53 What the
Politics further shows is the large role that one’s circumstances play in developing and
maintaining virtue. For the virtues of the middle class and the vices of the rich and poor are the
result of their good, bad, or moderate fortune when it comes to wealth. If circumstances should
change for any member of these groups, a change in her state (hexis) would follow. It is not just
the ordinary person whose character (hexis) is dependent on her circumstances for its
development and maintenance. Even the fully virtuous will require intense moral education and
will need to live under laws that compel or deter good or bad behavior as an adult. Thus,
Aristotle’s view of the fully virtuous person still recognizes significant limits to her control over
becoming and remaining good.
These insights into the ordinary person and the limits to the fully virtuous person
acknowledge the large extent to which one’s character is affected by moral luck and raises
questions concerning responsibility for character and the actions that follow from it. Extending
the conversation beyond what Aristotle says in the EN to include the ordinary person of the
Rhetoric and Politics allows us to construct a less stringent theory of responsibility that
acknowledges a person’s capacity for virtue. For there is an important distinction between having
an excellent character and being responsible for that character: the former might simply be a
matter of luck while the latter necessarily involves one’s conscious choices and capacity for
Natural virtue, too, can affect one’s ability to listen to reason. For Aristotle claims of the person in his prime that
he is able to judge in accordance with the truth (kata to alēthes krinontes) (Rhetoric, II.14, 1390a34).
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virtue. At EN III.5, Aristotle acknowledges this when he claims we are only co-responsible
(sunaitioi) for our characters. In the EN, Aristotle assumes his audience has a great capacity for
virtue since they are free Greek men – they have been socially, genetically, and temperamentally
blessed. Thus, his claim that virtue and vice are “up to us” at EN III.5 makes sense in the context
of those who have such a capacity for virtue, but failed to develop it. By contrast, the ordinary
person’s capacity for virtue may be limited if she does not have natural temperaments conducive
to forming virtue or she has developed under poor circumstances. She may develop a vicious
character under her poor conditions, but not be fully responsible for it given her bad luck.
Bringing out this feature of Aristotle’s account of responsibility not only provides a deeper
understanding of his view, but demonstrates how his view is not so far removed from our own
egalitarian beliefs about fairness and the importance of opportunity.
The account of the character of the ordinary person I have developed in chapters four and
five further speaks to the contemporary position in social psychology called situationism – the
view that it is one’s circumstances that are more explanatory of behavior than character. I
dedicate the following chapter to showing how Aristotle’s view both anticipates and is consistent
with this view.

CHAPTER SIX
ARISTOTLE AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY:
THE EMPIRICAL ADEQUACY OF CHARACTER
Drawing on the results from studies in recent social psychology, philosophers and
psychologists alike have cast significant doubt on the existence of character, arguing that there is
little or no empirical evidence that people have robust traits that cause their behavior to be crosssituationally consistent. Instead, situationists argue that minor situational factors, like finding a
dime in a phone booth, affect behavior more predictably.1 The empirical literature dates back to
Hartshorne and May’s 1928 study of honesty in school-aged children.2 In various experiments,
they found that students were not uniformly honest in a range of circumstances, suggesting the
lack of any cross-situationally stable trait. While some might point out that the lack of character
robust traits in young children says nothing about their presence in adults, there have been many
studies since then that have shown the same results in adults.
Rather than take these as indication that Aristotle’s notion of character is either nonexistent or too fragmented to sustain virtue, I explain how his broader account of character sheds
light on the development of the ordinary person. The result is a character that is fragmented: it
contains a mix of conscious and unconscious dispositions and is not unified by a single
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For the main views in support of situationism, see Harman (1999, 2000, 2003, 2009), Merritt (2000 & 2010),
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Swanton (2003), Kamtekar (2004), Webber (2006), Annas (2005), Adams (2006), and Athanassoulis (2000). For an
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conception of the good. Because the character of the ordinary person is fragmented, her behavior
will be heavily influenced by situational cues rather than robust traits, i.e., traits that are
consistently activated in trait-relevant situations regardless of situational pressures. I will show
how Aristotle’s view is not only consistent with the available evidence of social psychology. To
do this, I draw connections between the work I have done in chapters four and five on the
character of the ordinary person in Aristotle and recent empirical work on character.
The situationist often takes the studies (that I discuss below) to indicate that the
psychology upon which Aristotle’s view is built is outdated, and so his theory rests on false
assumptions about what is possible for, as Owen Flanagan puts it, “creatures like us.”3 Much of
the disagreement rests on the idea that Aristotelian virtues are global traits: they are traits of
character that are reliably expressed in trait-relevant actions in a range of diverse, trait-relevant
situations, and they are stable over time. So an honest person will behave honestly when it comes
to situations where she has opportunity to lie and in situations where she has opportunity to steal.
She will also refrain from lying or stealing in future situations where she has opportunity to lie or
steal. The psychological evidence, however, indicates that while a person might engage in traitrelevant behavior in one kind of situation, she will often fail to behave in the trait-relevant way in
another. For example, in the honesty studies4, the correlation between different kinds of
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(Flanagan, 1991, p. 32). In his book, Flanagan challenges Aristotelian ethics since he claims that the idea of full
virtue is one we don’t understand; we do not have a full list of the “correct” virtues and even if we came up with
such a list it would be bizarre to think that a single person could possess them all (p. 10). Thus, Flanagan rejects the
unity of the virtues thesis often attributed to Aristotle, an idea challenged by a closer examination of his texts which
reveals not only degrees of virtues, but lack of unity.
“Honesty” is defined quite broadly by Hartshorne and May. Kamtekar criticizes the use of this study as evidence of
local, rather than broad, traits since they stick together very different dispositions, like lying, cheating, and stealing,
that are not obviously connected (2004, pp. 468-470). Further, using a study that was done on schoolchildren does
not provide conclusive proof that people have local rather than broad traits since we ought to expect the character of
a child is not yet fully formed and thus may be fragmented in a way that an adult’s is not. In response, I follow Doris
4
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dishonest behavior, like cheating on a test and lying about having cheated, was significantly
lower than the correlation within one of the kinds of dishonest behavior, like cheating on a test.5
There was an even higher correlation within the domain of cheating in a particular way, such as
when it came to copying answers from an answer key compared to working on a test after time
was called.6 Further, studies indicate that behavior is more often caused by minor situational
factors rather than a person’s traits. So, a person will be helpful when she is in a good mood, but
not otherwise.7 In sum, traits seem to lack stability over time and robustness across situations, a
conclusion that seems inconsistent with the traditional understanding of Aristotelian virtue and
character.
I will show that the inconsistencies between the available psychological evidence and
Aristotle’s view are only apparent. Given that the EN presents an account of character and moral
development based upon ideal conditions being met, it is not surprising that almost no one lives
up to the virtuous person described there.8 Aristotle, especially in some of his lesser known texts
where he discusses the ordinary person, such as the Rhetoric and Politics, accounts for how we
become people with fragmented characters, and so, how we might modify our environments to
be more conducive to both developing and maintaining virtue. These insights find concrete

who says that while this study does not provide evidence for the fragmented character of an adult, it is useful as an
interpretative perspective (2002, p. 63).
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expression in the available psychological data. Even more, despite the theory’s setting a high
standard, there is still evidence that the virtuous traits presented in the EN are neither global9 nor
situationally independent in the way critics often suppose. Thus, Aristotle’s view of character
can accommodate the empirical work in both its explanation of the ordinary person and its
realistic conception of virtue as a narrow and socially dependent trait.10
Some might object that showing consistency between Aristotle’s theory and the current
psychological data is not enough to convince anyone that Aristotle presents a viable ethic. While
I do not propose a full defense of virtue ethics as the best approach to ethics, I do think that
showing there is consistency is an important step in that direction. Because of the tension
between the global traits of character in Aristotle’s ethics and the psychological evidence against
the existence of such traits, many philosophers have argued that Aristotelian ethics is
inconsistent with the available empirical data and should be abandoned. Gilbert Harman, for one,
argues that the existence of character is highly dubitable and so leaves no room for Aristotelian
ethics since no one could reasonably hope to acquire the virtues as he defines them (1999, 2000,
2003, and 2009). He claims, “Character based virtue ethics may offer a reasonable account of
ordinary moral views. But to that extent, these ordinary views rest on error” (1999, p. 327). John
Doris claims, “Aristotelian approaches to ethics, in so far as they presuppose certain distinctive
commitments in descriptive psychology, may be subject to damaging empirical criticisms”
(1998, p. 505). He later argues that Aristotelian virtues are robust traits, but that robust traits are
empirically inadequate since very few people have them (2002, pp. 18-23). Maria Merritt argues
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For example, he Aristotle claims bravery in the proper sense (kuriōs legoit’) involves the right amount of fear and
confidence in the face of death in war (EN, III.6, 1115a34-35). More on this later.
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that the situationist challenge is a problem particularly for an Aristotelian version of virtue
ethics, claiming, “if you accept [the situationist personality psychology] as a descriptive moral
psychology while at the same time taking to heart the Aristotelean normative ideal of virtue, you
will encounter serious psychological strains in your attempt to live the life of the Aristotelean
virtuous person” (2000, p. 376). Christian Miller argues in his two books on moral psychology
that while there may exist global traits of character, these traits are not virtues or vices (2013,
esp. pp. 156-157, 190-198, and 2014a, esp. pp. 38-41, 194-195, 206-210).11 If the reason to
abandon an approach to ethics that focuses on the development of a virtuous character is that
current psychological data is inconsistent with the psychology upon which such a theory is
based, showing that there is consistency is important because it undermines this major objection
to virtue ethics. So while more would need to be said to give an exhaustive defense of an
Aristotelian conception of ethics, for now we can be satisfied having made significant progress
in that direction.
I. The Studies and Their Interpretations
The following is a list of some of the prominent studies often cited by situationists as
indication that the traditional notion of character as a robust and stable set of traits is empirically
inadequate.
Ambient noise, good moods, and helping behavior. In various studies, minor situational
factors that had positive effects on a person’s mood were strongly correlated with helping
behavior. In Mathews’ and Cannon’s lawnmower study, only 12.5% of subjects helped a man
who dropped a stack of books in the high-noise condition, while 50% helped in the ambient-
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noise condition (1975, p. 575). In Levin and Isen’s study on cookies and helping behavior, they
found that 69% of participants who were given a cookie volunteered to help in a psychology
experiment, while only 50% of those who didn’t receive a cookie volunteered (1972, p. 386). In
Isen and Levin’s dime study, 14 out of 16 participants who received a dime from the phone
booth helped a confederate who dropped a stack of papers, while 24 of 25 men and women who
did not receive a dime from the phone booth did not (1972, p. 387).12
The Milgram Experiments. Most alarming of the experimental psychology literature
findings is the well-replicated Milgram Experiments conducted in 1963 by Stanley Milgram. In
these studies, the gentle urging of the experimenter was enough to cause most subjects to attempt
to administer lethal levels of high-voltage shocks to a hidden, but audibly in pain, learner
whenever he answered a question incorrectly.13 Only 35% of Milgram participants in his
obedience experiments refused to proceed to administer the deadly 450 volts to an out of sight,
but audibly in pain learner (1974, pp.60-61).
Situations and Samaritans. Darley and Batson’s 1973 study on situational factors and
helping behavior showed that minor situational changes like being in a rush determined whether
a seminarian stopped to help a woman in distress.14 Of those seminarians who were in a rush,
having been told they were late for the second part of the experiment, only 10% stopped to help
the person in distress, while 63% who were not rushed offered assistance, and 45% who were
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told they were on-time for the next part of the experiment offered help (Darley and Batson, 1973,
p. 105).
Watching Eyes. Moral behavior has been shown to increase when a picture of eyes is
present rather than a picture of flowers. Pictures of eyes have been correlated with: increased
generosity in a game where players decide how much of their good fortune they’d share with
other players,15 increased donations to a communal pot in a public goods game,16 increased
donations to a communal pot used to replenish the coffee supply in a shared office,17 and
decreased litter in a self-service cafeteria.18
Group Effect. The results of group effect studies conducted by Latané and Nida show that
when a higher the number of people are present, the chances of any individual helping are
lower.19
There are two conclusions one might draw from these findings. One might say that hardly
anyone has a virtue, let alone all of the virtues. This conclusion does not conflict with the claims
of virtue ethicists since they all agree that virtue is indeed a rare achievement. Consider the
following argument for the rarity thesis. In her response to situationism, Neera Badhwar points
out the “forgotten minority”; there are some people in the studies whose behavior is not affected
by morally irrelevant features of their environment such as ambient smells or noises or the voice
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of an authority figure (2014, p. 41). While all of the numbers are very small, that some people
were not affected proves that virtue is not psychologically impossible. It is just rare.20
While it is possible that this minority consists of people who have other unsavory traits
like being too arrogant, say, to listen to an experimenter’s request to continue with the
experiment, this interpretation requires the same amount of speculation as attributing virtue
(which includes virtuous motivations) to any or some of the minority group in these studies. At
the end of the day, the experimental evidence does not test for how a person reasons or which
considerations she takes into account when she acts: whether she is acting on pride, arrogance,
sympathy, or by some other motivation. We are left to infer those reasons on the basis of how
much we know about a particular person and the patterns of her behavior, information that is
severely limited in these studies. Miller, for one, argues that we need longitudinal studies –
studies conducted on the same people over time – to make these inferences about particular
people (2014a, pp. 200, 202). Kristján Kristjánsson also suggests the need for longitudinal
studies (2008, p. 76).
Still, we are not altogether without evidence that a person is not affected by moral
reasons; the rushed seminarians who did not help appeared anxious after encountering the person
in distress (Darley and Batson, 1973, p. 108). While appearing anxious is not conclusive proof
for virtue – and in fact might indicate the person is “soft” rather than virtuous – it does more to
indicate the cognitive and emotional content pertinent to the virtue in question. For Aristotle
claims that a good person will feel pain when he does the wrong thing (EN, IV.1, 1121a1-2).
There might still be a question about the usefulness of a theory of virtue that sets a standard

For a few examples of the “rarity thesis,” i.e., the view that the studies do not provide evidence for virtue because
it is rare, see Kupperman (2003), Annas (2011), and Miller (2014).
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almost no one reaches. I will argue that the standard for virtue is not so high; the view that one
need situational support to maintain one’s virtue is not contrary to Aristotle’s view.
One might, by contrast, conclude that these studies show not only that most people are
not virtuous, but that it is not possible for any human to become virtuous given the limitations of
our psychology. On this view, the studies completely undermine character ethics by showing that
it is based upon an outdated and inaccurate psychology. The idea here is that virtue is not rare,
but impossible for humans. Of the situationists involved in the debate on character, Gilbert
Harman expresses the most skepticism about the existence of character (1999, 2000, 2002, and
2010). He argues that the appeal to character is the result of the fundamental attribution error
where a person wrongly attributes behavior to a robust character trait while ignoring the
situation(s) that gave rise to the behavior in question.21 Early on in the situationist debate,
Harman claimed, “It is very hard to do studies that might indicate whether or not people differ in
character traits, but few studies that have been done do not support this idea. We must conclude
that, despite appearances, there is no empirical support for the existence of character traits”
(1999, p. 330). Harman argues that the sensible conclusion to draw from the empirical data,
however limited it might be, is that there is no evidence that people have character traits. While
his language early on in this debate is quite strong – he claims we must conclude there is no
empirical support – he later clarifies that he is not asserting there are no traits, but that we do not
have reason to believe that there are any:
I do not think social psychology demonstrates there are no character traits, either as
ordinarily conceived or as required for one or another version of virtue ethics. But I do
think that results in social psychology undermine one’s confidence that it is obvious there
are such traits (2009, p. 241).
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Harman does not argue that studies in social psychology prove without any doubt that people
have no character traits. In other words, he is not claiming that the empirical evidence does more
than scientists, in general, can do, i.e. make reasonable inductions from controlled experiments.
He instead argues that there is no evidence for the existence of traits other than that of the
anecdotal type. If he is right, then ethicists ought to shift their focus from character, at least until
there is more evidence to support their beliefs in it.
In the last few years, philosophers have come up with other views of character that they
argue fit better with situationist findings than Harman’s view.22 While Harman concludes from
the studies that there is no evidence (at least yet) to support our belief in character, others
interpret the findings as indicating there are traits, but that they differ from traditional
conceptions of character traits. Doris, for one, argues that we ought to abandon the conception of
character traits as global; the evidence supports the existence of local traits instead. For example,
someone who is honest when it comes to not cheating on a test, but not when it comes to lying is
honest-while-taking-a-test, but not honest in general.23 Christian Miller has also put forth an
empirically grounded view of character. He calls his view a Mixed Trait Framework and claims
ordinary people do not have any virtues or vices, even locally, but they do have mixed traits that
are both global and stable when considered with respect to certain kinds of situations (i.e.,
psychologically salient rather than nominal ones; more on this in subsection two).24 Both views
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have their own merits even if they also fall into trouble. I will examine each in turn, drawing out
what I take to be the insights from each. Then I bring my findings in the previous chapters to
bear on these views, showing how Aristotle’s view is empirically adequate. Much of this
evidence is found outside of the Nicomachean Ethics, in his Rhetoric and Politics, which focus
on ordinary citizens. I highlight how Aristotle’s focus on the development of character accounts
for the sources of our fragmented characters, which provides a basis for an account of
responsibility for character as well as an emphasis on the need to develop and act in
environments conducive to virtue. These ideas find concrete expression in social psychology.
1. Key concepts. Before I discuss Doris’ and Miller’s respective view, I first want to say
some more about the important distinctions between nominal and psychologically salient
situations and between global and local traits. Since these distinctions are at the heart of Doris’
and Miller’s disagreement, it is important to understand the relative significance of each. Briefly
put, nominal situations are comprised of objective, third party observable features of a situation,
while psychologically salient situations depend on the individual’s construal of a situation.
Global traits enjoy cross-situational consistency and stability among trait-relevant situations,
while local traits have consistency and stability only with respect to certain, narrow types of
nominal situations.
A nominal situation defines a situation with respect to its objective features that can be
observed by a third party, say an experimental psychologist. These features include the physical
features of a situation such as the place, time, or event.25 For example, in the Good Samaritan
study, the situation is nominally defined as one calling for helping behavior because of the
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See Miller (2014a, pp. 115-116) or Doris (2002, pp. 76-85) for more discussion on the distinction between
nominal and psychologically salient situations.
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visible person in distress, the low cost involved in helping that person, and the importance of the
distressed person’s need outweighing the need to arrive on time to give a lecture. For each
participant, most parts of the nominal situation remained the same, but only minor, morally
irrelevant features were tweaked; different participants were in differing levels of time
constraints as they passed by the person in distress. By looking at the nominal features of the
situation, the results of this study support the situationist hypothesis that minor situational
differences play a larger role than character in determining behavior – being in a rush was highly
correlated with not helping, and not being in a rush correlated with helping. Other differences in
character and situation, such as whether religion was seen as a means to provide meaning in
one’s life or whether it was seen as an end goal and whether a person had just heard a lecture on
the Good Samaritan or on possible jobs for seminarians, did not have as strong of correlations
with helping behavior.26
For social-cognitive theorists and some philosophers, the psychologically salient features
of a situation are more important than the nominal features and are better explainers of
behavior.27 A psychologically salient situation is comprised of “the features of the situation that
have significant meaning for an individual or type, and that are related to the experienced
psychological situation – the thoughts and affects and goals that become activated within the

26

(Darley and Batson, 1973)

Miller is just one example of a philosopher who thinks psychological situations are more explanatory of people’s
traits and behavior than nominal situations. He argues that taking into account how a situation appears to a particular
person is more significant and accounts for broad traits – a person will exhibit cross-situationally consistent behavior
if we consider her emotional state or what is psychologically salient to her. For example, if two people are in the
same garden, they occupy the same nominal situation. But, if one of these people has a fear of garden snakes, he will
be in a different psychological situation. See also Snow (2010) and Sreenivasan (2002) who are that psychologically
salient situations are more predictive and explanatory of behavior than nominal ones. This approach was inspired by
Shoda, et al’s work on developing the CAPS model of personality. See Shoda, Mischel, and Wright (1994) for
discussion on this model.
27
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personality system” (Mischel, 2004, p. 15). Thus, one looks not to generic features that can be
observed by a third party, but considers the situation from the perspective of the agent – her
thoughts, attitudes, goals, values, fears, etc. Focusing on psychologically salient features causes a
person to make sense of an agent’s behavior by appealing to the parts of her situation that will in
particular stand out to her. So while a group of people might inhabit the same nominal situation –
like witnessing a person in need of help – they may be in different psychologically salient
situations – like being in an anxious mood or not.28
The distinction between nominal and psychological situations originates in Mischel and
Shoda’s CAPS model. One feature of this model is that situations have meanings for an
individual that depend on a person’s natural temperament or social learning history.29 The
psychological evidence in support of this distinction includes a 1994 study of 84 children over a
six week period where their behavior varied in correlation to psychological variables arising
from such situations as being teased by peers, having positive contact with peers, or being
praised, punished, or warned by adults.30 Rather than modifying features of the situations that
have significance independently of a person’s mood, this study attempted to alter the emotional
states of the child and show that, when put in a certain emotional state, the child will be more or
less likely to behave in certain ways.31 The results indicated a higher than chance correlation

This does not exclude the possibility that nominal features of a situation may affect one’s mood. In fact, Snow
argues that people have traits that are consistent across objective situations because of a person’s subjective
construals of those situations (2010, p. 33).
28
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See Snow (2010, ch. 1) for more discussion on the CAPS model. For criticisms see Doris (2002, pp. 76-85) and
Miller (2014a, ch.5).
30
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(Snow, 2010, pp. 21-25).

To contrast to nominal situations, the children were also observed during woodworking sessions and cabin
meetings (Ibid., p. 21).
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between behavioral profiles and children. For example, one child consistently responded to
negative interpersonal interactions with both peers and adults with verbally aggressive
behavior.32
Where there is lack of consistency when it comes to nominal situations, we might find
consistency if we consider how the individual’s emotional state, such as feeling anxious,
regularly affects her helping behavior. Miller argues that focusing on psychologically salient
situations allows for cross-situationally consistency, and thus demonstrates the presence of
global traits. As I have outlined above, global traits are supposed to display both consistency
amongst diverse situations and stability within similar situations.33 For example, a brave person
should display consistent bravery in both physical and moral situations and her trait is also
expected to stably produce brave behavior from one battle to the next. Miller’s mixed traits are
global because they produce trait-relevant behavior across similar and diverse situations; a
person with a mixed aggression trait will behave aggressively whenever she is seeking revenge,
but not if she has reason to fear being held responsible for her aggression.
In contrast to global traits, local traits will only apply to narrowly defined situations. A
locally brave person will not necessarily be brave in every type of situation that calls for bravery.
She might be brave when it comes to physical situations demanding bravery, but not moral ones.
Further, she might only be brave when it comes to certain types of physical situations, like when
an attacker has a knife, but not others, like when he has a gun.

32

33

(Ibid., p. 23).

They are also thought to be evaluatively integrated with other, similar traits, but this feature is not as important for
this chapter since Doris and Miller are not arguing for a unity of the virtues thesis. I myself consider this thesis to be
an aspect of Aristotle’s ideal theory that need not limit our attributions of virtue to those who have all of the virtues
to every degree. In other words, when it comes to actual virtue, individuals may possess only one or a few of the
virtues and may only possess them to some degree. See chapter four of this dissertation on Aristotle’s Rhetoric for a
detailed account of these traits.
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2. Doris and local traits. Inspired by Owen Flanagan’s 1991 book Varieties of Moral
Personalities and the growing empirical data that has given rise to situationist concerns, Doris
presents an account of behavior that takes into consideration empirical findings while still
finding a place to talk about character. To do this, he attacks the thesis that people have global
traits, which he defines as: 1) consistent in diverse situations that are trait-relevant; 2) stable in
similar trait-relevant situations; and 3) evaluatively integrated so that the presence of one trait is
likely to mean a person has another, similar trait (2002, p. 22). Since these three features of a
trait conflict with the results of experimental psychology, Doris concludes that “globalist
conceptions of personality are empirically inadequate” (p. 23).
While Doris concludes that traditional notions of character are empirically inadequate, he
develops his own positive account of character traits that he believes reflects the empirical data
better. He argues, “Systematic observation of behavior, rather than suggesting evaluatively
integrated personality structures, suggests instead fragmented personality structures –
evaluatively disintegrated associations of multiple local traits” (p. 25). According to Doris,
character is not a set of robust and causally efficacious global traits, but a fragmented set of local
traits. Studies show that the more similar a situation is to another, the more there is consistency
in behavior, and the less similar a situation is, the less consistency there is (p. 64).34 So while the
standard view of a global trait like sociability holds that the sociable person will exhibit sociable
behavior whenever there is opportunity, Doris’ local traits account holds that a person will not
always be sociable; she may be regularly and predictably sociable when it comes to a certain
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For example, one form of cheating in the Hartshorne and May studies would correlate strongly with a similar type
of cheating (like copying from an answer key), but not with a less similar type of cheating (like continuing to work
after time is called on a speed test) (Hartshorne and May, 1928, pp. 382-383).
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type of situation, such as when she is at office parties, but she will fail to be sociable in other
situations. On Doris’ view, she has office-party-sociability rather than the global trait
“sociability.”35
Local traits do seem better able to fit with the growing literature in experimental
psychology since they account for both behavioral inconsistencies across situations and the
common observations of friends, co-workers, family, etc. who exhibit some regularity in our
interactions with them. Local traits do exhibit regularity with respect to their trait-relevant
situations and so they do not make ordinary appeal to traits obsolete. For Doris, local traits do
not exclude cases of local virtues or vices; someone might be courageous on the battlefield when
it comes to facing certain dangers, while lacking courage in other physical or moral situations,
like standing on the roof of a tall building or sticking up for a bullied friend.
Still, Doris admits his view lacks the explanatory power that character is supposed to
have. By focusing on behavioral outcomes, his view looks hopelessly circular; a person’s
courage on the battlefield is explained by her battlefield-courage trait, while her battlefieldcourage trait is explained by her regular courageous behavior on the battlefield. Doris argues that
this is not a problem unique to his local traits account but a problem for any trait account (2002,
p. 66). He briefly mentions appealing to the psychological context of the person, such as her
goals, motives, attitudes, desires, etc., in order to have a more satisfying explanation, but his
account of local traits does not appeal to such aspects of a person’s psychology.36 For example,
Doris dismisses the appeal to attitudes to account for consistencies in character, arguing that a
person’s attitude does not correlate very much with her behavior (2002, p. 86). In response,
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(Doris, 2002, p.66)
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See Chen (2014) and Adams (2006) who also make this criticism.
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Doris may emphasize that his local traits account does not explain why or how are person has the
trait, but rather, allows us to infer that a person has a local trait from her reliable behavior in
narrow situations. His account has predictive power, but leaves the explanatory work for others
to pursue. If this is so, then his account, while important and helpful for predicting behavior,
invites supplementation from others on the psychologically relevant aspects of character, which
may upon deeper analysis show some correlation to behavior. In an alternate account, Christian
Miller includes these other aspects in his discussion of character and argues that they do correlate
with behavior. Considering the larger psychological context of a person’s character provides the
explanation of traits needed in order to understand how we develop the traits we do and how we
can do better.
3. Miller and global traits. Unlike Doris, Miller claims that the evidence does indicate
there are global traits, though these traits are rarely, if ever, virtues or vices.37 He claims, “Most
people actually do possess traits of character pertaining to the different moral domains, and these
traits consist of various interrelated mental state dispositions pertaining to that domain” (2014a,
p. 43). Miller argues that people do have characteristic beliefs and desires (mental state
dispositions) that affect their behavior, but they do not constitute the kind of moral traits we
typically talk about like compassion or hostility (p. 44). So, Miller calls them mixed traits.
It is helpful to consider an example of a mixed trait to understand Miller’s position. Take
for instance the “Mixed Aggression Trait.” This trait is considered mixed because its moral
evaluation is mixed; some of the mental state dispositions comprising it are positive, others
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(Miller, 2013, 2014a)
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negative.38 It is called an aggression trait because it pertains to that domain of morality; it deals
with behaviors and mental state dispositions having to do with aggressiveness. Mixed does not
mean virtue in some cases and vice in others; it is neither a virtue or vice, neither entirely
morally good nor bad. Miller claims this trait consists of certain mental state dispositions39 like:
Beliefs and desires concerned with harming the offender in order to retaliate for his
offense, or to get even with him, or to get revenge.
Beliefs and desires concerned with harming others in order to maintain a positive opinion
of myself.
Beliefs and desires concerned with harming others in order to obey instructions from a
legitimate authority.
Beliefs and desires concerned with not harming others when they are similar to me in
important ways.
Beliefs and desires concerned with not harming others when I am thought to bear a
significant degree of personal responsibility for the harm and would be blamed if I did
(2014a, p. 43). 40
None of these dispositions that Miller takes to comprise the Mixed Aggression Trait are virtuous
or vicious. A virtuous mental state would involve doing a good deed for its own sake, which
means acting for the sake of another’s welfare rather than personal gain such as a good mood or
praise or some other advantage.41 A vicious mental state would involve doing wrong out of bad

He claims: “…the trait has both morally positive and morally negative elements that prevent it from being
accurately classified using a simple virtue or vice label. On the one hand, it consists of some mental state
dispositions which seem as if they would belong in a virtue like compassion, such as dispositions to empathetically
help others for altruistic reasons. On the other hand, it consists of some mental state dispositions which seem as if
they would belong to a vice like selfishness, such as dispositions to not help others if so doing would perpetuate a
negative mood. Hence I claim… that because of this mixture of mental state dispositions the trait does not meet the
requirements in the minimal threshold for being either a virtue or a vice” (pp. 156-157).
38
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Miller argues that character traits are grounded in mental state dispositions; the regularity in behavior follows
from the regularity in one’s disposition to have certain kinds of beliefs and desires (2014a, p. 30).
For another example, see also his claim that a mixed helping trait involves “dispositions to form beliefs and
desires pertaining to helping and guilt, embarrassment, positive and negative moods, elevation, activated moral
norms, empathy anticipated approval, and anticipated embarrassment” (2013, p. 156).
40
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motivations. While the motivating reasons in the mixed trait involve things like increasing
positive opinions of oneself, getting revenge, only helping others who are similar to oneself, or
acting out of fear of punishment or social disapproval, and these reasons are the same as the
reasons from which a vicious person acts. But, Miller argues that mixed traits are not vices.
Similarly, Miller claims that a mixed trait might contain a disposition to help for altruistic
reasons, but this is not enough to make the trait virtuous since the trait as a whole contains a mix
of morally positive and negative elements (2013, p. 157).
If we consider the altruistic disposition independently, it is like Doris’ local virtue. But, if
it is considered as merely one part of a global trait relating to a specific domain of morality (such
as helping), the global trait is called mixed; it is neither a virtue nor a vice. In other words, where
Miller sees one global trait that may be expressed in different behaviors depending on the
psychologically salient features of a situation, Doris sees several local traits that are activated in
different nominally defined situations. Their views are not incompatible, but involve different
evaluative approaches and emphasize different types of situations in their explanations. Doris’
local traits can be local virtues, while Miller rejects the idea that the narrow instances of being
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To do an act for its own sake means that one is not performing the act in order to pursue some non-moral, vicious,
or selfish end, such as pleasure, honor, or avoiding punishment. Instead a person chooses the act because it is a good
act. This does not exclude other factors such as desiring someone’s welfare. A virtuous person would not only
choose the act because it is good to help others, but would genuinely desire the welfare of the person she is helping.
Consider Aristotle’s claim that friendship involves wishing the good for another for her own sake and where it is not
reciprocated, we call it good will (eunoia) (EN, VIII.2, 1155b30). Aristotle names friendliness a virtue (EN, IV.6)
and defines friendly feeling in the Rhetoric as “wishing for [another] what you believe to be good things, not for
your own sake but for his…” (II.4, 1381a1). He also defines universal justice as the “complete exercise of complete
virtue. And it is the complete exercise because the person is able to exercise virtue in relation to another, not only in
what concerns himself; for many are able to exercise virtue in their own concerns, but unable in what relates to
another” (EN, tr. Irwin, V.1, 1129b32-34). See also Aristotle’s claim that what is done for the sake of others is
nobler than what is done for one’s own sake (Rhetoric, I.9, 1366b36-1367a6). Further evidence against the charge of
egoism can be found in the Politics where Aristotle distinguishes correct and deviant constitutions according to
whether they are aimed at the common good (correct) or at the good of the rulers (deviant) (III.7, 1279a28-31).
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properly motivated are not enough to attribute virtue to a person. Miller is skeptical that the
narrow instances of regular virtuous behavior will contain the right motivations.
By appealing to mental state dispositions, Miller argues for the global status of traits. If
we look only to outward behavior, as Doris does in his interpretation of the situationist results,
then what we see is fragmented behavior. But, if we consider not only the act a person engages
in, but her psychological context, we can better understand how that particular instance of
behavior fits into a character comprised of global (mixed) traits (Miller, 2014a, p. 46-47). Mixed
traits are global because they are stable across situations understood on the basis of one’s
psychological context. In other words, the situation is defined in terms of how a person sees it
(e.g., a stressful situation) rather than in terms of its nominal (or, third-party observable) features
(e.g., an opportunity to help a distressed person). On Miller’s view, if you acknowledge the
broader psychological context and define situations with respect to what is psychologically
salient to a person rather than by its nominal or objective features, you will find global traits that
are stable across situations (p. 55). For example, if a person has a Mixed Helping Trait, she may
be prone to help when the demand is low and she is aware of her ability to help, but not if she is
in anxious mood. So, her helping behavior is fairly predictable in helping-situations when she is
not in an anxious mood, and her not helping is also fairly predictable when she is in an anxious
mood.
Miller argues that his view fits better with the evidence than the view put forth by Doris
because if character were as fragmented as Doris’ account claims, there would not be patterns of
augmented behavior as a result of factors such as mood, guilt, or embarrassment (p. 200). While
Doris’ view holds that most people will have local virtues and vices, Miller argues instead that
there is no reason to think people possess even local virtues or vices. For example, a person may
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seem compassionate insofar as she regularly helps out at food banks, but there is much evidence
that people’s helping behavior is motivated by such things as relieving guilt or maintaining a
positive mood, rather than the kind of beliefs or desires that typically constitute a traditional
virtue (pp. 201-202). Further, Miller claims his view is preferable because there is more
predictive power; we can predict that once put in a positive mood, people will be more helpful,
and that when in a negative mood, they will often fail to help (p. 201).
In response to Miller’s 2013 and 2014 books on character and moral psychology, Doris
revisits his line of argument made in his 2002 book against the move from nominal to
psychologically salient situations. First, he claims that this move makes mixed traits look a lot
like local traits (e.g. honest-when-in-a-good-mood). Second, Doris claims there are morally
relevant situations that are the same for all because they involve shared ethical principles like
being honest or compassionate. Trading nominal for psychologically salient situations is not
desirable if it requires us to ignore morally significant aspects of a situation, like a person in
distress, and instead focus on the parts of the situation that are psychologically significant to the
person given her character, like being in a positive mood (Doris, 2002, p. 80; see also Doris’
2015 commentary). As Doris puts it:
Changing the subject is not an excuse; finding consistency in one regard need not reduce
discomfort regarding inconsistency in another. What is needed to salve this sort of
dismay is good reason to think that inconsistency regarding the standard in question may
be safely neglected in ethical judgment… when it comes to the standards embodied in
ethical trait concepts – honesty, loyalty, compassion, and the rest – argument is required,
and those not tempted to egoism or amoralism won’t be easily convinced (Doris, 2002, p.
84).
4. Assessing Miller and Doris. Any account of character traits aims to do two things. On
the one hand, it should, for the most part, help us predict the behavior of the person who has the
trait. While we may not be able to accurately predict behavior on every occasion and in every
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situation, it should be able to do well in predicting behavior most of the time. A virtuous person
will sometimes make a mistake, but knowing that she is virtuous will allow a third party to
predict she will likely do the right thing. On the other hand, an account of character traits should
also have explanatory power. Since a trait is more than a disposition to behave in certain ways,
an account of character traits should include more than an appeal to the typical behavior involved
in the activation of the trait; it should also appeal to the typical kinds of attitudes, emotions,
values, goals, beliefs, desires, and reasoning patterns of the person who has the trait. Saying that
a person is generous means more than that she always or often engages in generous behavior,
such as donating part of her income to charity; if she does it begrudgingly or in order to brag to
her peers about it, we would not call her generous.42
While Doris’ view has predictive power, his view does not have much explanatory power
since it does not fully appreciate the other psychological features of character, such as one’s
motives, goals, or attitudes.43 Miller’s view fares better on this count. His mixed traits model
makes sense of the empirical evidence that indicates there are strong correlations between
behavior and certain cognitive and emotional states, such as being in a good mood or wanting to
relieve feelings of guilt.44 But, Miller’s conclusion that virtue and vice are not only rare – which
is a generally accepted claim – but that almost no one has any amount of virtue or vice, does not

42

There is also an evaluative dimension to character; we praise or blame people for their character traits. See
Kamtekar (2004, pp.461, 478-479) for discussion on this often neglected aspect of character.
43

Doris does argue that the appeal to attitude is not promising since there is evidence that attitudes usually do not
predict behavior. But, this does not make one’s attitudes unimportant, but only indicates that there is a (bridgeable)
gap between the attitudes and behavior of the ordinary person. Still, it is important to realize that our attitudes are
not as causally efficacious as we believe (or hope) they are, which indicates a need to unify them with our other
dispositions even if this unification is only possible within the context of good environment. For example, the fully
virtuous person still relies to some extent on good circumstances to act well.
44

(Miller, 2013, pp. 34, 64-66).
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reflect an accurate understanding of having virtues or vices to certain degrees, as I will argue in
section III. He claims that most people have mixed traits that are global, which means their
behavior will be consistently affected by certain traits, but because they may not act for the right
reasons, their traits will not resemble a virtue or vice in any degree. Miller’s view also lacks
economy. On it, any psychological inhibitor or enhancer can be counted as explanatory, making
it hard to determine when a person is acting out of character. Any type of behavior might be
explained by referring to some aspect of the global mixed trait or by appeal to a new part of the
trait. By further excluding nominal features of a situation from his analysis, Miller’s view also
raises another problem. The problem is just as Doris states – there are certainly morally
significant aspects of a situation that are relevant in order to morally assess a person’s actions (or
inactions) and character.
II. Aristotle and Situationism
Both Doris’s and Miller’s accounts present important distinctions that allow us to account
for and accurately describe the character of the ordinary person. In this chapter, I will not speak
to their disagreements or argue in favor of one over the other. Rather, my focus for the remainder
of this chapter is on the way Aristotle is consistent with them. For my reconstruction of an
account of the character of the ordinary person and actual virtue in Aristotle’s Rhetoric and
Politics is not aimed at presenting a competing theory of the psychology of character. Rather, my
aim is to address the problem of character luck. But, given that Aristotle’s moral theory relies on
a theory of psychology, it is necessary to show that his psychology is not incompatible with what
is possible for us. If his theory of virtue and character was inconsistent with recent empirical
work in psychology, then his moral theory would collapse as it would fail the minimal
requirement for psychological realism.
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While there have been different ways philosophers have attempted to respond to the
problems posed by situationists such as reinterpreting the available evidence,45 attacking notions
of virtue or character operating in the literature,46 appealing to the normative/descriptive
distinction to “dodge” challenges,47 or weakening the commitments of virtue ethics to
accommodate situationist findings,48 my approach looks back to Aristotle to show that his
broader account of character is consistent with empirical findings. I do this by looking to other
sources in Aristotle that speak to the character of the ordinary person and the actually virtuous
person rather than the ideally virtuous person in the EN. Thus my approach differs from the
approach often taken by virtue ethicists who appeal to ideal notions of virtue and character and
argue that the situationist conception of character is impoverished. I also do not weaken my
commitments to virtue ethics, but rather, show how Aristotle presents a more realistic account of
virtue and character than he is often credited for.
1. Aristotle on actual virtue. In the last few years, work by psychologists and
philosophers in the situationist debate has shifted and now focuses on understanding virtue or
character in light of situationist results. My work on Aristotle advances the current state of this
discussion by drawing attention to ordinary character and the realistic conception of virtue in
Aristotle. In what follows, I show where Aristotle’s views are consistent with recent empirical
work. I include the work of Neera Badhwar, who also presents a view about virtue and character
in Aristotle that shows his view is not as stringent as is traditionally conceptualized. She calls
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(Badhwar, 2014) or (Athanassoulis, 2000)
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(Kamtekar, 2004) or (Sreenivasan, 2002)
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(Badhwar, 2009) or (Kupperman, 2009).
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this view of character “realistic” and “actual.”49 I offer some modifications of her view along the
way, but also contribute more evidence in support of the view that the fully virtuous person is not
as unreachable a standard as presupposed. I then discuss Aristotle’s character of the ordinary
person whose virtues are natural or modest. The results are two-fold. On the one hand, the notion
of full virtue as global and immune to circumstance is undermined by Aristotle’s texts; his
account of actual virtue is more realistic. On the other hand, while the standard for virtue is still
very high, there is evidence in Aristotle’s work for both the more modestly conceived virtues and
the fragmented character of the ordinary person.
A major objection to Aristotelian notions of virtue is that they are global traits and global
traits are psychologically impossible for humans.50 Yet, if we catalogue what Aristotle says of
the virtues we see that they are in fact narrowly construed. First, Aristotle defines the brave
person very narrowly – he says that this person is concerned not with fearlessness or confidence
in the face of any type of undesirable thing like bad reputation, poverty, sickness, or
friendlessness (EN, III.6, 1115a10), aggression being committed against women and children
(III.6, 1115a22), being whipped for one’s crimes (III.6, 1115a24), death in sickness (III.6,
1115a29) or death in shipwreck (III.6, 1115b6). Instead, bravery in the proper sense (kuriōs
legoit’) involves the right amount of fear and confidence in the face of death, especially
courageous behavior in a noble war (III.6, 1115a34-35).
Several other virtues are also defined narrowly. Aristotle claims that genuine temperance
deals only with particular pleasures. They do not involve the pleasures of the soul, such as
learning, since these do not affect the body (EN, III.10, 1117b29). Temperance is concerned only
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See for example Harman (1999).
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with bodily pleasures, and only of certain ones. Aristotle excludes those pleasures of sight,
hearing, or smell, even though these might possibly be enjoyed to excess or deficiency, because
he says no one would call a person intemperate with respect to these (III.10, 1118a4-17).
Temperance involves only the pleasures of touch and taste (III.10, 1118a26). Further, even the
pleasures of taste that concern temperance are narrow: they are the pleasures of eating and
drinking and not simply discriminating amongst flavors (III.10, 1118a30-32). The pleasures of
touch that concern temperance are similarly narrow; Aristotle counts only sexual gratification in
this category (III.6, 1118a33, 1118b7).
Generosity’s narrow definition excludes generosity in matters of war (such as allowing an
enemy to live), pleasure (such as sharing some of one’s dessert with another), or in judicial
verdicts (such as prescribing a merciful punishment to a criminal) (IV.1, 1119b24). He claims
that genuine generosity only concerns matters of the giving and taking of wealth, and more in the
giving (IV.1, 1119b25). It is further distinguished from the narrower virtue, magnificence, which
is concerned with the giving and taking of money or things money can buy on a large scale.
Aristotle claims magnificence is “like generosity, concerned with wealth, but it does not extend,
as generosity does, to all actions involving wealth, but only to those involving heavy expenses,
and in them it exceeds generosity in its large scale” (EN, tr. Irwin, IV.2, 1122a20-22). Like
generosity and magnificence, Aristotle narrowly distinguishes two other virtues, magnanimity
(or being “great-souled”) and proper ambition in terms of how large the scale is for desiring and
deserving honor. If one desires great honors and deserves them, one is magnanimous (IV.3,
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1123b3). If the matters concerning honor are small or medium in size, the virtuous person is said
to have proper ambition (IV.4, 1125b5).51
Unlike the understanding of honesty in Hartshorne and May’s honesty studies, which
included a range of behaviors not clearly related to one another, such as cheating on tests, lying
about what one has done, or pocketing loose change,52 Aristotle defines truthfulness very
narrowly so that it only concerns “those who are truthful… both in words and in actions… in
their claims about themselves” (tr. Irwin, IV.7, 1127a20). He excludes truthfulness in agreements
concerning justice, claiming that this involves a different virtue (IV.7, 1127b1).
Lastly of the narrowly defined virtues, Aristotle divides justice into several traits, each
narrower than the last. His first division is between universal and particular justice: the former
having to do with “the complete exercise of complete virtue” in relation to others (V.1, 1129b32)
and the latter with having the appropriate desire for gain (V.2, 1130b5). Particular justice is
concerned with fairness, and Aristotle further divides this virtue into distributive (dealing with
the distribution of wealth and honors) and retributive justice (rectifying wrongs committed in
transactions) (V.2, 1130b30-1131a1). The divisions do not end here, and retributive justice is
even further divided. First, it is divided into voluntary and involuntary injustices, which depends
on whether both parties had willingly entered a contract together or if the wrong was committed
against another party who did not consent. Second, involuntary injustices are divided into two
kinds: secret or violent. For example, a person can harm another in secret, like committing
adultery or she can harm another violently, like assaulting another (V.2, 1131a2-9).
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Aristotle also defines some vices narrowly. He claims, for instance, that there are several
vices corresponding to the virtue mildness. Of the excessive vices, Aristotle names irascibility
(quickly angered, toward the wrong people, at the wrong times, and more than is right) (IV.5,
1126a14-15), choleric people (those who are irascible about and at everything) (IV.5, 1126a19),
bitter people (those who get angry for a long time, until they get revenge) (IV.5, 1126a20-22),
and irritable people (those who are irritated by the wrong things, more severely and for longer
than is right, until they get revenge) (IV.5, 1126a28-29).
Along with individual virtues and vices, Aristotle also narrowly defines certain states of
character. Like intemperance, Aristotle distinguishes between different notions of incontinence
in accordance with which pleasures are pursued excessively. He claims that unqualified (haplōs)
incontinence concerns the same pleasures of the body that temperance does: those of food, drink,
and sex (VII.4, 1148a5-10). Those who excessively pursue other pleasures are called incontinent
by similarity (homoiotēta). They are call incontinent with respect to wealth, victory, honor, or
spirit, for instance (VII.4, 1147b34-35). He later says the relation between these types of
incontinence is one of homonymy, that is, they are the same in name only (VII.5, 1149a24).
Given that these conditions bear some resemblance to one another, the homonymous relation is
not merely one of chance, but suggests some deeper relation.53
Aristotle distinguishes continence and incontinence from softness and resistance. The
former two involve overcoming, or being overcome by, pleasure, while the latter two involve
being overcome by, or overcoming, pain, respectively. Aristotle claims that most people are in
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between continence or resistance and incontinence or softness (VII.7, 1150a13-16). Thus, the
ordinary person behaves in variable ways when it comes to pleasures and pains.54
Aristotle lastly distinguishes between two kinds of incontinence: impulsiveness and
weakness. The latter sort deliberates, but is later overcome by appetite. The former sort is guided
by feelings because she has not deliberated (VII.7, 1150b20-23). Because it is necessary for the
incontinent person to have choice, which implies she has deliberated, the point here is not that
deliberation is wholly absent, but that it does not occur in the moment; one is lead immediately
by the appearances before her reason can catch up (VII.7, 1150b27-29). All types of character
here – continent, incontinent, soft, and resistant – are thus narrowly defined.
In sum, many of the actual virtues of the fully virtuous person are narrowly defined and
so the objection that they are global traits is not based on an accurate reading of the text. Still, we
might hold that the truly brave person will be brave not only when facing certain dangers on the
battlefield, but in other bravery-related situations such as when facing poverty or when standing
up for herself. Perhaps she is most genuinely exercising her virtue when facing death at war, but
we might also expect her to respond bravely in other situations calling for reactions similar to
those she displays when at war, in particular, having the right amount of fear and confidence
when facing dangers to oneself, such as death or financial ruin. For it would be strange indeed to
call a person brave who was too afraid to stand up to physical bullying. Whether or not Aristotle
thinks the genuinely brave person would also behave in ways that were brave “by similarity,”
however, is a matter of interpretation since he does not say explicitly. If we stick only to what he
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does say, however, we have some reason to think he is only concerned with genuine instances of
the virtues, which are narrowly defined.
Showing that full virtues are narrow for Aristotle, however, does not necessarily establish
him as being consistent with Doris’ local traits view. For the local virtues that Doris conceives of
seem to be far more situationally sensitive than Aristotle’s virtues. For example, a person who is
helpful when in a good mood has a trait that relies primarily upon her circumstances being
favorable enough to induce a good mood. By contrast, Aristotle’s local virtues seem only to rely
on circumstances insofar as one’s circumstance provide an opportunity to respond virtuously.
The brave soldier only needs to be in a situation that calls for bravery in order to activate her
virtue. She does not need minor situational boosts, like a pleasant smell, to act well. In fact, she
often does well despite the absence of pleasant circumstances.
While Aristotle’s virtues are thought to operate independently of the favorability of one’s
circumstances, there is still evidence that this is not the whole story. For his claims in the Politics
suggest that even a fully virtuous person will err and will need a good environment to facilitate
virtuous activity and prevent vice. For example, he recognizes that even fully virtuous people
will still sometimes do wrong.55 Badhwar argues that there is a minimal threshold for saying a
person has a virtue even if it does not issue in behavior that perfectly conforms to the virtue in all
situations. In support of this claim, she cites Aristotle, who says that even the virtuous person
may have trouble discerning the mean (2014, p. 38). Aristotle says, “For sometimes, indeed, we
ourselves praise deficient people and call them mild, and sometimes praise quarrelsome people
and call them manly” (EN, tr. Irwin, II.9, 1109b14-26). He does not say that this praise is

For in Aristotle’s discussion of the ideal constitution, where all citizens are fully virtuous, he mentions laws that
involve punishing citizens for doing wrong (Politics, VII.16, 1335b38-1336a2; VII.17, 1336b8-12).
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mistaken. Later, Aristotle also claims that even the virtuous person sometimes deviates from
mean but that he errs in certain directions. He states, “It is also very definitively proper to the
generous person to exceed so much in giving that he leaves less for himself” (tr. Irwin, IV.1,
1120b3-4). Aristotle claims that the behavior of an actually generous person will not always hit
the mean. Thus, full virtue does not mean that a person will never err when it comes to acting
virtuously.
Further, Aristotle claims in the Politics that there should be safeguards in a city to prevent
citizens from acting out of self-interest at the expense of others (VII.10, 1330a15-6), suggesting
that even the fully virtuous person will need to be in favorable social or political circumstances
to prevent bad behavior.56 In a similar vein, Badhwar acknowledges Aristotle’s claim in the
Politics that a virtuous person can become corrupt if she lives in corrupting situations, such as
when political power is unconstrained by law. He states, “For appetite is like a wild beast,
passion perverts rulers even when they are the best of men” (Politics, tr. Reeve, 1287a31-32).
Badhwar lastly considers Aristotle’s notion of constrained behavior, discussed in both EN and
the Politics. When an agent is constrained by force or ignorance, she may be exculpated or pitied
rather than blamed. Here, Aristotle recognizes that a situation may overcome a person, causing
her to do something she would not do in better circumstances. Consider the following example.
No one willingly throws cargo overboard, without qualification, but anyone with any
sense throws it overboard to save himself and the others (EN, tr. Irwin, III.1, 1110a1011).
Aristotle recognizes that there might be situations where a person’s actions do not line up with
what she would have chosen if the situation were more conducive to choosing rightly. Thus, he
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does not fail to consider that we might face situations that demand “greater virtue than human
nature allows” (Politics, tr. Reeve, III.15, 1286b27). This last point about constrained action will
not make as big a splash with situationists since they argue that there is little force involved –
Milgram’s experimenter merely said things like “the experiment must go on” – and that the
morally right thing to do should have been obvious. At the very least, they are concerned with
situations that do not call for heroism and ask minimal moral effort on the part of participants.57
Setting aside cases of constrained behavior, there are still plenty of remarks made by Aristotle
that suggest there is a limit to what an actually virtuous person can accomplish and how
important a conducive environment is to her development and maintenance of virtue.
2. Aristotle on ordinary virtues. Badhwar similarly claims that Aristotle rejects
globalism when discussing the virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics. As evidence, she cites
Aristotle’s claim about bravery that “some people who are cowardly in the dangers of war are
nonetheless generous, and face with confidence the dangers of losing money” (EN, Irwin trans.,
II.6, 1115a20-22). Badhwar draws from this claim that a brave person might be a coward in war,
yet brave with respect to money loss, suggesting that her bravery is local, rather than global. She
further draws the conclusion that actual virtue is not based on so high of a standard given that a
person with bravery-in-matters-of-money-loss might still be considered brave. But, Aristotle’s
statement here applies to whom he calls “brave by similarity (homoiotēta).” Badhwar suggests
that the distinction here is between ideal and actual virtue; the ideally virtuous person has
bravery globally, while the actually brave person is only locally brave. But, this seems to be an
interpretive stretch. For Aristotle explicitly says that this person is not brave, only similar to the

Consider Doris: “My arguments do not depend on assuming any especially demanding ethical standard. Unlike
‘heroic’ virtues such as courage, compassion is the subject of quite commonplace ethical demands, demands that are
customarily applied to ordinary people in ordinary circumstances” (2002, p. 29).
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brave person. Aristotle makes this remark about other states that are similar to bravery. He
claims that the person who fights in response to being angered and who takes pleasure in
exacting a penalty has “something similar (paraplēsion) to bravery” (tr. Irwin, III.8, 1117a4). He
further claims that “the bravery caused by spirit (thumos) would seem to be the most natural sort
(phusikōtatē), and to be genuine bravery once it has also acquired decision (prohairēsis) and goal
(to heneka andreia)” (tr. Irwin, III.8, 1117a5).
Aristotle’s claims about states that are “similar” to virtue are better interpreted as
applying to ordinary virtues had by the ordinary person than to the actual virtues of a fully
virtuous person. For Aristotle uses natural bravery as an example of a virtue that is similar to
genuine bravery, and natural virtue is clearly distinguished from full virtue (EN, VI.13, 1144b412). These virtues “by similarity” are virtues to a lesser degree than full, actual virtue since they
do not capture what Aristotle thinks is primarily definitive of the virtue. For example, the
actually brave person is brave primarily because of his dispositions to think, feel, and act with
the right amount of confidence and fear when facing death, especially one in a noble war. By
contrast, the ordinary bravery of a lower middle-class person when faced with very large medical
bills is similar to real bravery, but not quite there. While she may face certain dangers of
financial loss with appropriate fear and confidence and act with composure, what ultimately
defines true bravery is facing death bravely. Evidence of ordinary, moderate virtue can also be
found in Aristotle’s discussion of the middle class (hoi mesoi) in the Politics. As I have shown in
chapter five, Aristotle treats this group as having developed virtues to some extent on account of
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their moderate circumstances (Politics, IV.11, 1295b2-12), though these virtues are far from the
full virtues of the EN.58
The natural virtues and vices attributed to the young, old, and those in the prime of life in
the Rhetoric are further examples of ordinary, natural virtue. Throughout Rhetoric II.12-14,
Aristotle dedicates a chapter to the typical temperaments (ēthē) that accompany the following
ages: youth, prime of life, and old age. First, Aristotle claims that the temperament (phusikai
hexeis) of the young tends to be marked by excessive: they love too much, trust too readily, are
courageous on account of their naturally spirited temperament, and err on the side of excess.59
Second, the Rhetoric claims that the temperament (phusikai hexeis) of the person in old age is
characterized by deficiency. Because of their weakened desires and appetites, they tend to be
more self-controlled and cautious, and since they have been met with many disappointments,
they tend to seek the useful over the fine. Third, and lastly, Aristotle claims that the
temperaments (ēthē) of those in their prime of life express the mean between youth and age
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We might compare a modest virtue to the way Badhwar interprets the experimental studies done on good mood.
Badhwar argues that good moods arising from ambient smells or noises can be said to supplement, not supplant
standing reasons to help by making it easier to help (2014, p. 41). She argues that helping behavior is not a causal
by-product of a good mood (as Miller holds in his global traits view), but rather, these studies show that good
people, when happy, want to share the happiness, which is a good trait (p. 42). So while Miller claims that being in a
good mood is the sole cause of subsequent helping behavior, Badhwar argues that the mood enhancers’ correlation
to helping behavior indicates a person has the good trait of wanting to spread her good mood to others; the good
mood is not the primary motivation for her behavior, but rather, an accompanying one, and thus her unawareness of
its having been caused by something like a good smell is not problematic. Though she applies this description to the
actually virtuous person, her explanation here again seems to be a better fit for the modestly or non-ideally virtuous
person. For that person’s virtues are, for the most part, accounted for by her circumstances. Though the fully
virtuous person’s virtues are also reliant on good circumstances, the extent to which this is the case is far more
limited; a fully virtuous person will ultimately act from the right motivations.
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He describes the temperaments of young people in the following way:
[The young] look at the good side rather than the bad, not having yet witnessed many instances of
wickedness. They trust others readily…They are sanguine; nature warms their blood as though with excess
wine; and besides that, they have not yet often been cheated… they have exalted notions because they have
not yet been humbled by life or learnt its necessary limitations… [Youth] would always rather (mallon) do
noble deeds than useful ones: their lives are regulated more by [character] (ēthei) than by reasoning; and
whereas reasoning leads us to choose what is useful, [virtue] (aretē) leads us to choose what is noble
(kalon) (Rhetoric, tr. Roberts, II.12, 1389a33-35).
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(II.14, 1390a1), possessing the advantages of youth and age, such as temperance and courage
(II.14, 1390b8-9). Aristotle’s attribution of the various virtues to these age groups refers to
natural, not full virtue; his descriptions of the temperaments focus on the appetitive part of the
virtue. Though his discussion of temperaments here lines up with various ages, we can use what
he says of the various temperaments to apply to anyone. His point is merely to discuss which
temperaments are generally found in certain age groups, but this does not mean that they cannot
be found in people of other ages.
In sum, Aristotle suggests that there are ordinary virtues – virtues that fall short of full
virtue, but resemble it. While Badhwar errs in calling the ordinary virtues of EN actual virtues,
she draws the right conclusion that they are virtues enough. She states,
Even if dispositions are not global, if people exhibit reliable patterns in their attitudes and
behavior, if their deliberative, emotional, and behavioral responses to people and events
they encounter daily in pursuit of their goals are usually consistent and predictable, they
have dispositions, and if those goals and dispositions are praiseworthy, they have virtues
(Badhwar, 2014, p. 38).60
The virtues that are only similar to virtue in the fullest sense are virtues enough insofar as they
promote virtuous activity (albeit, to a lesser extent than full virtue) in the person who has them.
They are akin to natural virtues of EN VI.13 and Rhetoric II.12-14 and the modest virtues of the
middle class at Politics IV.11. They are the virtues of the ordinary citizen: heavily dependent on
one’s circumstances to both develop and be sustained and thus less stable than full virtue. These
modest virtues are more similar to the local virtues Doris describes because of their modularity
and dependence on favorable circumstances. While these modest virtues might still be a little
broader than Doris’ sociable-at-office-parties kind of traits, they still indicate that many of the
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virtues Aristotle defines were not as globalist as is often believed and that modest virtue might
still be found in the ordinary person. In other words, current research in social psychology can
help us determine just how narrow these traits tend to be and which circumstances affect them,
but fixing the line does not undermine Aristotle’s own understanding of virtue and character.
3. Fragmented character and behavioral inconsistencies. While Aristotle characterizes
the temperaments that accompany age as containing certain inclinations, he does not leave out
the possibility that a person will behave in different ways depending on her situation. For
example, the ends for which an old person aims may change in relation to what she finds useful
at the time: while helping another person may be of use in securing respect or admiration,
cheating another person may on another occasion benefit her. Regardless of age, the person who
is inclined towards utility will display these inconsistencies. Being inclined towards courage will
also meet with inconsistencies if it is not a fully habituated state: a person may be courageous
when it comes to money matters, but not when it comes to standing up for herself when being
insulted or attacked.
Further evidence from the Rhetoric is consistent with the situationist conclusion that
ordinary people are easily manipulated by minor situational factors such as mood change. In his
advice to the orator, Aristotle recognizes the power that a change of mood can have on the way a
person thinks and subsequently acts: he claims it is important not only for the orator to make a
good argument and to appear to be of good character, but to be able to put her audience in the
right frame of mind because,61 he says, “when people are feeling friendly and placable, they
think one sort of thing; when they are feeling angry or hostile, they think either something totally
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different or the same thing with a different intensity” (tr. Roberts, Rhetoric, II.1, 1377b301378a1). Here, Aristotle recognizes that people will think differently if they are in different
moods. After acknowledging the significant impact that a person’s mood can have on her
judgment, Aristotle spends ten chapters examining various emotions so that the orator knows
how to arouse them in his audience in order to be successful in his persuading.
When Aristotle catalogues the emotions, he focuses on three aspects: the state of mind of
the person, to whom the emotion is felt, and on what grounds the emotion arises (II.1, 1378a2425). In other words, he recognizes that our emotions are influenced by the kinds of situations we
are in or the kind of people with which we are dealing. This means that he acknowledges that the
way a situation is framed or presented can alter the way an ordinary person decides upon a
course of action by affecting her emotional state. Like the framing bias studied by Tversky and
Kahneman,62 Aristotle’s catalogue of the various emotions and what situations give rise to them
aims at giving the orator information that can help alter the way an audience will choose by
presenting his case in a certain way. For example, if an orator can make his audience feel
friendly towards a person who is about to be tried, they will more likely regard him as not having
done wrong (II.1, 1378a2).63 Aristotle therefore recognizes that being in a good mood can make
a person more likely to be merciful to others. This idea is emphasized and extended in the
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This is not to say that Aristotle endorses the manipulation of emotions as a proper way to persuade an audience.
This is the kind of persuasion upon which he accuses Sophists of relying. He claims, “it is not right to pervert the
judge [or jurymen] by moving him to anger or envy or pity – one might well warp a carpenter’s rule before using it”
(tr. Roberts, I.1, 1354a25-26). Instead, the proper orator will use the best available means of persuasion, which
includes putting the audience in the right state of mind along with using good arguments and establishing one’s
credibility (I.1, 1355b26-7). This is different than the sophist who, rather than putting the audience into the correct
frame of mind, excites whatever emotion will allow him to successfully persuade his audience. For example, a
sophist will have no problem fear-mongering, while a proper orator would never resort to such means. It may,
however, be necessary to around compassion in his audience in order to show them that they ought to endorse a
certain policy that will better promote the common good.
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various studies done on good mood and helping behavior.64 In these recent studies, the focus
extends beyond the moods and subsequent judgments of an audience or jury, and looks at the
effect in everyday situations where there is opportunity to perform a minor good deed.
III. Ordinary Character as a Temperament: An Example
In Aristotelian terminology, I consider the nature of the ordinary person’s character to be
akin to having a certain kind of temperament; she will have inclinations to act in certain ways,
but they will be manifested in different ways depending on the kinds of situations she faces. The
notion of a temperament is useful because it is not primarily concerned with a person’s
reasoning, which has been attacked by situationists as being just as, if not more, situationally
sensitive.65 Rather, a temperament includes the affective inclinations of a person’s character,
which have been shown to enjoy their own level of stability.66
Consider Sue who has a generous temperament. She will be inclined to give some money
to homeless people whom she meets on the street, but when it comes to lending money to her
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(Levin and Isen, 1972 & 1975)

65
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Jerome Kagan presents early work on temperament, positing broadly two temperaments present in infancy: being
inhibited or uninhibited (1994). Later work has shown that the presence of one of these temperaments exhibits
continuity, correlating strongly with how a person in late adolescence or early adulthood responds to social
situations involving the anticipation of a reward or punishment (Guyer, et al, 2014).
The Five-Factor model, popular amongst personality theorists, posits 5 broad personality traits:
neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness, see Miller (2014a, ch. 6)
for discussion of this view. People vary on which traits they have and to what degree, but they involve a person’s
temperamental inclinations such as affection (or agreeableness) or anxiousness or hostility (included under
neuroticism) that correlate with how a person thinks and behaves.
See also Aaron Ben Ze’ev’s work on emotions, especially his claim that affective traits, such as shyness or
susceptibility to be embarrassed, display tendencies to behave in affective manners and last longer than emotions
that are caused by one’s context (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000, pp. 88-89). The difference here raises an important distinction
between pleasant moods that are caused by minor rewards, such as being in a pleasant-smelling environment, and a
person’s tendency to be in a pleasant mood, which is not as responsive to contextual features and is far more stable.
McCrae et al have also found stability amongst the personality traits named in the Five-Factor model and
how different traits might be more emphasized in different ages. For example, people aged 18-30 tend to have lower
degrees of neuroticism, extraversion, and openness to experience and higher degrees of agreeableness and
conscientious (2000, p. 183).
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friends, she is reluctant because she worries she will not be paid back. The difference in her
behaviors here lines up with the difference in nominal situations. This view is conducive to both
Doris’ and Miller’s views. On Doris’ view, we can say that she is generous-towards-thehomeless, but not generous-towards-friends. Still, she might also be inconsistent in her
generosity towards homeless people, say if she is in a rush, anxious, or nervous. In other words,
different psychological situations will affect her behavior. So on Miller’s view, she has a global
Mixed Generosity Trait comprised of beliefs or desires that issue in generous behavior when she
is in a certain mood, but not when she is in other moods. Because her generosity depends on her
mood, Miller would not consider it real generosity to any degree. But, for Aristotle, natural
virtue does not require that one acts for the right reasons; a person with natural virtue lacks
practical wisdom.67 Further, while Miller’s view rightly suggests that psychologically salient
situations are important to explaining and assessing a person’s character, he does not say
anything about the frequency of a person’s mood. Drawing on the evidence for mood enhancers
and inhibitors,68 Miller argues that a person’s construal of a situation can give rise to certain
psychological states, like guilt or anxiety, that may reliably promote or inhibit certain moral
behavior, like helping.69 These states, however, are those that arise when faced with certain
situations.70 Such states are not as stable as states comprising a person’s temperament.71 So,
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For example, finding a dime in a phone booth is thought to increase helping behavior because it puts the agent in a
good mood. Thus, the person’s good mood can be manipulated by nominal features of a situation.
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(Miller, 2013, esp. pp. 131-135).

For example, Miller claims that one might tend to feel guilty after performing or omitting certain actions or
forming a particular intention. He distinguishes this from having a general trait of guilt where one would tend to feel
guilty in a wide-range of situations on the basis of one’s own evaluative standards. He states that he is concerned
with the former and not the latter (2013, p. 31, fn. 6).
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while he argues that we can reliably predict that a person will be helpful when put in a good
mood, he does not consider how often a person is in a good mood. For instance, if a person is
often in a good mood, her helpfulness will be a global trait. An appeal to temperament can do
this work since it is comprised of the emotional inclinations of a person.
In sum, we can say that Sue has a generous temperament, is naturally generous, or has
some local or mixed generous trait. The difference is in terminology, but the phenomenon is the
same: she is inclined to act generously in certain nominal situations, but is not always consistent
in those situations. She is generous, but her generosity is not a settled state like a virtue is, and so
she relies heavily on favorable conditions for her virtue to be activated. She has not consciously
habituated it, but rather, she happens to be inclined towards being generous.
To best explain Sue’s generous temperament, we should look at how she became the kind
of person who has such a temperament. For in considering the development of her ordinary
character, we can see why the result is a less than fully developed set of character traits.72
Proceeding in this way also reveals the implications of ordinary character for moral education,
which I will come back to later. I divide the developmental process into roughly two parts meant
to capture major influences on one’s character, but not to be exhaustive: (1) the early habituation
process, which is affected by one’s natural temperaments and upbringing, and (2) the later
habituation process undergone by adult’s as they make free choices.
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(Ben-Ze’ev, 2000, pp. 88-89).

For more discussion on the importance of understanding moral development for understanding character and
responsibility, see Annas (2011), Nussbaum (2001), Sherman (1991), or Burnyeat (1980). I discuss this view in
chapter three.
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We begin with Sue’s natural temperament. As Jerome Kagan argues, temperaments are
present from very early on and may not result in behavior consistent with one’s temperament.73
So while Sue is born with a temperament conducive to generosity, she may not consistently
respond in generous ways. Sue’s naturally generous temperament might mean she is uninhibited,
has a general sensitivity to others’ needs, is empathetic, naturally desires to help others, or is
simply naturally disposed towards generous acts. Perhaps she has some mix of these inclinations
or others of a similar type. Her natural generous temperament might exist in a variety of ways,
but, like Miller’s global mixed traits, it involves some set of generosity-involving beliefs or
desires that issue in generous behavior. Consider the similarity to Aristotle’s description of
natural virtue.
It seems that the various kinds of character (ēthē) inhere in all of us, somehow or other,
by nature. We tend to be just, capable of self-control, and to show all our other character
traits from the time of our birth. Yet we still seek something more, the good in a fuller
sense, and the possession of these traits in another way. For it is true that children and
beasts are endowed with natural qualities or characteristics (hai phusikai…hexeis), but it
is evident that without intelligence (nous) these are harmful. This much, to be sure, we do
seem to notice: as in the case of a mighty body which, when it moves without vision,
comes down with a mighty fall because it cannot see, so it is in the matter under
discussion (EN, tr. Ostwald, VI.13, 1144b4-12).
Unlike the virtue generosity, Sue does not consciously habituate the trait74 and so her generosity
is fragmented rather than robust. She will be prone to making mistakes or omissions since she
does not have practical wisdom.75
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(1994, pp. 35-37). In fact, he claims that though we may be born with certain temperaments, they do not
determine our later development; they increase the probability that we will develop certain characteristics, but other
factors influence our development, such as our environment (pp. 35-36). I consider the effect of a person’s
environment on her character in the next part of her early habituation process – her upbringing.
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A trait will surely develop to some extent before a person becomes an adult, but it is not until she is able to choose
actions for themselves that she begins to solidify her character in the form of a set of robust traits, viz. a hexis
prohairetikē (EN, III.5, 1114b30-1115a2; X.9, 1180a1-3, 15-17). See Brickhouse (1991, p. 144) and Meyer (1993,
ch. 5) for discussion on this.
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As Sue develops, she is impacted by both her natural propensities76 and her upbringing.
Her natural inclinations might be encouraged, or they might be ignored or rejected while other
values are emphasized in her everyday life. Since she tends to be in the same situations and have
contact with the same kinds of people, her natural traits will become localized. She will begin
developing certain habits that are influenced by those around her. These habits will have an
effect on her character as she becomes an adult. In fact, some of the implicit biases she forms as
a youth will extremely difficult, if at all possible, to undo later in life.77 Aristotle acknowledges
this point in the EN:
characteristics (hexeis) develop from corresponding activities (energeiai). For that
reason, we must see to it that our activities are of a certain kind, since any variations in
them will be reflected in our characteristics. Hence it is no small matter whether one habit
or another is inculcated in us from early childhood; on the contrary, it makes considerable
difference, or, rather, all the difference (EN, tr. Ostwald, II.1, 1103b21-25).
Given the importance of a person’s upbringing with respect to her later moral development, a
person’s moral character is subjected to the luck involved in the kind of social and political
world in which she is raised. In Aristotle’s EN, he presents an account to an audience of free,
Greek men, the supposed ideal candidates for virtue. While Aristotle endorsed some of the
harmful prejudices of his time, his view has important insights that do not depend on holding

75

While situationists deny that an appeal to practical wisdom is satisfying given the amount of cognitive biases
people tend to display in their practical reasoning (see Merritt, et al (2010) for a detailed account of these biases), I
have two responses here. One is that this point can at most support the rarity thesis; virtue is rare because the
practical wisdom required for it is rare. This is not something I deny. Second, the wisdom required for virtue needs
experience to develop and may be hindered by having limited experiences or opportunities to learn. This suggests
that a good community and a good education is required for developing one’s practical wisdom, a point that is
endorsed by several philosophers responding to situationism (Doris, 2015, esp. ch. 5), (Badhwar, 2014, p. 39),
(Haybron, 2014, pp. 255-256), and (Miller 2014c, pp. 25-27), and is supported by what Aristotle says in the EN and
Politics.
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See Guyer, et al (2014), Rapee (2014), and McAdams and Olson (2010) for recent work in psychology on the
impact of natural temperament on one’s later personality and character development.
See Galinsky and Moskowitz (2007) who show that attempting to repress one’s implicit biases might have the
effect of amplifying them.
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those prejudices against non-Greeks and women. So, we can still argue that his view of moral
development in the EN assumes a person has been born with the temperaments78 and has had the
kind of upbringing most conducive for developing full virtue later in life. In chapter five, I
outlined the extent to which Aristotle thinks one’s upbringing affects her character development
and moral awareness. While we might undo some of the bad habits we have picked up early in
life, some will remain incorrigible. For example, explaining to people the phenomenon of group
effect has been shown to increase the amount of helping behavior in subsequent experiments
resembling Darley and Batson’s Good Samaritan study.79 Utilizing other debiasing methods have
also been shown to help, such as considering the opposite strategy, which helps overconfidence
and hindsight biases to a small extent.80 Yet, making people conscious of their implicit biases
detected on the Implicit Association Test (IAT)81 does not seem to help weaken or eliminate the
bias. In fact, some psychologists have found that focusing on one’s implicit biases with the
intention of suppressing them has the unsavory result of making them worse.82 Thus, with
respect to certain areas of our moral life, in Aristotelian terminology, the best some of us can do
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As a Greek male would in comparison with women, Europeans, or Asians, according to Aristotle. The right
temperament for Aristotle would involve a balance of intelligence and spirit.
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(Miller, 2014a, p.233)
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(Gilovich, 2011). Aristotle utilizes the considering the opposite strategy in order to strengthen confidence in his
view: “We must, however, not only state the true view, but also explain the false view; for an explanation of that
promotes confidence. For when we have an apparently reasonable explanation of why a false view appears true, that
makes us more confident in the true view” (EN, VII.14, 1154a23-26).
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Recently, the conclusions drawn from studies on implicit biases suggesting a link between them and unsavory
behavior have been questioned because these experiments are fundamentally flawed (Singal, 2017). Still, there are
several other studies on the pervasiveness of cognitive bias that together give us reason to believe that our
consciously held values are not always operative on the subconscious level. See Gilovich (2011) for a study of these
biases.
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(Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2007). There are other studies that show that other strategies are more successful in
training oneself to remove implicit bias. For example, one study shows that training a participant to negate
stereotypes is not as effective as training a participant to affirm counter-stereotypes (Gawronski et al, 2008).
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is to be continent; we can consciously choose the right actions even if our desires and emotions
do not align with them. Still, we can use information gathered from the empirical sciences to
better our community in order to prevent these bad habits from forming in the first place and to
offset their negative effects later. Though presenting a developed proposal for how we might do
this is beyond the scope of this project, one suggestion is for negative or harmful images of
women and minorities that are pervasive in the media to be replaced by positive ones in order to
prevent bad associations from forming and to promote the formation of good ones instead.
Studies have shown that exposing individuals to counter-stereotypical exemplars, such as
pictures of Martin Luther King, Jr., have the effect of mitigating bias in participants’ racial
attitudes.83
When a person reaches adulthood, she is in a better position to make choices that express
her values. For Aristotle, an adult has the capacity to make choices that solidify her character.84
In his account of the second stage of moral development in the EN, this requires a level of
control and awareness that social psychology has shown us most people do not have. This is
because most people are not born with ideal temperaments and do not grow up in ideal
circumstances. By considering the impediments to moral awareness and control, we should
revise our understanding of responsibility by presenting a broader account. While some people
may lack the moral awareness needed for full responsibility, we can still hold them responsible
for the kind of people they are in proportion to the access they have to moral awareness and
moral knowledge. A broader account of responsibility derived from Aristotle will hold a person
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(Wittenbrink, Judd, and Park, 2001).

See EN III.5 as well as Kristjánsson (2014a&b), Destrée (2011), Kerr (2011), Lawrence (2011), Meyer (1993, ch.
5), and Curren (1989) for discussion on forming one’s character as an adult.
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responsible with respect to her capacity to develop virtue. If this capacity is inhibited by her
circumstances, rather than, say, her own resistance to criticism, she will not be as responsible for
her character as someone who has access to moral knowledge, but continues to choose wrong.85
By focusing on the stages of moral development rather than simply judging the character
of ordinary people to be far from an ideal standard of robustness, we can understand how most
people develop the fragmented characters they do. Knowing that the source of this fragmentation
is bad moral luck with respect to one’s genetic and social inheritances provides useful insight
into how we might correct the problem. Because our upbringings and social and political
environment are so important, a focus on structural changes that does not only offset our
tendencies to make bad choices, but that are also more conducive to developing virtue is
necessary for us to live well. Further, Aristotle also provides a way in which we can still
understand responsibility for character despite its (un)lucky influences: we can bear in mind
one’s capacity to develop and sustain virtue when holding one responsible for one’s character
and what follows from it. Thus, we can expect to have more for which we are accountable as the
empirical data informs institutional policies, making moral knowledge more widely available.
And so, Aristotle’s account of responsibility and ordinary character is not only consistent with
the current empirical evidence, but its focus on the developmental aspect of character can guide
our evaluative judgments as well as suggest ways we might change the obstacles we face to
developing well.
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An exception might be made, however, for someone whose resistance to criticism is caused by a difficult
upbringing, such as one in which she was excessively criticized in cruel ways. Notice that this involves a person’s
circumstances inhibiting her capacity to reform her character.
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IV. Further Implications for Moral Education
In my emphasis on being fortunate with respect to one’s genetic and social inheritances
and natural temperaments, I have indicated how the habituation of virtue is possible. Most people
do fail, but it is not wholly their own faults. The habituation of virtue requires not only individual
effort, but a conducive environment that can help in the developmental process by making one’s
cognition and habits less fragmented. While we cannot change what natural moral advantages
with which people are born, we can make changes to their environment that encourage and
support the development and maintenance of good traits.86 Important to this process is also
eliminating bad influences that overtime can develop into harmful implicit biases.87
A further objection can be made that manipulating situations is paternalistic and thus
inhibits, rather than encourages, virtue.88 But, if our focus is on moral development, the changes
we make in our community aimed towards justice and goodness will be for the sake of education
rather than manipulation. Aristotle argues in the Politics that education of the citizens is
important for the stability of the constitution, stability which enables the best living possible for
naturally political animals under non-ideal circumstances.89 Further, for those who are worried
that moral education may raise issues regarding autonomy, indoctrination, and manipulation, I
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See Kenny (1993) who also argues that we ought to focus on building just societies. The approach here, which I
take to be suggested by Aristotle, is similar to other approaches by political philosophers who make use of the same
literature in social psychology to inform their views. This approach focuses not only on how we can change one’s
environment in order to offset the negative consequences of the cognitive biases most people have, but also on how
one’s environment can be altered to aid in the development of virtue rather than focusing. See Trout (2010) for an
example of an approach that aims only at offsetting the negative effects of cognitive biases.
Paul Lewis argues that recent work on moral education “converges with and supplements” Aristotle’s account of
moral development (2012, p. 156).
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See for example Haybron (2014, p. 252)

89

Politics, 1263b37. See full argument in chapter five on Aristotle’s Politics.
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warn that we should emphasize education in our training. For education involves not the filling
of minds with dogma, but aiding in their development so that they may be able to reason well
and develop their abilities to read situations.90 Presenting a full account of the best kind of moral
training – training that is effective without infringing on the development of autonomy despite its
use of indoctrination – is beyond the scope of this project and beyond the say of the moral
philosopher. How and why moral habituation can produce critical thinking in an adult is a matter
to be determined empirically. As Aristotle claims, some questions, like how we move from a
state of ignorance to a state of knowledge, will have to be determined by the natural scientists
(EN, VII.3, 1147b7-9). I only suggest here that finding ways to inculcate virtue does not have to
be paternalistic.
V. Conclusion
By acknowledging natural temperaments and non-ideal conditions in Aristotle’s work, I
have shown that Aristotle’s view of character is consistent with empirical findings and recent
accounts of character put forth by Doris and Miller. By looking to other texts in Aristotle, I have
supplemented Badhwar’s recent work on finding textual evidence for actual and ordinary virtue.
While her account focuses on actual virtue, I add discussion of two types of ordinary virtue:
natural and modest. The ordinary person falls between a virtuous or vicious person. Her
character is partially formed insofar as she displays certain inclinations and she may have natural
virtues or vices or modest virtue, but she does not have robust traits. For those who have already
developed in less than ideal circumstances, we can aim at broadening and strengthening our
narrow traits so that they become more reliable and allows us to act well in a wider range of
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See Kupfer (1998) for a wonderful discussion of this point. See also Annas (2011) and Sherman (1991) who
include the development of one’s reasoning in the moral development of children. I discuss this aspect of moral
development in chapter three.
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situations. For instance, I can work on developing my narrow trait of courage when facing
physical threats so that I become courageous in moral situations such as standing up for those
who are being unjustly treated. Robert Adams makes a similar suggestion in his work on virtue,
concluding that the goal of moral education ought to be building up our modular virtues into
more global ones (2006, p. 126).
A further result is that we need more than experience, good upbringing, and reflection to
develop a good character. Rachana Kamtekar, for instance, argues that these elements seem to be
inadequate given the failures recorded in the social psychology experiments. As examples,
Kamtekar cites the willingness of participants to administer dangerously high voltage shocks to
learners simply because an experimenter told them they must continue with the experiment and
the seminarians’ rushing past a dangerously ill person to give a lecture. She concludes that the
evidence indicates our need to focus not only on the “foreground” of intellect and will, but on the
“background” of decision-making – those processes that affect our decisions and behavior
automatically and unconsciously (Kamtekar, 2010, p. 155). Kamtekar worries, however, that
focusing on correcting biases will lead to the development of a neurotic personality (p. 156).
What I have shown through a close examination of the ordinary person in Aristotle’s works,
however, is that it is no threat to virtue if it is one’s social or political circumstances and
situations that correct for one’s biases rather than his or her individual effort. If, for example, the
evidence indicates that it is opportunity and not character that is more responsible for a person’s
attempting suicide, eliminating opportunities for suicide, such as placing barriers above the
railing on the Golden Gate Bridge,91 is more effective than urging a suicidal person to reflect on
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See Friend (2003). See also Trout (2010) for an extensive study of the ways we can use what we learn from
cognitive psychologists to build better societies and increase individual well-being through policy changes.

204
whether his decision is too heavily influenced by his circumstances rather than a reflection of his
actual desire to end his life.92 Aristotle’s recognition that the ideal constitution would include
policies aimed at preventing bad behavior in fully virtuous citizens as well as his discussion of
the modest virtues of the middle class both indicate the large extent a person’s social and
political circumstances play in her virtuous character without concluding that the dependence on
circumstances undermines autonomy or virtue. Since Aristotle thinks that a good life requires not
just individual virtue, but living in a good community with others, we also know that bettering
our characters will involve bettering our circumstances. Recent work in psychology has provided
evidence that is consistent with the Aristotelian view that our circumstances have a significant
impact on our characters and choices. Though most of the time, one’s character is a fragmented
set of local traits, or global only if we consider the psychologically salient features of one’s
situation, it is still a character to the extent that it includes dispositions to act in predictable ways.
The further task for moral psychologists is to use what we know about the role of situational cues
in moral behavior in order to inform policies aimed at developing and maintaining virtuous
citizens.
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Encouraging efforts to eliminate opportunities for suicide does not mean that we must ignore appeals to the
individual’s intellect and will, but only that these may need supplementing or buttressing in cases where there is
clear evidence they are overall insufficient to prevent behavior that is contrary to one’s well-being. In the case of
suicide prevention, therapy and other treatment would remain as important measures to prevent suicide. They would
simply be supplemented by other measures aimed at eliminating opportunity for suicide.

CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
There are many significant factors, such as one’s natural temperaments and upbringing,
that are outside of one’s control and affect one’s character. This calls into question one’s
responsibility for one’s character, and if we are not responsible for our characters, then it seems
we cannot be held responsible for the many actions that stem from them.
In the preceding chapters, I have presented an argument that shows how a person can be
responsible for her character and actions stemming from it despite the pervasiveness of character
luck. To do this, I have constructed an account of character and responsibility from various
passages in Aristotle’s EN, Rhetoric, and Politics. The latter two texts take into consideration the
ordinary citizen who has not been met with good character luck, and they teach us much
concerning the way contingent factors like one’s natural temperament or upbringing can affect
one’s character and actions springing from it. I have argued that we can construct an account of
responsibility from Aristotle’s empirically-grounded texts, the Rhetoric and Politics, that is
broader than the standard account taken from the EN since it does not assume ideal conditions
surrounding one’s character development and maintenance. This view of responsibility takes into
account not only control and moral awareness, but also one’s capacity to develop virtue and
perform virtuous actions. This capacity can be affected by one’s natural temperaments,
upbringing, or circumstances that make it either easier or more difficult to develop virtue or
perform virtuous actions. I finally have shown how the account of the character of ordinary

205

206
people in Aristotle is consistent with contemporary findings in contemporary social psychology.
The work that has gone into this dissertation has resulted in several significant findings.
In chapter two, I argued for three important conclusions concerning luck and moral luck. First, I
have argued that lack of control and significance are necessary conditions for luck. My view
refines and improves the vague notion of control assumed in the moral luck literature. For while
most scholars simply identify control with the exercise of effective control, one scholar,
Broncano-Berrocal, rightly acknowledges the epistemic aspect of control. I have refined this
epistemic aspect in order to reflect the kind of epistemic control a person can exercise in relation
to an event when she is able to make predictions or plans with respect to it.
Second, I argued that moral luck is a distinct type of luck since it related to responsibility.
Many scholars, especially Stephen Hales, have argued that paradigmatic cases of moral luck
cannot be accounted for under any of the general theories of luck. This problem is solved if we
consider that moral luck is a special kind of luck since it involves what an agent can reasonably
be expected to predict. In other words, moral luck is perspectival; it considers the perspective of
the agent who makes plans or predictions in relation to some event or circumstances and who
rarely operates with full knowledge. So while an event might have been likely to occur, it still
may be a matter of luck relative to what an agent could have reasonably been expected to know.
Third, I have shown how character luck is a special type of moral luck since it involves
fortune with respect to one’s natural temperaments and social inheritances. Some instances of
luck include those events that are unpredictable, which leaves a person unable to plan in relation
to them. By contrast, the general conditions surrounding one’s life, such as one’s natural
temperaments or social inheritances, are not matters where one is totally unable to make plans or
predications. While we cannot predict or choose which temperaments or social inheritances with
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which we will be born or which will develop over time on their own, we can make plans in
relation to them. For example, knowing that one is naturally shy can help a person develop a prosocial virtue by pushing her to overcome her shyness when it comes to certain virtuous acts.
Further, it may be predictable which temperaments develop as we age and so a person can
develop virtue in a way that will offset the physical changes that occur over time. Since these
cases are ones that are not outside of one’s epistemic control, i.e., one can make plans with
respect to them, they are matters of fortune, not luck. Still, the various ways one’s natural
temperaments and social inheritances can interact are not as predictable. So, the interaction
between one’s natural temperaments and social inheritances is a matter of character luck.
In chapters three, four, and five, I compared the EN account of character and
responsibility to his Rhetoric and Politics, finding evidence for a view of character and
responsibility that is more empirically adequate and that can apply to more people, one that
emphasizes contingent factors such as one’s age or circumstances rather than what is “up to us.”
Since the EN is written for an audience that Aristotle assumes has been met with good moral
luck – they are free, Greek male citizens who are in the best position to become virtuous since
they have the right temperaments and upbringings – he ignores cases where a person may lack
the capacity to become virtuous or whose capacity is limited on account of bad character luck.
By contrast, in the Rhetoric and Politics, his emphasis is on these cases since he is writing about
a more general population. Though Aristotle does not explicitly state his view of character and
responsibility in these texts, I have constructed such a view using pieces from all three texts,
especially the more empirically-grounded texts, i.e., the Rhetoric and Politics. In chapter four, I
focused on the moral luck concerning one’s natural temperaments in the Rhetoric – that is,
temperaments with which one is born or temperaments that develop naturally over time, on
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account of physical changes that take place in relation to age. In chapter five, I focused on the
moral luck concerning one’s social inheritances in both the Rhetoric and Politics, that is, one’s
upbringing, community, and the conventional morality of one’s time. I have argued that, taken
together, the EN, Rhetoric, and Politics develop Aristotle’s view of the character of ordinary
people. This view acknowledges and respects the pervasive role that moral luck plays in the
development and maintenance of character.
As I have gathered evidence about the ordinary person, in chapter four I have also teased
out an account of responsibility that takes into account one’s capacity for developing virtue and
performing virtuous actions. In Aristotle’s descriptive accounts of the various temperaments that
accompany age in the Rhetoric, he uses normative language that indicates a varying level of
responsibility according to age. I have argued that this variation is a function of the amount of
life experience a person has had which affects her access to moral knowledge. For example, an
older person is held more accountable for his behavior than a young person because he should
have known more given his life experience. In some cases, however, one’s life experience is not
enough to develop moral knowledge. Because our understanding requires experience, and our
experience depends on the kind of environment in which we develop, we do not always have
access to those truths on account of unfortunate situational factors. In chapter five, I considered
the effect that one’s circumstances have on one’s character development and maintenance,
showing how Aristotle’s view in the Rhetoric and Politics indicates that one’s community can
impede on one’s moral understanding in a way that limits one’s capacity to develop and maintain
virtue. For example, in both the Rhetoric and Politics, Aristotle mentions that having a lot of
wealth can affect one’s moral awareness since it causes one to base one’s value judgments on
wealth. Further, he claims that having a moderate amount of wealth makes one better able to
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listen to reason because those with too much or too little wealth think about money too much.
These points indicate one’s capacity for virtue, and thus responsibility, can be affected by
circumstances.
In addition to constructing the account of the ordinary person, I have brought together
much evidence in Aristotle that indicates his account of full virtue does not present an impossible
standard. In other words, full virtue as Aristotle describes it is possible for “creatures like us.”
For one, many of his individual definitions of the various virtues are quite narrow, which
contrasts with the claim made by situationists that Aristotle understood the virtues to be global
traits. Thus, his view of the virtues in the EN consistent with the situationist view that traits of
character are narrow. Further, I have also found significant evidence in the Politics that the fully
virtuous person is neither infallible nor the possessor of traits that are independent of his
circumstances. Both of these points are evident in Aristotle’s description of the ideal
constitution. First, he claims that the ideal constitution, which assumes all citizens are fully
virtuous, will include laws to punish those who commit serious offenses, like adultery, an act
which Aristotle claims in the EN a virtuous person should never commit. So, it is not the case
that the fully virtuous person will never err. Second, Aristotle includes provisions for preventing
a fully virtuous person from doing wrong, indicating that full virtue is not only dependent on
good social or political structures to develop but also to be maintained. This is consistent with
the findings in social psychology that a person’s character is situationally sensitive; local traits
depend on particular situations for their stability.
The accounts of character and responsibility I construct are significant in two ways. First,
they are developed to an extent that has not been done before in Aristotelian scholarship. Second,
they show that we can construct an account of character from Aristotle’s empirically-grounded
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texts that is consistent with recent findings in social psychology that a person’s behavior is more
significantly determined by minor situational factors rather than character. For the ordinary
person develops a character that is fragmented and far less stable than a person of full virtue.
This means that her behavior is inconsistent across situations; she will behave virtuously in some
situations, but not other. This is especially the case when there are competing values. For
example, in the chapter on the young person in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, he claims they desire the
noble but are also driven by pleasure. So, they may not always pursue the noble when their
appetites urge them to pursue some pleasure instead. In the empirical literature, this is consistent
with the results from Darley and Batson’s study on seminarians. This study has been critiqued
insofar as it involves competing values rather than failure to express one value in action. In other
words, it was not that the seminarians simply failed to act when a person in need demanded
attention, but that they failed to choose correctly between helping a stranger and making an
appointment. It can be difficult even for the fully virtuous person to juggle competing moral
demands, but it is very difficult for the ordinary person who lacks a unified conception of the
good and she may find herself acting in surprising ways she would not have predicted.
Further, Aristotle’s remarks on the ordinary person in the Rhetoric are consistent with
many studies in social psychology that indicate that mood is a strong determinant for behavior.
In particular, these studies showed a strong correlation between a good mood and helping
behavior. In the opening chapter of book II of the Rhetoric, Aristotle similarly claims that a
person’s mood has a significant effect on her decision-making. For example, he claims that being
in a good mood will make a person more merciful. So he spends the ten chapters that follow
discussing ways in which an orator might arouse certain emotions in order to make his audience
more persuadable. That Aristotle holds this view is quite surprising given the view that is
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traditionally ascribed to him that character is independent of the situation one is in and a larger
determinant of behavior.
My conclusion that Aristotle’s moral theory is empirically adequate is admittedly limited
as I have focused only on the evidence presented by situationists and have only shown that this
evidence is consistent with Aristotle’s view of psychology. Further work would need to be done
to fully establish once and for all that Aristotle’s moral theory is empirically adequate. For
instance, we should go beyond the situationist literature and consider other evidence in
psychology and neuroscience that might be incompatible with Aristotle’s views of human
psychology. Here I have only followed others in focusing on the situationist literature. The
literature outside situationism is certainly vast and so it may be the case that there is evidence in
that other literature that falsifies the account of responsibility I have developed by ruling out the
possibility that humans can develop virtues, even ones that are narrow and situationally
dependent for their development and maintenance. Other evidence may even support hard
determinism. Some versions of virtue ethics will be more vulnerable to empirical findings than
others. Exemplarism is especially vulnerable since it requires there actually exist exemplars of
particular virtues. I have so far only addressed one prominent worry. Looking at other evidence
will be important to do in the future as I continue in this project.
In sum, I have made seven important arguments in this dissertation. First, I have refined
the epistemic aspect of the definition of control which is important for establishing that lack of
control is a necessary condition for luck. Other definitions of control are too limited and do not
show that lack of control is necessary for luck. Second, I have shown how moral luck is distinct
from other types of luck. Third, I have shown how character luck is a unique instance of moral
luck. Fourth, I have developed an empirically adequate account of the character of ordinary
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people from Aristotle’s works. Fifth, I have developed a corresponding account of responsibility
that addresses the problem of character luck. Sixth, I have shown that Aristotle’s account of full
virtue, though difficult to achieve, does not set an unrealistic or impossible standard. Lastly, I
have shown the extent to which the account of ordinary character and actual and modest virtue in
Aristotle is consist with recent findings on character.
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